Opinion
No. X01 CV 05 4006649S
June 21, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BACKSTORY
The defendant, Connecticut General Life Insurance Company (CIGNA), is a duly constituted corporation transacting business within the state of Connecticut with an office at 900 Cottage Grove Road in Bloomfield, Connecticut.
From June 21, 1976 to March 31, 2005, the plaintiff, Jean H. Walker, was employed by CIGNA in a variety of positions, including Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of CIGNA Retirement and Investment Services (CR IS), a position she held from on or about 2001 to March 31, 2005.
As CFO of CR IS, the plaintiff's duties consisted of management of financial reporting and accounting, internal controls, risk management, strategy and business planning, and pricing of products for the retirement and investment businesses of CIGNA.
The plaintiff's compensation consisted of a base salary, an annual bonus opportunity, restricted stock grants and options, and Strategic Performance Units (SPUs). SPUs are an internal equity plan paid each year based upon three years of business performance. Annual bonuses are paid in March of the following year while SPUs are paid out in May of the following year.
CIGNA employs Annual Performance Objectives (APOs), which are created each December for use in the following year.
CIGNA begins the process of reviewing executive performance and compensation arrangements each December.
On or about September 2002, and again in 2003, CIGNA experienced downgrades in its insurance ratings from ratings agencies.
Beginning on or about the late spring or early summer of 2003, CIGNA began to consider and explore the sale of CR IS' assets to a third-party buyer.
The plaintiff argues that from the inception of its consideration of the sale of CR IS, CIGNA anticipated, expected and knew that it would exclude the plaintiff from employment with the third-party buyer during the period of divestiture and transition of CR IS' assets to the buyer because, the plaintiff argues, she had knowledge critical to its efforts to market and divest CR IS' assets.
Beginning on or about July 2003, CIGNA began formal efforts to market and sell the assets of CR IS. Ultimately, in November 2003, CR IS was purchased by Prudential Financial (Prudential).
On or about July 25, 2003, CIGNA issued to the plaintiff a letter laying out a "special arrangement" for employment and compensation during the period of the marketing and sale of CR IS' assets. (Letter from John Kim to Jean Walker dated July 25, 2003, hereinafter "Retention Agreement," plaintiff's exh. 8.)
The Retention Agreement states, in part, that the plaintiff would be paid a retention bonus of cash and stock "if all of the following conditions are met.
You must remain continuously employed by CR IS or the buyer through the earlier of:
Three months following the date of the closing of the sale (the Closing) of all or substantially all of CR IS' assets (the Transaction); or July 23, 2006.
Or, you are not employed by CIGNA or the buyer immediately after the Closing because CIGNA and the buyer fail to offer you a Suitable Position. You must not be formally affiliated in any way with the buyer before a definitive agreement to enter into the Transaction is executed."
The Retention Agreement further states with respect to the retention bonus "[i]f neither CIGNA nor the buyer offer you a Suitable Position (see below) upon the Closing, the payment of cash and vesting of shares will occur within 30 days after the Closing."
The Retention Agreement also provides for the payment of a guaranteed annual bonus which is earned if "you [are] continuously employed by CIGNA or the buyer through March, 2004."
The Retention Agreement states that severance benefits are triggered "if you are not employed by CIGNA or the buyer after the Closing and you have not been offered a Suitable Position upon the Closing by CIGNA or the buyer."
Among other things, "[a] Suitable Position is one that, in the opinion of CIGNA management. . . offers a base salary and bonus opportunity that is no less than your current base salary and target bonus amount. . ."
The plaintiff argues that at the time that CIGNA issued to the plaintiff the Retention Agreement, CIGNA failed to disclose to her that she was anticipated to be, expected to be or would be excluded by CIGNA from employment with the buyer during the marketing and sale of CR IS' assets.
On or about August 11, 2003, the plaintiff executed and agreed to the terms of the Retention Agreement, believing, she argues, that she was entitled to seek employment with a buyer of CR IS. (Deposition of plaintiff, plaintiff's exh. 4, p. 48-54.)
From on or about 1991 to on or about January 2004, Tina Yablonski was employed by CIGNA as a vice president of human resources — finance. In this capacity, Yablonski was responsible for human resources and employee relations, including succession planning; new job creation and transfers; and career planning and performance feedback for financial executives, including the plaintiff. Following Yablonski's retirement from CIGNA, Clem Cheng assumed responsibility for human resources and employee relations, including those related to the career and employment of the plaintiff.
