Summary
holding that the silence of release eligibility on the judgment form did not void the judgment
Summary of this case from Glenn v. JonesOpinion
No. E2006-00452-CCA-R3-HC.
Assigned on Briefs September 26, 2007.
Filed July 10, 2008.
Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Johnson County; No. 4733 Robert; E. Cupp, Judge.
Judgment of the Criminal Court is Affirmed.
Martin E. Walker, Mountain City, Tennessee, Pro se.
Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; and Benjamin A. Ball, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
Norma McGee Ogle, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Joseph M. Tipton, P.J., and James Curwood Witt, JR., J., joined.
OPINION
The petitioner, Martin E. Walker, filed in the Johnson County Criminal Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from his conviction for second degree murder. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.
I. Factual Background
This court previously summarized the procedural history of this case as follows:
The petitioner was indicted in 1984 on two counts of the first degree murder of his wife and his father in 1980. The cases were severed, and a jury convicted him in 1985 of first degree murder of his father, for which he is serving a life sentence. In 1986, the petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder for killing his wife in 1980. He was sentenced to not less than nor more than twenty-five years, which was to be served consecutively to his life sentence.
Martin E. Walker v. Howard Carlton, Warden, No. E2006-01584-CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 2570198, at *1 (Tenn.Crim.App. at Knoxville, Sept. 7, 2007),perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 2007). After the petitioner's convictions, he "made several collateral attacks in the state courts and one in federal court." Id.
The petitioner filed the instant petition, his fourth petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his sentence was illegal. The petitioner complained that his sentence of not less than nor more than twenty-five years was an indeterminate sentence; that the judgment form should have reflected the percentage of his sentence he must serve in confinement before becoming eligible for release, specifically maintaining that he should have received release eligibility after serving thirty percent of his sentence; and that he should not have been sentenced as a Class X offender. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that his sentence was void. The petitioner appeals the ruling of the habeas corpus court.
II. Analysis
Initially, we note that the determination of whether to grant habeas corpus relief is a question of law. Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 255 (Tenn. 2007). As such, we will review the trial court's findings de novo without a presumption of correctness. Id. Moreover, it is the petitioner's burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, "that the sentence is void or that the confinement is illegal."Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tenn. 2000).
Article I, § 15 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantees an accused the right to seek habeas corpus relief. See Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). However, "[s]uch relief is available only when it appears from the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings that a trial court was without jurisdiction to sentence a defendant or that a defendant's sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has expired." Wyatt, 24 S.W.3d at 322; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101 (2000). In other words, habeas corpus relief may be sought only when the judgment is void, not merely voidable. Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 83. "A void judgment `is one in which the judgment is facially invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction or authority to render the judgment or because the defendant's sentence has expired.' We have recognized that a sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute, for example, is void and illegal." Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 83).
Turning to the petitioner's issues, we first note that this court has previously determined that the petitioner's sentence of not more than but not less than twenty-five years is a determinate sentence.Martin E. Walker, No. E2006-01584-CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 2570198, at *2. Therefore, the petitioner was not subjected to an illegal, indeterminate sentence.
Additionally, the record reveals that the petitioner murdered his wife in 1980, prior to the inception of the 1982 Criminal Sentencing Act. At the time of the murder, second degree murder was a Class X offense punishable by a sentence of ten years to life. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-2403(b) (1980 Supp.), 39-2408 (1975); Charles Manning v. Jack Morgan, Warden, No. E2005-00701-CCA-R3-HC, 2006 WL 1679597, at *2 (Tenn.Crim.App. at Knoxville, June 13, 2006). The 1982 Sentencing Act did not change that designation. In fact, the Class X Felonies Act of 1979 was not repealed until the enactment of the 1989 Sentencing Reform Act.Eddie DePriest v. State, No. W2003-02561-CCA-R3-HC, 2004 WL 1872897, at *2 (Tenn.Crim.App. at Jackson, Aug. 20, 2004). Thus, the petitioner was correctly sentenced as a Class X offender.
Further, we note that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-112(a) (1986) provides, "For all persons who committed crimes prior to July 1, 1982, the prior law shall apply and shall remain in full force and effect in every respect, including but not limited to sentencing, parole and probation." However,
[t]he 1982 Act was amended in 1985, prior to [the petitioner's] sentencing, to add: "The release eligibility date, manner of service of sentence, and the release and parole of any person convicted and sentenced as a Class X offender for a crime committed before July 1, 1982, shall be governed by part 5 of this chapter."
Manning, No. E2005-00701-CCA-R3-HC, 2006 WL 1679597, at *2 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112(c) (1986)). Our review of the petitioner's judgment of conviction reveals that the petitioner received a sentence of twenty-five years for his second degree murder conviction, a sentence permitted for the offense. Also, the judgment does not impose an impermissible release eligibility percentage for the sentence. In fact, the judgment is silent as to release eligibility. This court has previously stated that "a `technical' omission in a standard judgment form does not render a judgment void and is therefore not a basis for habeas corpus relief." James R.W. Reynolds v. State, No. M2003-00112-CCA-R3-HC, 2004 WL 1293275, at *4 (Tenn.Crim.App. at Nashville, June 8, 2004). As such, the instant judgment is not void on its face. Id. Regardless, we agree with the petitioner that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(c) (1986) provided that a standard Range I offender, such as the petitioner, would be eligible for release after service of thirty percent of his sentence. "[U]nder the 1989 Sentencing Act, which we recognize was enacted after the petitioner's convictions, a judgment form `shall be returned to the sentencing court' for the completion of any omitted information." Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-209(g) (2003)). The petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief.
III. Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.