Opinion
18-P-1646
02-28-2020
Robert D. WALDRON v. Lori J. WALDRON.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Robert D. Waldron (husband), brought an equitable complaint against the defendant, Lori J. Waldron, his former wife (wife) seeking damages for unjust enrichment. The complaint was dismissed by a judge of the Probate and Family Court. On the husband's appeal, we affirm.
The complaint originally also included a breach of contract claim against the wife. The husband agreed to dismissal of that claim.
Background. The parties' marriage was terminated by judgment of divorce nisi on October 16, 2014, and became absolute on January 14, 2015. As part of their separation agreement (agreement), the husband waived rights to certain alimony. In exchange, the wife agreed to the transfer of "One Hundred (100%) percent of the total aggregated account values" of several retirement plans identified in the agreement. According to the agreement, "[t]he parties estimat[ed] the [value of the] accounts to be approximately $432,000.00 in the aggregate as of August 31, 2014." Within one year of the judgment of divorce, the wife transferred to the husband what she represented was one hundred percent of the retirement funds identified in the agreement. The total amount of those funds, however, was $347,825.34; $84,174.66 less than the estimated cash value of the accounts as recited in the agreement.
In signing the agreement, the parties agreed that they had had the opportunity for full discovery about the other's financial circumstances, and that each was "satisfied as to the other's financial status assets and liabilities."
Unsatisfied with this payment, the husband made a series of efforts to obtain payment of the $84,174.66 difference between the parties' estimated value of the retirement accounts, and the amount ultimately transferred to him by the wife. First, in April of 2016, the husband filed a complaint for contempt alleging that the wife "fail[ed] to transfer 100% ... of the total aggregated account values of approximately $432,000.00." A judge of the Probate and Family Court found that the wife was not in contempt. The husband did not appeal.
Next, in December of 2016, the husband filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 60 (b)(6), asserting that the wife "fail[ed] to pay the represented amount of the ... retirement funds as set forth in the [agreement]," and that he was "without $84,174.66 of negotiated funds due to a material misrepresentation by Wife." The motion was denied, and again, the husband did not appeal.
The husband stated there that the parties "stipulated that the value of the funds were $432,000.00." Our record does not reflect any such stipulation.
On appeal, the husband suggests that his rule 60 (b) motion was dismissed as untimely, rather than on the merits. The record support for his argument is subject to differing interpretations. As we discuss infra, however, the husband's complaint was properly dismissed regardless of the reason on which the judge based her decision.
Finally, the husband filed his complaint in equity against the wife on November 16, 2017, asserting a claim for unjust enrichment and alleging, exactly as he did in his rule 60 (b) (6) motion, that he was "without $84,174.66 of negotiated funds due to a material misrepresentation by [the wife]." The wife moved, pursuant to Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 12 (b), to dismiss the complaint on several alternative grounds. The motion to dismiss was allowed without findings. We affirm.
Discussion. We review the dismissal of the husband's equitable action de novo. See Okoli v. Okoli, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 381, 384 (2012). Assuming, without deciding, that the ruling on the complaint for contempt did not bar the husband's later equitable action, we discern at least two grounds for affirming the dismissal of the husband's complaint for unjust enrichment. See Clair v. Clair, 464 Mass. 205, 214 (2013), quoting Gabbidon v. King, 414 Mass. 685, 686 (1993).
As we discern no basis for the husband's conclusion that the judge's basis for dismissing the complaint was her determination of the merits of the husband's unjust enrichment claim, we reject his argument that the judge improperly treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. Even if that were not the case, as we discuss infra, we find adequate grounds to affirm. See Clair v. Clair, 464 Mass. 205, 214 (2013), quoting Gabbidon v. King, 414 Mass. 685, 686 (1993) ("on appeal, [an appellate court] may consider any ground apparent on the record that supports the result reached in the lower court").
First, the unjust enrichment action was an improper collateral attack on the divorce judgment. See Tompkins v. Tompkins, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 487, 492-493 (2006). While the husband could, and did, seek relief from the judgment of divorce by way of a motion under rule 60 (b), see DeMarco v. DeMarco, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 618, 621 (2016), quoting Sahin v. Sahin, 435 Mass. 396, 399-400 (2001) ( rule 60 "sets forth a comprehensive framework for obtaining relief from a final judgment or order"), he did not appeal either the divorce judgment or the order denying his rule 60 (b) motion. See G. L. c. 215, §§ 9, 24 ; Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 60 (b). The husband's unjust enrichment complaint, which was based on the same facts as his motion for relief from judgment, amounted to an impermissible collateral attack on the final judgment. See Tompkins, supra at 493.
Second, the husband's unjust enrichment complaint, which is nothing more than a recasting of his rule 60 arguments as equitable claims, was an attempt at improper claim splitting. "[T]he entry of a ‘valid and final judgment extinguishes ... all rights of a plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, ... out of which the action arose.’ " Massaro v. Walsh, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 562, 565 (2008), quoting Boyd v. Jamaica Plain Coop. Bank, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 153, 163 (1979). "Claim preclusion makes a valid, final judgment conclusive on the parties ... and prevents relitigation of all matters that were or could have been adjudicated in the action." Kobrin v. Board of Registration in Med., 444 Mass. 837, 843 (2005), quoting O'Neill v. City Manager of Cambridge, 428 Mass. 257, 259 (1998). In order for claim preclusion to apply, its proponent must demonstrate three elements: "(1) the identity or privity of the parties to the present and prior actions, (2) identity of the cause of action, and (3) prior final judgment on the merits." Kobrin, supra, quoting DaLuz v. Department of Correction, 434 Mass. 40, 45 (2001). Claim preclusion applies "even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second action to present evidence, grounds, or theories of the case not presented in the first action or to seek remedies or forms of relief not demanded in the first action." Massaro, supra, quoting Boyd, supra. See Wright Mach. Corp. v. Seaman-Andwall Corp., 364 Mass. 683, 688 (1974) (party cannot relitigate same claim "by seeking an alternative remedy or by raising the claim from a different posture or in a different procedural form").
Here, the parties in the husband's motion for relief from judgment and the equitable complaint were the same, the underlying facts and arguments of each were identical, the parties' divorce judgment was final, and the husband did not appeal the order denying his motion for relief from the judgment. See TLT Constr. Corp. v. A. Anthony Tappe & Assocs., 48 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 8 (1999) (for purposes of claim preclusion, claim is same if derived from same transaction); Air Purchases, Inc. v. Mechanical Coordinators Corp., 21 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 634-635 (1986) (preclusive effect of unappealed order denying rule 60 [b] motion). In the equitable action, the husband asked the judge to rule on exactly the same question of property division that the judge had already decided in ruling on the husband's motion for relief from the divorce judgment. Having had the "the incentive and opportunity to litigate the matter fully in the first lawsuit," Foster v. Evans, 384 Mass. 687, 696 n.10 (1981), quoting A. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion V-401 (1969), the rule against claim splitting precluded the husband from bringing another action on the same facts and for the same recovery. See Massaro, 71 Mass. App. Ct. at 565. See also Baby Furniture Warehouse Store, Inc. v. Meubles D&F Ltée, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 27, 34 (2009) (claim preclusion will apply even though party is prepared in second action to present different legal theories or seeks different remedies).
Finally, even if, as the husband argues, his rule 60 (b) (6) motion was treated as a motion under rule 60 (b) (3) or 60 (b) (4), and denied as untimely, rather than on its merits, the subsequent dismissal of the husband's unjust enrichment claim was correct. The unjust enrichment claim was simply a repackaging of the husband's claim for relief from judgment, brought nearly two years after the judgment became final. See Mt. Ivy Press, L.P. v. Defonseca, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 340, 347 (2010), quoting Sahin, 435 Mass. at 401 ("a party should not be able to avoid the one-year or ‘reasonable time’ limits of Rule 60 [b] simply by commencing an independent action seeking the same relief").
We deny the parties' requests for appellate attorney's fees.
--------
Judgment affirmed.