Opinion
23-CV-1430 (LTS)
05-05-2023
CYNTHIA WALKER, Plaintiff, v. ANNE-MARIE JOLLY; LETICIA JAMES; MANHATTAN FAMILY COURT, Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated her federal constitutional rights.Named as Defendants are New York City Family Court Administrative Judge Anne-Marie Jolly; the Manhattan Family Court; and New York State Attorney General Letitia James. By order dated February 23, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees.For the reasons set forth below the Court dismisses the complaint.
Under Rule 5.2(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, court submissions that refer to the name of a minor child must do so by using only the child's name's initials. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 5.2(a)(3). Plaintiff's complaint reveals the full name of a minor child. Thus, in an abundance of caution, the Court has directed the Clerk of Court to restrict electronic access to that submission to a “case participant-only” basis. If Plaintiff refers to a minor child in any future filings, she must comply with Rule 5.2 by referring to any minor child using only that child's initials.
By order dated March 6, 2023, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief. (ECF 5.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated her federal constitutional rights when Plaintiff was prevented from filing a post-judgment motion in a closed family court proceeding.The following allegations are taken from the complaint. “Defendant” refused Plaintiff “access to the courts for the purpose of filing a motion.” (ECF 1, at 1.) Plaintiff states,
Plaintiff does not specify the family court in which she attempted to file the motion. Because she sues the Manhattan Family Court, the Court assumes she attempted to file the motion in that court. However, the Court notes that the filing injunction Plaintiff is challenging was entered by a Kings County Family Court judge, and documents attached to the complaint show that Plaintiff's family court proceedings took place in Kings County Family Court.
Plaintiff does not identify which of the defendants she is referring to here.
Defendant has refused this access, claiming that plaintiff's motion is Res Judicata, and that Pla[i]ntiff must seek leave of court per an order by [Kings County Family Court Judge] Alan Beckoff, and that this order is legal under the laws of New York, in spite of the fact that there is no ‘vexatious litigator' injunction entered against Plaintiff.(Id.)
Plaintiff seeks to file a “1061 motion to vacate,” which she alleges “has never been filed or ruled upon previously.” (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that her motion is not barred by state res judicata doctrine, and she should therefore be able to file it, notwithstanding the leave-to-file order imposed by Judge Beckoff. (Id.)
Plaintiff also accuses Judge Beckoff, who is not a defendant in this action, of fraud in Plaintiff's family court action. She alleges that, in April 2022, Judge Beckoff denied her “well-evidenced Motion to Renew Motion to Dismiss.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff challenges Judge Beckoff's determination that her “caseworker's favorable court report was ‘just hearsay'” because the caseworker's “sworn testimony is not hearsay.” (Id.) Judge Beckoff denied her motions with prejudice “and entered an order barring Plaintiff from submitting further motions.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that the judge's motives were to “conceal his own bad acts” and his “knowing entertainment of a perjured petition.” (Id. at 4-5.)
Plaintiff attaches to the complaint multiple exhibits, including: (1) a 97-page transcript from her Kings County Family Court proceeding (id. at 8-104); (2) letters addressed to Kings County Family Court judges from Plaintiff's mental health care provider regarding Plaintiff's mental health (id. at 105-06); (3) an April 4, 2022, order signed by Judge Beckoff dismissing Plaintiff's order to show cause to vacate an order of another family court judge, which denied Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the amended petition (id. at 109-10); (4) a February 14, 2019, order from Kings County Family Court Judge Erik S. Pitchal denying Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the petition of the Administration for Children and Family Services (id. at 111-13); (5) the petition in Plaintiff's Kings County neglect case (id. at 127-32); and (6) what appear to be other documents that Plaintiff filed in her family court case (id. at 107-08, 114-25). Plaintiff alleges that these attachments show that it is “crystal clear that the caseworker signed amended petition of Dec 6, 2018 - continuing case - knowing that what she alleged was false.” (Id. at 5.)
Plaintiff asserts causes of action under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; “Ex Parte Young”; and fraud.
Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring Judge Jolly and the Manhattan Family Court to “immediately permit plaintiff to file 1061 motion in Manhattan Family Court.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff also seeks “[p]ermanent injunctive declaratory relief,” holding that “New York's use of arbitrary judicial orders barring only some citizens from filing motions in ongoing matters -without even a ‘vexatious litigant' injunction and hearing' [is] completely unconstitutional and void.” (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff seeks “further relief as this court deems just, including dismissal of [the] state court judgment obtained by fraud.” (Id. at 6.)
