Opinion
NO. 2014-CA-001111-MR
04-08-2016
RAY GENE WALKER APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Ray Gene Walker Central City, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General of Kentucky Christian K. R. Miller Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES C. BRANTLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00268 OPINION
AFFIRMING BEFORE: D. LAMBERT, JONES, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES. D. LAMBERT, JUDGE: This matter is before the Court on appeal from the order of the Hopkins Circuit Court denying the motion of the Appellant, Ray Gene Walker, for post-conviction relief. Having reviewed the record and finding no error, we affirm the trial court's ruling.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Walker was initially indicted on two counts of first-degree rape. As the result of plea negotiations, the Commonwealth agreed to amend those charges to second-degree rape. Walker entered an unconditional guilty plea to the amended charges. At sentencing, Walker attempted to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. The trial court then imposed a sentence of ten years on each count of the indictment, with the terms to be served consecutively.
Walker, believing his sentence to be unconstitutional, began availing himself to the post-conviction procedures afforded by the rules of court in this Commonwealth. He first filed a pro se motion pursuant to RCr 11.42, arguing that he was entitled to relief from judgment due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. This motion, in which he argued that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him of parole eligibility, was summarily denied by the trial court. Walker appealed the trial court's ruling to the Kentucky Supreme Court, which affirmed the ruling.
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Walker then filed a CR 60.02 motion for relief from the judgment. In that motion, Walker argued that his trial counsel induced his guilty plea through false promises and misstatements of law. The trial court summarily denied that motion as well. Walker appealed that ruling to this Court. Walker, who had not been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal by the trial court, failed to pay the required filing fee, prompting this Court to issue a show cause order. Walker then failed to respond, and the appeal was dismissed.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. --------
On May 9, 2014, Walker filed the instant motion. He argued that because he was convicted of a Class C felony, with a maximum sentence of ten years, then his twenty-year sentence is unconstitutional. The trial court summarily denied the motion based on two fatal procedural deficiencies: it was a successive 60.02 motion, and the allegations he brought should have been raised in his prior 11.42 proceedings. This appeal followed, wherein Walker contends the trial court wrongfully denied his motion.
II. ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A denial of a motion for post-conviction relief is one of the most commonly appealed issues in the jurisprudence of the Commonwealth. Consequently, there is a wealth of settled authority on the subject. The standard of review is an issue covered by such precedents: "[t]he standard of review of an appeal involving a CR 60.02 motion is whether the trial court abused its discretion." White v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Ky.App. 2000) (citing Brown v. Commonwealth, 932 S.W.2d 359 (Ky. 1996)). A trial court has abused its discretion "when a trial judge's decision [is] arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000).
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
SUMMARILY DENYING WALKER'S MOTION
A motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to CR 60.02 typically comprises the third and final step in a criminal defendant's appeals process, taken after a direct appeal and an RCr 11.42 motion. As such the bases for relief are very limited, and will only be granted in extraordinary cases. The seminal case concerning the post-conviction process is Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1983). The purpose of CR 60.02 is to provide trial courts a means to correct errors made apparent by certain facts arising after the entry of judgment and which could not be corrected through any other procedural means. Gross at 888. By its own terms, CR 60.02 is an extraordinary remedy, "available only when a substantial miscarriage of justice will result from the effect of the final judgment." Wilson v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Ky. 1966). Rule 60.02 does not permit multiple attempts at seeking relief under its terms. Foley v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Ky. 2014). Further, the Supreme Court has held that issues which could have been litigated in RCr 11.42 proceedings are not properly before the court when litigating motions pursuant to CR 60.02. McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 2007).
The trial court based its ruling on finding two fatal procedural defects in Walker's motion, which even independently would have justified denial. The ruling was based on settled legal precedents and an appropriate reading of the governing procedural rule. It was not an abuse of discretion.
III. CONLUSION
This Court, having reviewed the record and finding no error, hereby AFFIRMS the ruling of the Hopkins Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Ray Gene Walker
Central City, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky Christian K. R. Miller
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky