Thus, once an indictment has been returned against a defendant, the question of whether a commitment hearing should have been held becomes moot, id., and the trial court did not err in denying the writ in this case. See also Walker v. City of Atlanta, 238 Ga. 723 ( 235 S.E.2d 28) (1977). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

See McClure v. Hopper, supra; and Stynchcombe v. Hardy, 228 Ga. 130 ( 184 S.E.2d 356) (1971). See Casteel v. State, 235 Ga. 804 ( 221 S.E.2d 579) (1976); Walker v. City of Atlanta, 238 Ga. 723 ( 235 S.E.2d 28) (1977).State v. Middlebrooks, supra; Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 771 (4) ( 208 S.E.2d 825) (1974) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1115 (1975); Tucker v. State, 249 Ga. 323 (2) ( 290 S.E.2d 97) (1982); Holmes v. State, 224 Ga. 553 (2) ( 163 S.E.2d 803) (1968); see also Casteel v. State, supra, footnote 5. These cases hold that, because the purpose of a commitment hearing is to determine whether the defendant should be held for indictment and trial, the failure to hold such hearing is not reversible error after trial and conviction.

It was not error to deny the defendant's motion to quash the indictment because he had not received a commitment hearing. See State v. Middlebrooks, 236 Ga. 52, 54 ( 222 S.E.2d 343) (1976); Walker v. City of Atlanta, 238 Ga. 723, 724 ( 235 S.E.2d 28) (1977). 4.

The committing magistrate denied motions to dismiss because of insufficient evidence. Thereafter the grand jury returned the indictment against the defendants. Once indicted any error in the commitment hearing process becomes moot. Walker v. City of Atlanta, 238 Ga. 723 ( 235 S.E.2d 28). 2.

Not only did the warrant specifically allege that the offenses occurred between January 1 and December 31, 1976, a time within the four-year statute of limitation (Criminal Code § 26-502 (c)), any challenge to the commitment hearing process is rendered moot when the accused is indicted. Walker v. City of Atlanta, 238 Ga. 723 ( 235 S.E.2d 28) (1977). 2.