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asks the Court to vacate a state family court judgment, which appears to include a pre-filing injunction, and to direct a New York State Family Court to accept further filings in her family court action, notwithstanding the filing injunction and the state court's prior decision denying Plaintiff leave to file additional motions. The precise status of Plaintiff's family court action is unclear from the complaint. As discussed below, to the extent Plaintiff is asking the Court to overturn a state court judgment and related state court orders, her claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. To the extent Plaintiff is challenging post-judgment decisions in an ongoing state family court matter, including decisions denying her leave to file additional motions, her claims are barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. Finally, even if the Rooker-Feldman and Younger doctrines did not apply, Plaintiff names improper defendants and defendants who are immune from suit.
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Court understands Plaintiff to be asking the Court to review and overturn the judgment, and possibly other orders, in her state family court case. Congress has vested appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments exclusively with the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257; Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005) ([“Section] 1257, as long interpreted, vests authority to review a state court's judgment solely in this Court....”). A litigant seeking relief from a state court judgment may appeal within the state system and file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Federal district courts, such as this one, lack subject matter jurisdiction to review state court decisions.
Specifically, such claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The doctrine -created by two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983) - precludes federal district courts from reviewing final judgments of the state courts. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284 (holding that federal district courts are barred from deciding cases “brought by statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”); see Harriot v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, No. 16-CV-0211 (GBD), 2016 WL 6561407, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2016) (Under Rooker-Feldman, “federal district courts lack jurisdiction over cases that essentially amount to appeals of state court judgments, including claims that are inextricably intertwined with a prior determination of a state court.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies where the federal-court plaintiff: (1) lost in state court, (2) complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgment, (3) invites the district court to review and reject the state court judgment, and (4) commenced the district court proceedings after the state-court judgment was rendered. Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014).
Here, Plaintiff lost in state court. Her allegations suggest that a New York State Family Court entered a judgment against her and denied her motions to vacate that judgment. Second, Plaintiff complains that the judgment entered against her by the family court was based on “fraud” and her allegations and attached documents suggest that her child was removed from her custody. She also alleges that the family court judge entered an order barring her from filing additional motions challenging that judgment without leave from the court. These injuries are ultimately caused by the state court's judgment. Third, Plaintiff specifically asks the Court to “dismiss[]” the state court judgment. Plaintiff's invitation for the Court to review and reject the state court's judgment is further evidenced by her allegations pertaining to fraud in her family court case and her attachment of extensive transcripts from that action. Finally, although Plaintiff does not provide the dates of the state court judgment, her allegations suggest that she filed this action after judgment was entered in her family court action.
To the extent Plaintiff is asking this Court to review and vacate the judgment of the state family court, the Court dismisses those claims as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Szymonik v. Connecticut, No. 3:18-CV-0263 (MPS), 2019 WL 203117, at 3-5 (D. Conn. Jan. 15, 2019) (plaintiff's constitutional challenge to family court's imposition of leave-to-file injunction barred by Rooker-Feldman doctrine), aff'd on other grounds, 807 Fed.Appx. 97 (2d Cir. 2020).
In her complaint, Plaintiff argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply here, and cites to an unreported case from the United States Court of Appeals from the Sixth Circuit, Evans v. Cordray, 424 Fed.Appx. 537 (6th Cir. 2011). In Evans, the plaintiff sued the Ohio Attorney General and the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that Ohio's vexatious litigation statute was unconstitutional as applied in divorce proceedings. As an initial matter, Evans is an unreported decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and is therefore not binding on this Court. Plaintiff has not provided, and this Court has not found, any analogous Second Circuit precedent. In any event, Evans is distinguishable from the context in which Rooker-Feldman is being applied here. In Evans, a third party - the plaintiffs estranged spouse -filed a counterclaim against him, alleging that he was a vexatious litigator under Ohio's vexatious litigator statute. The state court entered an order under the statute prohibiting Evans from instituting or continuing actions in the Ohio state courts without first obtaining leave. The Sixth Circuit, relying on prior circuit precedent, noted that when the source of an injury is not the state-court judgment, but rather “a third party's actions,” the Rooker-Feldman doctrine will not bar the claim. Evans, 424 Fed.Appx. at 538. The court reasoned that the source of Evans's injury was the allegedly unconstitutional enforcement of Ohio's vexatious litigation statute, employed against him by his estranged wife, and not the state court's decisions denying him leave to proceed. Id. at 540. Here, Plaintiff is not challenging a third party's invocation of a state statute. She instead challenges an individual judge's decision to require leave of the court before filing additional motions in that same action, and she asks the Court to vacate the state family court's judgment.