From on or about 2002 until at least January 23, 2007, Michael Bell has been employed by CIGNA as executive vice president and chief financial officer of the CIGNA Corporation, with responsibility for the financial results of all the businesses of CIGNA, including CR IS. He was the plaintiff's direct supervisor beginning on or about March 2004. (Affidavit of plaintiff, exh. 3, ¶ 9.) On or about October 2003, Yablonski, at the request of Bell, met with the plaintiff to inform her of CIGNA's refusal to permit the plaintiff to seek employment with the buyer and of CIGNA's offer of employment options following the transition and divestiture of CR IS' assets, (Affidavit of plaintiff, exh. 3, ¶ 10.) The plaintiff maintains that the three positions discussed with the plaintiff by Yablonski were chief financial officer of CIGNA Healthcare, senior vice president of runoff reinsurance, and head of internal audit.
The plaintiff argues that in reliance upon CIGNA's representations, she agreed to forego both her departure from CIGNA and her opportunity to seek employment with the buyer.
In November 2003, CIGNA entered into a formal agreement with Prudential for the sale of CR IS' assets for $2.1 billion.
On or about December 18, 2003, CIGNA, issued a corporate-wide e-mail stating, among other things, that "Jean [Walker] will be working closely with us on transition issues and — at some point still to be determined will move to a new position within the financial organization of CIGNA." (E-mail from Grace M. Papapietro to plaintiff, dated December 18, 2003, plaintiff's exh. 10.)
The plaintiff agues that in reliance upon the representations made by CIGNA, she rebuffed in 2003 and 2004 advances by other companies, including the Hartford and ING, to hire her away from CIGNA. (Deposition of plaintiff, plaintiff's exh. 4, p. 188, 193-96, 238.)
On or about March 31, 2004, CIGNA and Prudential closed on the sale of CR IS' assets for $2.1 billion. (Affidavit of plaintiff, plaintiff's exh. 3, ¶¶ 19, 21.)
On or about November 2004, following the completion of the post-closing audit period which freed from further audit claims the $2.1 billion paid by Prudential for CR IS' assets, the plaintiff completed her post-divesture duties. (Affidavit of plaintiff, plaintiff's exh. 3, ¶ 29; deposition of plaintiff, plaintiff's exh. 4, p. 113-14.)
On or about February 25, 2005, the plaintiff was terminated effective March 31, 2005, without receiving any offer of employment from CIGNA, including any one of the three positions, that according to the plaintiff, were promised to her in October 2003. (Affidavit of plaintiff, plaintiff's exh. 3, ¶ 41.)
The plaintiff argues that at no time prior to her termination did CIGNA take any steps consistent with a meaningful effort to employ her.
On or about February 25, 2005, CIGNA proffered to the plaintiff a severance, which the plaintiff alleges differed markedly from those provided to other comparable executives. (Affidavit of plaintiff, plaintiff's exh. 3, ¶¶ 44-51.)
The operative complaint, the amended complaint filed on May 11, 2006, consists of five counts:
count one — breach of contract;
count two — breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing;
count three — intentional misrepresentation/nondisclosure;
count four — negligent misrepresentation/nondisclosure; and
count five — promissory estoppel.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
CIGNA's motion for summary judgment was filed on November 29, 2006, and the operative memorandum in support thereof was filed on January 12, 2007. The operative memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment was filed by the plaintiff on January 23, 2007. CIGNA filed its reply brief on February 9, 2007. Oral argument was heard on March 12, 2007.
APPLICABLE LAW
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brown v. Soh, 280 Conn. 494, 500-01, 909 A.2d 43 (2006). "The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318, 901 A.2d 1207 (2006). "[T]he party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. . . A material fact. . . [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case. . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deming v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 279 Conn. 745, 757, 905 A.2d 623 (2006). "[A]lthough the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact. . . a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue. . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact. . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court [in support of a motion for summary judgment]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schilberg Integrated Metals Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 263 Conn. 245, 252-53, 819 A.2d 773 (2003). "[T]he existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counteraffidavits and concrete evidence. . ." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Little v. Yale University, 92 Conn.App. 232, 235, 884 A.2d 427 (2005), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 936, 891 A.2d 1 (2006).
