Opinion
Civil Action 20-cv-02179-RBJ-MEH
11-10-2020
ARTHUR WALKER, Plaintiff, v. KNAPIC, and TRESCH, Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MICHAEL E. HEGARTY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
In his Prisoner Complaint (“Complaint”), ECF 1, Plaintiff Arthur Walker (“Plaintiff”) asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Gerald Knapic and Anthony Tresch (collectively, “Defendants”) in their individual and official capacities. Defendants have filed the present motion to dismiss (“Motion”) pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), seeking partial dismissal of the Complaint. ECF 26. Plaintiff filed a response to the Motion, ECF 37, and further briefing would not materially assist the Court. D.C. Colo. LCivR 7.1(d). The Motion has been referred by Judge R. Brooke Jackson for a recommendation. ECF 27. As set forth below, this Court respectfully recommends granting Defendants' Motion.
Plaintiff's response seems to concern exhaustion of administrative remedies and not Defendants' arguments raised in the Motion.
BACKGROUND
The following are factual allegations (as opposed to legal conclusions, bare assertions, or merely conclusory allegations) made by the Plaintiff in his Complaint, which are taken as true for analysis under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) pursuant to Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002 (10th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff, a pro se prisoner incarcerated at Buena Vista Correctional Complex, alleges that that Defendants violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Compl. at 4. Plaintiff contends that as a result of filing grievances, Defendant Knapic called him racial slurs and placed him in segregation. Id. As to Defendant Tresch, Plaintiff asserts that his request to be transferred to a cell with a white inmate was refused, because Defendant Tresch did not want to place “N****** with good white inmates.” Id. Plaintiff seeks both damages and injunctive relief in the form of a transfer to Arrowhead Correctional Facility. Id. at 8.
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Dismissal Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)
Rule 12(b)(1) empowers a court to dismiss a complaint for “lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is not a judgment on the merits of a plaintiff's case, but only a determination that the court lacks authority to adjudicate the matter. See Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994) (recognizing federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only exercise jurisdiction when specifically authorized to do so). A court lacking jurisdiction “must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceeding in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.” Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss “must be determined from the allegations of fact in the complaint, without regard to mere [conclusory] allegations of jurisdiction.” Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 677 (10th Cir. 1971). The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction. See Basso, 495 F.2d at 909. Accordingly, Plaintiff in this case bears the burden of establishing that this Court has jurisdiction to hear his claims.
Generally, Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction take two forms. Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002 (10th Cir. 1995).
First, a facial attack on the complaint's allegations as to subject matter jurisdiction questions the sufficiency of the complaint. In reviewing a facial attack on the complaint, a district court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true.
Second, a party may go beyond allegations contained in the complaint and challenge the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends. When reviewing a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, a district court may not presume the truthfulness of the complaint's factual allegations. A court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts under Rule 12(b)(1). In such instances, a court's reference to evidence outside the pleadings does not convert the motion to a Rule 56 motion.Id. at 1002-03 (citations omitted). The present Motion is a facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction; therefore, the Court will accept the truthfulness of the Complaint's factual allegations.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants for alleged violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants seek partial dismissal of the Complaint, raising two issues of subject matter jurisdiction. First, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim for damages against Defendants in their official capacities based on the Eleventh Amendment. Second, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief against Defendants in their individual capacities. For the reasons set forth below, the Court respectfully recommends dismissal without prejudice of the damages claims against Defendants in their official capacities and the injunctive relief claims against them in their individual capacities.
I. Sovereign Immunity
Defendants assert that Plaintiff's claim against them in their official capacities for damages is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Mot. at 3.
Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court has “consistently held that a[] [non-]consenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-663 (1974); see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (“[A]bsent waiver by the State or valid congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a State in federal court.”). “[W]hen the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants.” Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 281, 277 (1997) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459 (1945)). “Thus, the Eleventh Amendment bars a suit brought in federal court by the citizens of a state against the state or its agencies.” Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1552 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted). This immunity applies to Section 1983 suits. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 335 (1979) (“[Section] 1983 does not explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States.”).
Plaintiff requests $750,000 from each Defendant. ECF 1 at 8. Plaintiff also indicates that he is suing Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. Id. Defendants are state officials; accordingly, the Court must treat a suit against them in their official capacities as a suit against the state itself. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (“Suits against state officials in their official capacity . . . should be treated as suits against the State.”). Based on the Eleventh Amendment and as undisputed by Plaintiff, the state is immune from such suits, and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's damages claims against Defendants in their official capacities. Fent v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 235 F.3d 553, 559 (10th Cir. 2000) (Eleventh Amendment “immunity constitutes a bar to the exercise of federal subject matter jurisdiction.”). This Court respectfully recommends that the Motion be granted with respect to the damages claims against Defendants in their official capacities.
II. Injunctive Relief
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff's injunctive relief claim against them in their individual capacities should be dismissed. Mot. at 4. Plaintiff indicates in his Complaint that he is suing “all named Defendants for temporary injunctions” and requesting a transfer to Arrowhead Correctional Facility. Compl. at 8. “Section 1983 plaintiffs may sue individual-capacity defendants only for money damages and official-capacity defendants only for injunctive relief.” Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1161 n.5 (10th Cir. 2011). Consequently, Plaintiff may properly bring an injunctive relief claim against Defendants in their official capacities but not their individual capacities. Therefore, this Court respectfully recommends granting the Motion with respect to the individual capacity claim for injunctive relief.
III. Leave to Amend
Generally, in a case involving a pro se litigant, the Tenth Circuit has held that if “it is at all possible that the party against whom the dismissal is directed can correct the defect in the pleading or state a claim for relief, the court should dismiss with leave to amend.” Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124, 126 (10th Cir. 1990). “Particularly where deficiencies in a complaint are attributable to oversights likely the result of an untutored pro se litigant's ignorance of special pleading requirements, dismissal of the complaint without prejudice is preferable.” Id. However, in this case, the Court is recommending dismissal of some of Plaintiff s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This is not a case in which Plaintiff can cure deficiencies through an amendment of his Complaint. Accordingly, this Court recommends that the Motion be granted and Plaintiff not be permitted to amend on these claims.
CONCLUSION
The Court respectfully recommends GRANTING Defendants' Motion [filed October 20, 2020; ECF 26] as follows: dismiss without prejudice the official capacity claims for damages and the individual capacity claims for injunctive relief pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). In doing so, Plaintiffs official capacity claims for injunctive relief and individual capacity claims for damages will proceed.
Be advised that all parties shall have fourteen (14) days after service hereof to serve and file any written objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is assigned. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. The party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive or general objections. A party's failure to file such written objections to proposed findings and recommendations contained in this report may bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Judge of the proposed findings and recommendations. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676-83 (1980); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Additionally, the failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy may bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted or adopted by the District Court. Duffield v. Jackson, 545 F.3d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991)).
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of November, 2020, at Denver, Colorado.