While the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment in Szymonik, it declined to do so on the basis of Rooker-Feldman. The court of appeals noted that it appeared that some of the state court orders the plaintiff was challenging were issued after he filed the original complaint, and it was therefore unclear whether the federal court proceedings commenced after the challenged state-court judgment was rendered. See Szymonik, 807 Fed.Appx. at 99-100 (stating that the “correct sequencing of events for Rooker-Feldman purposes is unclear at this juncture” and declining to resolve the issue because other grounds support dismissal). Because the challenged judgment in Plaintiff's family court action was rendered before she brought this action, the Second Circuit's concerns in Szymonik do not apply here.
B. Younger Abstention
Plaintiff asks this Court to issue an order directing the state family court to accept Plaintiff's motions challenging the family court's judgment, notwithstanding the family court's prior injunction requiring Plaintiff to obtain leave from the family court before filing additional motions in that action. To the extent that Plaintiff is asking the Court to grant injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to an ongoing family court proceeding, including any ongoing family court post-judgment proceedings, the Court must abstain from hearing those claims under the Younger abstention doctrine. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court may not enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding in the absence of special circumstances suggesting bad faith, harassment, or irreparable injury that is both serious and immediate. See Heicklen v. Morgenthau, 378 Fed.Appx. 1, 2 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1973)).
“A federal court's obligation to hear and decide a case is virtually unflagging,” Sprint Commc' ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013) (quotation marks and citations omitted), and even in the presence of parallel state proceedings, abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the “exception, not the rule.” Id. at 81-82; see also Gentes v. Osten, No. 21-2022, 2022 WL 16984686, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 17, 2022) (where a court has subject matter jurisdiction, “it has a virtually unflagging obligation to exercise that jurisdiction”). Younger abstention is therefore appropriate in only three categories of state court proceedings: (1) state criminal prosecutions; (2) civil enforcement proceedings that are “akin to criminal prosecutions”; and (3) civil proceedings “that implicate a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 72-73.
A “state-initiated proceeding to gain custody of children allegedly abused by their parents” is a civil proceeding akin to a criminal proceeding that comes within the second Sprint category. Id. at 79 (citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 419-420 (1979)); see also Davis v. Baldwin, 594 F. App' x 49, 51 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that the Supreme Court placed “a state-initiated proceeding to gain custody allegedly abused by their parents” in the second Sprint category). Moreover, “the way that New York courts manage their own divorce and custody proceedings [is] a subject which ‘[New York has] an especially strong interest'” for the purposes of the third Sprint category of actions requiring Younger abstention. See Falco v. Justices of the Matrimonial Parts of Sup. Ct. of Suffolk Cnty., 805 F.3d 425, 427-28 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
“[F]ederal courts, including the Supreme Court, have applied the principles of Younger abstention in the context of ongoing post-judgment proceedings in state court.” Sargent v. Emons, No. 3:13-CV-0863 (JBA), 2013 WL 6407718, at *4 (D. Conn. Dec. 9, 2013) (citing cases); see Zahl v. Kosovsky, 471 Fed.Appx. 35, 36 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming district court's decision to apply Younger abstention to the plaintiff's “post-judgment matrimonial action that remained pending when [plaintiff] filed his federal complaint”); Kelly v. New York, No. 19-CV-2063 (JMA) (ARL), 2020 WL 7042764, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020) (refusing under Younger to “interfere in Plaintiff's on-going State Court post-judgment divorce and custody proceedings”).
This Court will not interfere in Plaintiff's ongoing post-judgment proceedings in the family court. The family court's orders that Plaintiff challenges implicate New York's “interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts” and were issued by the family courts “in furtherance of [their] ability to perform their judicial functions.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 72-73, 78; see Bukowski v. Spinner, 709 Fed.Appx. 87, 88 (2d Cir. 2018) (affirming “the dismissal of [plaintiff's] complaint on the ground that federal-court abstention is required under Younger . . . insofar as [plaintiff] seeks declaratory or injunctive relief that would interfere with a ‘[s]tate court's ability to perform its judicial function in . . . [an ongoing] custody proceeding[ ].'” (quoting Falco, 805 F.3d at 425)).