"In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must decide whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. If there are issues of fact, the court may not resolve them without giving the parties a full hearing." Gould v. Mellick Sexton, 66 Conn.App. 542, 556, 785 A.2d 265 (2001), rev'd on other grounds, 263 Conn. 140, 819 A.2d 216 (2003). Summary judgment "is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003). "The test is whether the party moving for summary judgment would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts. . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neuhaus v. Decholnoky, 280 Conn. 190, 199, 905 A.2d 1135 (2006). "[A] directed verdict may be rendered only where, on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the trier of fact could not reasonably reach any other conclusion than that embodied in the verdict as directed." (Emphasis added.) Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., supra, 815.
Count One — Breach of Contract
CIGNA seeks summary judgment as to count one of the plaintiff's amended complaint. CIGNA makes the following arguments in support of its motion for summary judgment as to count one: (1) the Retention Letter is clear on its face; (2) there was no modification of the Retention Letter; and (3) CIGNA provided all of the benefits promised under the Retention Letter.
The plaintiff makes the following assertions in opposition to the motion for summary judgment as to count one: (1) CIGNA breached the express terms of the Retention Letter by precluding the plaintiff's employment with the buyer; (2) the Retention Letter was modified to promise the plaintiff other employment with CIGNA and this modification was supported by ample consideration; and (3) CIGNA failed to pay the plaintiff "standard" severance as provided for in the Retention Letter.
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges in ¶ 17 of count one of the amended complaint that CIGNA breached the Retention Letter by proposing to her a severance package which was "not the `standard severance available to other CIGNA senior managers at [her] level' in 2003 and/or 2004 and [was] not the same as the severance offered to other CIGNA senior managers in 2003 and/or 2004." CIGNA's position is that it did not breach the Retention Letter by offering the plaintiff the severance package that it did as the proposed severance package was "standard." In its memorandum in support of the motion for summary judgment, CIGNA contends that the plaintiff's severance package was "near the very top of what was offered to other comparable managers." In its memorandum in support of the motion for summary judgment, Cigna also maintains that "it is uncontested that CIGNA's human resources personnel calculated Walker's severance package using the identical spreadsheet, and applying the identical factors to calculate payment, as was used for every other senior manager terminated during the relevant timeframe." CIGNA further asserts in footnote 4 in its reply brief that "as a promise to be eligible for standard severance, the Retention Agreement did not even promise severance at all, much less a severance amount." (Emphasis in original.)
"Whether a contract has been breached ordinarily is a question of fact. . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lydall, Inc. v. Ruschmeyer, 282 Conn. 209, 242, 919 A.2d 421 (2007). "A motion for summary judgment is properly granted only where no genuine issue of fact exists." Avon Meadow Condominium Ass'n., Inc. v. Bank of Boston Connecticut, 50 Conn.App. 688, 696, 719 A.2d 66, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 946, 723 A.2d 320 (1998). Here, at a minimum, there is an issue of fact as to whether CIGNA breached the Retention Letter by not offering the plaintiff a "standard" severance package upon her termination. Therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate. CIGNA's motion for summary judgment as to count one is denied.
Count Two — Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
"Every contract carries an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requiring that neither party do anything that will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gaudio v. Griffin Health Services Corp., 249 Conn. 523, 564, 733 A.2d 197 (1999). "Absent allegations and evidence of a dishonest purpose or sinister motive, a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is legally insufficient." Alexandru v. Strong, 81 Conn.App. 68, 81, 837 A.2d 875, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 906, 845 A.2d 406 (2004). "Bad faith in general implies both actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive. . . Bad faith means more than mere negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) De La Concha of Hartford, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 269 Conn. 424, 433, 840 A.2d 382 (2004). "A mere conclusory allegation of bad faith unsupported by any factual allegations, is insufficient to sustain a claim of bad faith." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ackiefi v. Bloomfield, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury, Docket No. X01 CV 01 4005253 (February 9, 2007, Cremins, J.).
The court finds that the plaintiff's allegations do not support a bad faith claim. Differences in the parties' interpretations of a contract do not amount to bad faith conduct. The court fails to see how CIGNA's alleged acts can be looked upon as signifying a dishonest purpose. The plaintiff has, at most, alleged sufficient facts for an action sounding in breach of contract, but not for an action sounding in the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
CIGNA's motion for summary judgment as to count two for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is granted.
