Opinion
CIVIL NO: 3:18-CV-00347
11-09-2018
NAQUILLA M. WALKER Plaintiff, v. LACKAWANNA CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES Defendant.
(Judge Mariani) () REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction.
Naquilla M. Walker ("Walker") filed a complaint on February 12, 2018, which initiated this case. Because her complaint is repetitious in light of our decision in Walker's previous case, we dismiss her complaint under the doctrine of res judicata. We further recommend that her complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
II. Background and Procedural History.
In her previous case (Walker v. Lackawanna Children & Youth et al., No. 3:17-cv-02011 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2018)) ("Walker I"), Walker sought to have her three children "returned home" and alleged that her daughter had physical injuries. Walker I doc. 6 ¶ 3. On September 27, 2018, this court found that Walker had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, dismissed her amended complaint, and directed the Clerk of the Court to close Walker I. Walker I doc. 8.
On February 12, 2018, Walker filed the complaint in the present case, in which she asks for her "children to be returned home" and for "$250,000 for the harm that was done to her children and herself" and "emotional abuse caused by Cristen Worworth, Nicole Henusach, Stephanie Harris, [and] George Gretz." Doc. 1 at 2, 4. These individuals, however, are not named defendants, as Walker names only Lackawanna Children and Youth Services in her complaint. Id. at 1, 3. Walker claims that she has videos, pictures, and paperwork to support her claim. Id. at 4. On August 8, 2018, Walker filed a handwritten letter stating "Im adding to my complaint I been harrassed for 13 yrs by lackawanna children and youth my daughter is being molested and burnt I got thrown in handcuffs and a holding cell due to my rights being violated." Doc. 7 at 1. Walker also filed over 100 pages of medical reports, child custody documents, and school papers for reasons that are unclear. See docs. 4, 5, 6. Walker's complaint does not contain any factual allegations to support any claims of wrongdoing by Lackawanna Children and Youth Services or any other party.
III. Discussion.
We have a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of complaints brought by plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which provides that:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal—
For the reasons that follow, we find that Walker's complaint should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 because (a) it is barred under the doctrine of res judicata and (b) it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A. Walker's Claim is Precluded under the Doctrine of Res Judicata. "The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, is intended to avoid piecemeal litigation of claims arising from the same events." Sims v. Viacom, Inc., 544 F. App'x 99, 101 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 194 (3d Cir. 1999)). "[A] final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action." Id. (citations omitted). "Application of the claim preclusive aspect of the res judicata doctrine requires . . . (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same causes of action." U.S. v. Athlone Industries, Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). A "final judgment on the merits" includes dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Sims, 544 F. App'x at 101; see also Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981) ("[T]he dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a 'judgment on the merits.'").
Although "[t]here is no bright-line test for determining when the causes of action in two suits are identical for res judicata purposes," the Court should consider the following factors:
(1) whether the acts complained of and the demand for relief are the same (that is, whether the wrong for which redress is sought is the same in both actions); (2) whether the theory of recovery is the same; (3) whether the witnesses and documents necessary at trial are the same (that is, whether the same evidence necessary to maintain the second action would have been sufficient to support the first); and (4) whether the material facts alleged are the same.O'Leary v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1062, 1065 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Athlone, 746 F.2d at 984).
Walker's complaint is precluded under the doctrine of res judicata. The dismissal of Walker's amended complaint in Walker I satisfies the first condition of res judicata. In Walker I, we dismissed Walker's amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, which is a final judgment on the merits. Next, the identical parties in both Walker I and this case satisfy the second condition of res judicata. In both cases, Walker named Lackawanna Children and Youth Services as the defendant. Walker I doc. 1 at 1; doc. 1 at 1, 3.
Finally, this case satisfies the third condition of res judicata—a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action. In Walker I, Walker alleged that one of her children sustained injuries from abuse, and she sought custody of her children or monetary damages. Walker I doc. 1. Here too Walker alleges that "harm . . . was done to [her] children," and she seeks custody of her children or monetary damages. Doc. 1 at 2. Walker alleges neither a theory of recovery, nor any material facts in her complaint in this case. See doc. 1. Accordingly, referring to what little Walker provides us in her complaint, we conclude that the causes of action are the same in Walker I and this case with respect to her child custody claims and her children's alleged injuries such that claim preclusion bars Walker's claims.
B. The Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted.
Walker's complaint in this case should also be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A federal court is obligated to dismiss a complaint brought in forma pauperis when the complaint "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2018). This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
To state a claim for relief, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). The complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).
In deciding whether to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a federal court "must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Krieger v. Bank of America, 890 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Flora v. County of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2015)). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id.at 679. In practice, this leads to a three-part standard:
To assess the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, a court must: 'First, take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim. Second, identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 220 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Burtch v. Millberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011).
Complaints brought pro se are afforded more leeway than those drafted by attorneys. In determining whether to dismiss a complaint brought by a pro se litigant, a federal district court is "required to interpret the pro se complaint liberally." Sause v. Bauer, 138 S. Ct. 2561, 2563 (2018). "[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (2007). Nevertheless, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
Walker's complaint is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). "When a suit against a municipality is based on § 1983, the municipality can only be liable when the alleged constitutional transgression implements or executes a policy, regulation or decision officially adopted by the governing body or informally adopted by custom." Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (1996) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 658 (1978)). "[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
In this case, Walker's complaint alleges that "harm . . . was done to [her] children" and that she and her children suffered the "harm of abuse . . . [and] emotional abuse." Doc. 1 at 2, 4. Walker's claims are not supported by any factual allegations in her complaint, and therefore are not entitled to an assumption of truth in determining whether to dismiss the complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In addition, because a government entity cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely on the basis that its employee committed a tort, the complaint would need to allege some policy, regulation, or decision that had been adopted by the government. Beck, 89 F.3d at 971. Walker's complaint does not allege the existence of any government policy, regulation, or decision, and therefore her complaint fails to state a claim under § 1983 upon which relief can be granted.
IV. Recommendation.
For the foregoing reasons, we recommend that Walker's complaint be dismissed and the case file closed because her claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and is precluded under the doctrine of res judicata.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and
all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 9th day of November, 2018.
S/Susan E . Schwab
Susan E. Schwab
Chief United States Magistrate Judge