This statute has been held to be a penal statute that must be strictly construed. Walker v. Dugger, 1962 OK 88, ¶ 13, 371 P.2d 910, 913; Walker v. Duncan, 1970 OK 86, ¶ 24, 469 P.2d 647, 650. Accordingly, the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 12 O.S. Supp.2005 § 95(4) is applicable.

While more specific and detailed findings would have been helpful in resolving the issues raised on this appeal, the finding by the trial court is sufficient to provide the losing party the basis for an appeal on that issue. Moore v. Cavett, Okla., 368 P.2d 224; Walker v. Duncan, Okla., 469 P.2d 647. Moreover, we note that more specific findings were not requested by appellants even after the trial court made specific inquiry concerning the sufficiency of the finding. By failing to call any omission to the trial court's attention, the right to question the sufficiency of the findings was waived.

In reviewing the action of the trial court, we first take note of the test to be applied when reviewing a judgment of a trial court in an action of legal cognizance tried without a jury. In a court tried action of legal cognizance, the judgment and the underlying findings on issues of fact have the same effect as a verdict of a properly instructed jury, and will not be disturbed on appeal if there is any evidence reasonably tending to support them. Walker v. Duncan, Okla., 469 P.2d 647 (1970); and Sparks v. Midland Supply Company, Okla., 339 P.2d 1056 (1959). After examining the evidence before the trial court, we hold that the record did contain evidence reasonably tending to support a finding that the implied warranty of habitability was breached.

"This Court in reviewing a judgment entered upon [a] jury's verdict must presume that the jury accepted as true the evidence which supports [the] verdict." The same rules of review are applicable in a civil action where the jury is waived and the trial judge is the trier of fact. E. g., Walker v. Duncan, Okla., 469 P.2d 647 (1970) and Givens v. Western Paving Co., Okla., 261 P.2d 450 (1953). In the case now before us, under the above rule, we must assume that the trier of fact, the trial judge, accepted as true, evidence which would support his verdict.

In a jury action of legal cognizance, judgment will not be disturbed in absence of legal errors, if there is any competent evidence tending to support the trial court's decision. Walker v. Duncan, Okla., 469 P.2d 647; Mid-Continent Casualty Company v. Grimes, Okla., 470 P.2d 1003. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

¶ 5 Oklahoma courts have long held that § 15 is a penal statute and that it must be strictly construed, which as applied to § 15, means refusing to extend the law by implication or equitable considerations and confining its operations to cases clearly within the letter of the statute, as well as within its spirit or reason. Walker v. Duncan, 1970 OK 86, 469 P.2d 647; Walker v. Bugger, 1962 OK 88, 371 P.2d 910; Bullington v. Lowe, 1923 OK 978, 221 P. 502; Arnold v. Leader Federal Bank for Savings, 2001 OK CIV APP 139, 37 P.3d 960. The remedy and measure of damages provided by § 15 for failing to release a mortgage is exclusive. Pittsburg Mortgage Investment Company v. Cook, 1931 OK 447, 1 P.2d 665. ¶ 6 Landowners do not argue § 15 is ambiguous or explain why we should extend § 15 to any document other than the one to which it expressly refers-"mortgage on real estate.

In a case tried to the court, the trial judge's decision on a question of fact is entitled to the same deference accorded a verdict of a jury, and it will not be reversed if there is any evidence reasonably supporting that decision. Walker v. Duncan, 469 P.2d 647 (Okla. 1970). The trial court's finding of negligence by CIG is reasonably supported by the evidence.

Two of the cases it relies on turn on the conclusion that a party plaintiff who possesses no cause of action has no capacity to bring a lawsuit. See Walker v. Duncan, 469 P.2d 647 (Okla. 1970); Frisco Lumber Co. v. Waldock, 71 Okla. 197, 176 P. 220 (1918). The third case — Carraco Oil Co. v. Roberts, 397 P.2d 126 (Okla.

Furthermore, when the court tries the facts it has a legal duty to reach its judgment only on sufficient evidence and the mere submission of the issue to the court raises the question of sufficiency necessarily and automatically. In Wilcox Oil Co. v. Lawson, Okla., 301 P.2d 686 (1956) and Walker v. Duncan, Okla., 469 P.2d 647 (1970), the Supreme Court made it clear that the sufficiency of the evidence could be raised by a motion for new trial in the absence of a demurrer to the evidence or a motion for a directed verdict where a legal action was tried to the court. Since a motion for new trial is not necessary to preserve issues for appeal, 12 O.S. 1971 § 991[ 12-991], we believe we have ample authority to consider the sufficiency of the evidence in this case.

It is basic and fundamental in all appeals that the District Court's findings of fact in matters of legal cognizance are entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict and should not be set aside if there is any competent evidence which reasonably tends to support the decision. Walker v. Duncan, 469 P.2d 647 (Okla. 1970) and Nikkel v. Stifel, Nicolaus Co., Inc., 542 P.2d 1305 (Okla. 1975).