Reed v. Galaxy Holdings, Inc., 914 N.E.2d 632, 636 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (citing Branson v. R & L Inv., Inc., 554 N.E.2d 624, 628 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)). Additionally, property owners and business operator do not have a duty to remove the tracks or residue left inside the building by customers who have walked through natural accumulations outside the building; likewise, they do not have duty to warn of such conditions. Id. (citing Roberson v. J.C. Penney Co., 623 N.E.2d 364, 367 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) and Walker v. Chi. Transit Auth., 416 N.E.2d 10, 13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)). "It is irrelevant whether the natural accumulation remains on the property for an 'unreasonable' length of time." Id. (citing Kellermann v. Car City Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc., 713 N.E.2d 1285, 1288 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)).

Since business owners and operators are not liable for failing to remove natural accumulations of water, owners and operators also have no duty to warn of such conditions. Walker v. Chicago Transit Authority, 92 Ill. App. 3d 120, 123, 416 N.E.2d 10, 13 (1980). Nevertheless, property owners and business operators may be liable for injuries resulting from an accumulation of ice, water, or snow if a plaintiff establishes that the means of ingress or egress was unsafe for any reason other than a natural accumulation of ice, water, or snow. Compare Branson, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 1094, 554 N.E.2d at 629 (holding that since there was no evidence that the means of ingress and egress was unsafe for any reason other than a natural accumulation of water, there was no triable issue of fact), with Kittle v. Liss, 108 Ill. App. 3d 922, 925-26, 439 N.E.2d 972, 974 (1982) (holding that although the plaintiff-business invitee slipped and fell on a natural accumulation of ice, there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the owner provided adequate lighting in accordance with his duty to provide a reasonably safe means of ingress or egress). Plaintiff's burden is satisfied if he establishes that a defendant failed to meet his duty to properly illuminate t

) However, despite that heightened duty of care, a common carrier has no duty to clean up natural accumulations of snow, ice and water. ( Shoemaker, 187 Ill. App.3d at 1045, 543 N.E.2d at 1017; Serritos, 153 Ill. App.3d at 271-72, 505 N.E.2d at 1039.) Where the accumulation is found to be natural, the carrier also has no duty to warn of the condition created by that accumulation. Serritos, 153 Ill. App.3d at 272, 505 N.E.2d at 1039; Walker v. Chicago Transit Authority (1980), 92 Ill. App.3d 120, 123, 416 N.E.2d 10, 13. Arguments can be made that a common carrier's duty of highest care should prevail over the natural accumulations rule.

A landowner will only be held liable if the plaintiff's "injury occurred as a result of water produced or accumulated by artificial causes or in an unnatural way or by defendant's own use of the area concerned and creation of the condition." Walker v. Chicago Transit Authority (1980), 92 Ill.App.3d 120, 122, 48 Ill.Dec. 115, 416 N.E.2d 10 quoting McCann v. Bethesda Hospital (1979), 80 Ill.App.3d 544, 35 Ill.Dec. 879, 400 N.E.2d 16.         Although the absence of a duty on the part of the landowner is well established with respect to natural accumulations, the evidence here that the puddle was not comprised of tracked-in water, but of a foreign substance is considerable.

“Since business owners and operators are not liable for failing to remove natural accumulations of water, owners and operators also have no duty to warn of such conditions.” Reed, 914 N.E.2d at 636 (citing Walker v. Chi. Transit Auth., 416 N.E.2d 10, 13 (Ill.App.Ct. 1st Dist. 1980)). Courts applying Illinois's natural accumulation rule have also rejected theories that the “store failed to install an adequate number of mats to remove the water” on which the plaintiff slipped because a “defendant's voluntary use of mats gave rise to no duty beyond that of maintaining the mats with ‘reasonable care.' ”

But, more importantly, the issue of notice is a nonstarter in light of her failure to point to evidence that would permit a reasonable conclusion that the substance on which she slipped was anything other than a natural accumulation. See Walker v. Chi. Transit Auth., 416 N.E.2d 10, 13 (Ill.App.Ct. 1980) (finding it unnecessary to reach plaintiffs final argument that defendant had actual or constructive notice of the condition of its premises in light of the court's conclusion that the water at issue was a natural accumulation and explaining that defendant's “duty to ascertain hazardous conditions or warn of such is contingent upon the finding that the water resulted from an unnatural or artificial accumulation”); Nunez, 2017 WL 3610566, at *5

As a result, store operators have no duty to remove the "tracks or residue left inside the building by customers who have walked through natural accumulations outside the building," and "have no duty to warn of such conditions." Id. at 42-43, 914 N.E. 2d at 636 (citing Roberson v. J.C. Penney Co., 251 Ill. App. 3d 523, 526, 623 N.E.2d 364, 366 (3rd Dist. 1993) and Walker v. Chicago Transit Authority, 92 Ill. App. 3d 120, 123, 416 N.E.2d 10, 13 (1980)). Plaintiff insists that Defendants remain liable even if the water that was present at the time of the fall was a natural accumulation, because Defendants' use of substandard tile near the store entrance and negligent placement of the mat near the entryway created an unreasonably dangerous condition.

The dispute in this case centers on the formation of the ice between the gas pumps. As mentioned, a property owner has no duty to remove a natural accumulation of ice from his property, Russell, 782 N.E.2d at 909, and no duty to warn of such condition, Newcomm v. Jul, 273 N.E.2d 699, 701 (Ill.App.Ct. 3d Dist. 1971); Mulvihill v. United States, Case No. 00-C-3495, 2001 WL 686786, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 2001); Walker v. Chicago Transit Auth., 416 N.E.2d 10 (Ill.App.Ct. 1st Dist. 1989). But see Weber v. Chen Enter., Inc., 540 N.E.2d 957, 958 (Ill.App.Ct. 3d Dist. 1989).

However, these issues are irrelevant in light of our conclusion that plaintiff presented no evidence that she slipped upon anything other than a natural accumulation of water. Walker v. Chicago Transit Authority, 92 Ill. App. 3d 120, 123 (1980). ¶ 22 Second, the parties have also addressed the propriety of the affidavit that plaintiff presented below in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. We need not further address this issue, as a review of the averments made in that affidavit—even if we did consider them—do nothing to alter the conclusions we have reached above. ¶ 23 Third, the parties' arguments appear to focus on the question of whether summary judgment was properly granted on the negligence claim pled as count I of plaintiff's complaint.

The owner or possessor of real property is not liable for injuries resulting from the natural accumulation of ice, snow, or water. ( Graham v. City of Chicago (1931), 346 Ill. 638, 641-43, 178 N.E. 911; Lansing v. County of McLean (1978), 69 Ill.2d 562, 570-71, 372 N.E.2d 822.) This rule has been extended to common carriers in the maintenance of their stations, platforms ( Walker v. Chicago Transit Authority (1980), 92 Ill. App.3d 120, 416 N.E.2d 10), and vehicles of conveyance ( Serritos v. Chicago Transit Authority (1987), 153 Ill. App.3d 265, 271-72, 505 N.E.2d 1034). Although common carriers are under no duty to remove natural accumulations of ice or snow from their premises or vehicles, the absence of such a duty does not rest upon the notion that the conditions presented by such accumulations are safe. To the contrary, the hazards presented have always been acknowledged, but the imposition of an obligation to remedy those conditions would be so unreasonable and impractical as to negate the imposition of a legal duty to do so.