Count Three — Intentional Misrepresentation
"Intentional misrepresentation is synonymous with fraudulent misrepresentation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Heller v. LaPorte Associates, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. CV 02 0079784 (November 10, 2003, Scholl, J.). "The essential elements of a cause of action in [fraudulent misrepresentation] are: (1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) it was made to induce the other party to act upon it; and (4) the other party did so act upon the false representation to his injury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Phillips v. Phillips, 101 Conn.App. 65, 71 (2007). "In order to prevail in a claim of fraudulent or intentional misrepresentation, the Plaintiff must establish fraud. This must be done by clear and convincing evidence. Bruneau v. W. W. Transportation Co., 138 Conn. 179, 182 [ 82 A.2d 923] (1951)." Hrostek v. Massey, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 03 0407894 (May 25, 2007, Radcliffe, J.).
A review of the allegations of the third count of the complaint reveals that the allegations, at most, support a claim of negligent, rather than intentional, misrepresentation. Even if one views the allegations as setting forth a claim of intentional misrepresentation, the evidence submitted to the court in opposition to CIGNA's motion for summary judgment does not support such a cause of action. In support of her memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff submits her own affidavit which, as indicated above, would support, at most, a claim of negligent, not intentional, misrepresentation.
The facts of this case do not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence of intent on the part of CIGNA to commit a fraud upon the plaintiff. Here, the evidence presented by the plaintiff in opposition to the motion for summary judgment is insufficient to raise an issue of material fact as to whether CIGNA engaged in intentional misrepresentation. At most; the evidence raises an issue as to whether there was negligent misrepresentation. There being insufficient proof of any intentional misrepresentation, CIGNA's motion for summary judgment is granted as to the third count of the amended complaint.
Count Four — Negligent Misrepresentation
In count four, the plaintiff alleges a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, stating in her amended complaint that the "nondisclosures and/or representations on the part of the Defendant concerned material facts, and which were false and/or misleading, upon which Plaintiff reasonably relied to her detriment, and in making those representations or nondisclosures, Defendant did not exercise reasonable care or competence. . ."
"[Our Supreme Court] has long recognized liability for negligent misrepresentation. [The court has] held that even an innocent misrepresentation of fact may be actionable if the declarant has the means of knowing, ought to know, or has the duty of knowing the truth. . . The governing principles are set forth in similar terms in § 552 of the Restatement Second of Torts [1979]: One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment. . . supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) CT Page 11204 Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc., 274 Conn. 33, 72-73, 873 A.2d 929 (2005); see also Richard v. A. Waldman Sons, Inc., 155 Conn. 343, 346, 232 A.2d 307 (1967).
"Traditionally, an action for negligent misrepresentation requires the plaintiff to establish (1) that the defendant made a misrepresentation of fact (2) that the defendant knew or should have known was false, and (3) that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation, and (4) suffered pecuniary harm as a result." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nazami v. Patrons Mutual Ins. Co., 280 Conn. 619, 626, 910 A.2d 209 (2006). "Unlike a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, the standard of proof for a negligent misrepresentation claim is that of a preponderance of the evidence. Rego v. Connecticut Ins. Placement Facility, 22 Conn.App. 428, 430, 577 A.2d 1105 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 219 Conn. 339, 593 A.2d 491 (1991)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnnycake Mountain Associates v. Ochs, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 03 0524226 (January 18, 2006, Shaban, J.). "For purposes of a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. . . the plaintiff need not prove that the representations made by the defendants were promissory. It is sufficient to allege that the representations contained false information." (Emphasis added.) D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors, 202 Conn. 206, 218, 520 A.2d 217 (1987). "There must be a justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation. . . to recover damages." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mips v. Becon, Inc., 70 Conn.App. 556, 558, 799 A.2d 1093 (2002).
In the present case, the gravamen of the plaintiff's allegation of negligent misrepresentation is that CIGNA made representations to the plaintiff when, in fact, CIGNA knew or should have known that the representations were false. As previously discussed, the plaintiff must present sufficient facts to demonstrate a misstatement by CIGNA and the plaintiff's justifiable reliance on the misstatement.
"The tort of innocent misrepresentation is grounded in the theory `that the defendant is chargeable with deceit when he makes an unqualified assertion of a fact that is susceptible of knowledge, and the assertion turns out to be untrue.' Alfred Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 690 (1973)." Bassetti v. East Haven Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket Nos. 410872, 410873, 410874 (June 19, 2001, Blue, J.). " D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors, supra, establishes that misrepresentation of future plans can amount, under appropriate circumstances, to the tort of negligent misrepresentation." Bassetti v. East Haven Board of Education, supra, Superior Court, Docket Nos. 410872, 410873, 410874. D'Ulisse-Cupo involved a representation that the defendant school authorities allegedly made to the plaintiff teacher, Marie D'Ulisse-Cupo. D'Ulisse Cupo alleged "that the defendants made unconditional representations of their plans to rehire the plaintiff, when in fact the defendants knew or should have known that hiring plans would be contingent upon student enrollment levels for the following year." D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors, supra, 202 Conn. 218. D'Ulisse-Cupo's allegations were held to be legally sufficient to withstand a motion to strike her cause of action sounding in negligent misrepresentation. The D'Ulisse-Cupo court stated that in pleading the tort of negligent misrepresentation "[i]t is sufficient to allege that the representations contained false information." Id. "[The D'Ulisse-Cupo] holding is in keeping with the very well established proposition that a negligent statement may, in certain circumstances, render the person making the statement liable for the economic loss by his negligence. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (Cardozo, J.)." Bassetti v. East Haven Board of Education, supra, Superior Court, Docket Nos. 410872, 410873, 410874.
Although the question is a close one, the plaintiff has asserted sufficient evidence to permit her claim of negligent misrepresentation to give rise to a genuine issue of material fact on this issue. The factual question is what Yablonski and Bell told the plaintiff. The plaintiff's affidavit submitted to the court states the following: "On or about October, 2003, Ms. Yablonski met with me. She told me that she was doing so at the request of Michael Bell. She told me that CIGNA was refusing to let me seek employment with the buyer. She told me that she wanted to discuss with me CIGNA's offer for options following the transition and divestiture of CR IS' assets." (Affidavit of plaintiff, plaintiff's exh. 3, ¶ 10.) In the affidavit, it is further stated: "When Ms. Yablonski first informed me in October, 2003 that CIGNA was going to prevent me from working for the buyer, I [the plaintiff] insisted on preserving my options. I told her that I wanted the option to seek such employment. Ms. Yablonski told me that CIGNA would not allow it but that she had been sent to ensure that if I remained with CIGNA that it would agree to place me in one of three specific roles upon completion of the transition and divestiture with CR IS. . .
"Ms. Yablonski discussed with me three positions, Chief Financial Officer, CIGNA Healthcare, Senior Vice President — Runoff Reinsurance and Head of Internal Audit." (Affidavit of plaintiff, plaintiff's exh. 3, ¶¶ 12, 13.) In addition, the following is stated in the affidavit: "Following that meeting with Ms. Yablonski, I [the plaintiff] spoke directly to Mr. Bell in late October or early November, 2003. During that conversation, Mr. Bell told me that he had followed up with Ms. Yablonski. He said that he agreed that the three roles identified by Ms. Yablonski were suitable for me after the divestiture of CR IS. . ."
* * *
Mr. Bell promised that he would place me in one of the three jobs. . . (Affidavit of plaintiff, plaintiff's exh. 3, ¶¶ 15, 17.)
CIGNA points to the deposition testimony, which is not as specific as the statement in the affidavit referenced above. (Deposition of plaintiff, plaintiff's exh. 4, p. 77-80.)
Before the court can reach the issue of whether CIGNA is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff's claim of negligent misrepresentation, it must determine, as a threshold matter, what representations were made by Yablonski and Bell to the plaintiff. Based on the evidence presented by the parties, a question of fact exists as to what representations were made by Yablonski and Bell to the plaintiff. "A resolution of this question is not proper for the court on a motion for summary judgment, but should be determined by the trier of fact." Kenney v. McClatchie, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 01 0450368 (May 6, 2003, Gilardi, J.). "In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500, 538 A.2d 1031 (1988). CIGNA's motion for summary judgment as to count four of the amended complaint is denied.
Count Five — Promissory Estoppel
In count five, the plaintiff asserts a claim of promissory estoppel. "The allegations, at most, amount to an agreement to enter into an at-will employment relationship and not a contract to employ the plaintiff for a specific term." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Parker v. Ginsburg Development CT, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 02 0188873 (February 3, 2003, Lewis, J.T.R.) (34 Conn. L. Rptr. 55, 56). "Promissory estoppel is not available to a plaintiff in an at-will employment situation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Therefore, CIGNA's motion for summary judgment as to count five is granted.
SUMMARY
Count One — CIGNA's motion for summary judgment is denied.
Count Two — CIGNA's motion for summary judgment is granted.
Count Three — CIGNA's motion for summary judgment is granted.
Count Four — CIGNA's motion for summary judgment is denied.
Count Five — CIGNA's motion for summary judgment is granted.