Although terminable-at-will employment does not give an employee a contractual right to remain employed, an at-will employment relationship can give rise to certain contractual rights. See Walker Elec. Co. v. Byrd, 281 Ga.App. 190, 192, 635 S.E.2d 819 (2006); Brazzeal v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 51 Ga.App. 471, 180 S.E. 853 (1935). “In a terminable-at-will employment contract the original terms for compensation are enforceable for that work actually performed under the contract.”
Although terminable-at-will employment does not give an employee a contractual right to remain employed, an at-will employment relationship can give rise to certain contractual rights. See Walker Elec. Co. v. Byrd, 281 Ga.App. 190, 192, 635 S.E.2d 819 (2006) ; Brazzeal v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 51 Ga.App. 471, 180 S.E. 853 (1935). “In a terminable-at-will employment contract the original terms for compensation are enforceable for that work actually performed under the contract.”
The district court did not err in determining that Oasis had no contractual duty to pay wages to Coleman after Oasis terminated its contracts with H2S. The district court agreed with Coleman's arguments that PEOs qualify as employers under Georgia law, O.C.G.A. § 34-7-6(d), and that at-will employees can recover under a breach of contract theory in certain circumstances, see Walker Elec. Co. v. Byrd, 635 S.E.2d 819, 820 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). However, the Employee Authorizations & Acknowledgements signed by Coleman expressly disclaimed that any contract with Oasis existed.
Second, the Plaintiff's at-will employment status does not preclude a breach of contract action alleging unpaid compensation. Under Georgia law, “an employee may sue on an oral contract for employment terminable at will ‘for the amount of compensation due him, based upon services actually performed by him up to the time of his discharge[.]'” E.D. Lacey Mills, Inc. v. Keith, 183 Ga.App. 357, 359 (1987) (quoting Brazzeal v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 51 Ga.App. 471 (1935)); see also Walker Elec. Co. v. Byrd, 281 Ga.App. 190, 192 (2006) (allowing an at-will employee to sue “on the contract for compensation allegedly due for services he performed during his employment”).
And at-will employees can, under certain circumstances (when the employer makes an oral promise to pay), recover under a breach of contract theory. See Walker Elec. Co. v. Byrd , 281 Ga.App. 190, 191–92, 635 S.E.2d 819 (2006). Oasis does not contest those conclusions.
The fact that an employment contract is a verbal agreement does not alter the rights and obligations of the parties. See generally Wright v. Cofield, 317 Ga. App. 285, 287-88, 730 S.E.2d 421 (2012); (holding that a question of fact remained for whether the company had orally promised the plaintiff fifteen percent of the net sale proceeds); Dye v. Mech. Enters., Inc., 308 Ga. App. 311, 313-15, 708 S.E.2d 24 (2011) (reversing summary judgment because there was a question of fact for calculating an employee's commission under an oral contract); Walker Elec. Co. v. Byrd, 281 Ga. App. 190, 191-92, 635 S.E.2d 819 (2006) (determining that an oral agreement to pay an at-will employee per diem compensation could be enforced).
Such facts properly support a claim for breach of contract under Georgia law in the amount of $48,018.06. See Walker Elec. Co. v. Byrd, 281 Ga. App. 190, 192 (2006). Plaintiff has apparently made a minor mathematical error in his calculations.
They allege they were not paid for work they performed. They are not claiming the PCSD is obligated by contract to continue their employment or to pay wages for time they did not work. Clearly, if the Plaintiffs worked, they are entitled to be paid for their work at the agreed upon rate. Walker Elec. Co. v. Byrd, 281 Ga. App. 190, 635 S.E.2d 819 (2006). Therefore, with the exception of Plaintiff Livatt, the PCSD is not entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims.
The Court noted that while terminable at-will employment does not give an employee a contractual right to retain employment, it may give rise to certain contractual rights agreed upon at the beginning of the employment. See Id . ; see also Walker Elec. Co. v. Byrd , 281 Ga. App. 190, 192, 635 S.E.2d 819 (2006). In holding that the firefighters may be able to assert a contractual claim, we noted that