Accordingly, the Court abstains from adjudicating Plaintiff's claims for injunctive or declaratory relief arising from any ongoing post-judgment family court proceedings under the Younger abstention doctrine.
C. Immunities and Improper Defendants
Even if the Court did not dismiss the complaint under the Rooker-Feldman and Younger doctrines, the named defendants are either improper or protected by various immunities.
1. Manhattan Family Court
Manhattan Family Court is not a “person” for purposes of Section 1983 and is therefore not a proper defendant in a Section 1983 action. See Will v. Mich. Dep' t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (state is not a “person” for the purpose of Section 1983 claims); Zuckerman v. Appellate Div., Second Dep't Supreme Court, 421 F.2d 625, 626 (2d Cir. 1970) (court not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983); Whitley v. Westchester Cnty. Corr. Fac. Admin., No. 97-CV-420 (SS), 1997 WL 659100, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1997) (correctional facility or jail not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983).
It is unclear why Plaintiff is suing the Manhattan Family Court. Plaintiff's complaint and the attached documents show that Plaintiff's family court proceedings took place in the Kings County Family Court. She alleges no facts explaining why she is suing the Manhattan Family Court or facts suggesting that any of the events giving rise to her claims arose at the Manhattan Family Court.
Because the Manhattan Family Court is a part of the New York State Unified Court System, Plaintiff's claims against it are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 368 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he New York State Unified Court system is unquestionably an ‘arm of the State,' and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.”) (citation omitted); Murray v. Thompson, No. 17-CV-7004, 2018 WL 5113955, at *
2. Attorney General Letitia James
The Court construes Plaintiff's claims against New York State Attorney General as claims seeking prospective injunctive relief under the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) and its progeny, “sovereign immunity [does] not bar actions seeking only prospective injunctive relief against state officials to prevent a continuing violation of federal law because a state does not have the power to shield its officials by granting them ‘immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.'” In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 411 F.3d 367, 371 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 160). This exception applies only when the state official against whom suit is brought has “some connection with the enforcement of the act that is in continued violation of federal law.” Id. at 372-73 (quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff's claims against James fall outside of the exception in Ex parte Young. Plaintiff alleges that state family court judges entered a pre-filing injunction against her and then prohibited her from filing additional motions. Nowhere in the complaint does Plaintiff allege that James or the New York Attorney General's office took any action to seek or to enforce the court orders that caused her injuries, or that James had the authority to intervene in Plaintiff's family court proceeding.
3. Judge Jolly
Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Judges are also immune from civil rights claims for injunctive relief based on actions taken in their judicial capacities, “unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2018) (a New York Family Court is an arm of the State of New York and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). U.S.C. § 1983. Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “A court's control of its docket is . . . a judicial act because it is part of a court's function of resolving disputes between parties. Mireless, 502 U.S. at 12 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). “Even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Id. (citations omitted). This is because, “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation ....” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994).
Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge takes action “outside” his judicial capacity, or when the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature). But “the scope of [a] judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Judge Jolly acted beyond the scope of her judicial responsibilities or outside her jurisdiction. See Mireles, 509 U.S. at 11-12; Szymonik v. Connecticut, No. 3:18-CV-0263 (MPS), 2019 WL 203117, at *7 (D. Conn. Jan. 15, 2019) (enforcement of pre-filing injunction is judicial in nature (citing Mireless)), aff'd on other grounds, 807 Fed.Appx. 97 (2d Cir. 2020). Plaintiff appears to seek injunctive relief against Judge Jolly, but she does not allege facts suggesting that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Declaratory relief against a judge for actions taken within her judicial capacity is ordinarily available by appealing the judge's order. See Salem v. Paroli, 260 B.R. 246, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing Section 1983 claim for injunctive relief because declaratory relief was available through appeal in state court); LeDuc v. Tilley, No. 3:05-CV-0157 (MRK), 2005 WL 1475334, at *7 (D. Ct. June 22, 2005) (same). Here, Plaintiff has alleged no facts suggesting that she was unable to appeal any decision made by Judge Jolly. Because Plaintiff has not alleged facts suggesting that Judge Jolly violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable, Section 1983 precludes any award of injunctive relief against this defendant.
D. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Plaintiff attempts to assert claims of fraud, which arise under state law. A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). Having dismissed the federal claims of which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.'”) (quoting City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997)).
E. Leave to Amend is Denied
District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Because the defects in Plaintiff's complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses the complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3), and under the Younger abstention doctrine.
The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in this action.
SO ORDERED.