Rather, in such cases Waldron v. Hammond, 71 Wn.2d 361, 428 P.2d 589 (1967); Annot., Tavernkeeper's Liability to Patron for Third Person's Assault, 43 A.L.R.4th 281 (1986); Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 628. the courts attach considerable weight to the fact that [the] proprietor of the establishment . . . had some notice of the possibility of harm from prior actions of the person causing the injury, either on the occasion of the injury, or on previous occasions.

There was sufficient evidence, if believed by the jury, to support a finding that the defendants or their employees were negligent in allowing Dominquez to become intoxicated or remain on the premises while intoxicated without taking appropriate steps to protect or warn patrons and employees of the lounge when they knew or should have known that Dominquez posed a risk of physical harm to those patrons and employees. See Vigil v. Pine, 176 Colo. 384, 490 P.2d 934 (1971); Carey v. New Yorker of Worcester, Inc., 355 Mass. 450, 245 N.E.2d 420 (1969); Reilly v. 180 Club, Inc., 14 N.J. Super. 420, 82 A.2d 210 (1951); Waldron v. Hammond, 71 Wn.2d 361, 428 P.2d 589 (1967). The appellants point to the facts that on the night of the assault Dominquez had not been overtly violent or hostile in the bar and that no contact occurred between Dominquez and the appellee before the shooting.

[2] The plaintiff's principal theory of recovery was that the defendant violated its duty to exercise reasonable care to protect its patrons. In Waldron v. Hammond, 71 Wn.2d 361, 363, 428 P.2d 589 (1967), we stated: This court, in common with courts of other jurisdictions, has accepted and adhered to the rule that the keeper of an establishment wherein intoxicating liquors are dispensed, while not an insurer of the safety of his patrons, owes the duty to his patrons to exercise reasonable care and vigilance to protect them from reasonably foreseeable injury, mistreatment or annoyance at the hands of other patrons.

... ... As a matter of public policy, we have premised the duty of commercial vendors on the need to protect innocent bystanders from intoxicated patrons, Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash.2d 479, 497, 780 P.2d 1307 (1989) (citing Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wash.2d 911, 914, 541 P.2d 365 (1975); Waldron v. Hammond, 71 Wash.2d 361, 363, 428 P.2d 589 (1967)), and on the need to protect minors. Purchase v. Meyer, 108 Wash.2d 220, 737 P.2d 661 (1987); Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wash.2d 655, 663 P.2d 834, modified, 672 P.2d 1267 (1983).

Nevertheless, the applicability of Wilson to the context of commercial vendors is dubious. As a matter of public policy, we have premised the duty of commercial vendors on the need to protect innocent bystanders from intoxicated patrons, Christen v. Lee, 113 Wn.2d 479, 497, 780 P.2d 1307 (1989) (citing Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wn.2d 911, 914, 541 P.2d 365 (1975); Waldron v. Hammond, 71 Wn.2d 361, 363, 428 P.2d 589 (1967)), and on the need to protect minors. Purchase v. Meyer, 108 Wn.2d 220, 737 P.2d 661 (1987); Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wn.2d 655, 663 P.2d 834, modified, 672 P.2d 1267 (1983).

To affix liability against a tavern owner for injuries to patrons intentionally inflicted by third parties, a risk of harm to his patrons must be reasonably foreseeable, and the weight of authority, both in this state and elsewhere, supports a standard of reasonable foreseeability. See, e.g., Sparks v. Ober, 192 So.2d 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966); Industrial Park Businessmen's Club, Inc. v. Buck, 252 Ark. 513, 479 S.W.2d 842 (1972); Kerby v. Flamingo Club, Inc., 35 Colo. App. 127, 532 P.2d 975 (1974); Gorby v. Yeomans, 4 Mich. App. 339, 144 N.W.2d 837 (1966); Tyrrell v. Quigley, 186 Misc. 972, 60 N.Y.S.2d 821 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946); Waldron v. Hammond, 71 Wn.2d 361, 428 P.2d 589 (1967). Although knowledge of a particular assailant's propensity for violence is often found to be evidence of foreseeability in these cases, we reject the contention advanced by amicus curiae here that proof of foreseeability should be limited by law to evidence of actual or constructive knowledge of a particular assailant's propensity for violence.

As such, the proprietor owed him the duty to exercise ordinary care for his safety. Linxwiler v. El Dorado Sports Center, Inc., 233 Ark. 191, 343 S.W.2d 411. The weight of authority supports the view that while a tavern keeper or bar operator is not an insurer of the safety of his patrons, he is under the duty to use reasonable care and vigilance to protect guests or patrons from reasonably forseeable injury, mistreatment or annoyance at the hands of other patrons. Glen Park Democratic Club, Inc. v. Kylsa, 139 Ind. App. 393, 213 N.E.2d 812 (1966); Priewe v. Bartz 249 Minn. 488, 83 N.W.2d 116, 70 A.L.R.2d 621 (1957); Reilly v. 180 Club, Inc., 14 N.J. Super. 420, 82 A.2d 210 (1951); Kane v. Fields Corner Grille, Inc., 341 Mass. 640, 171 N.E.2d 287 (1960); Kimple v. Foster, 205 Kan. 415, 469 P.2d 281 (1970); Waldron v. Hammond, 71 Wn.2d 361, 428 P.2d 589 (1969). Negligence in such a situation may consist of failure to take appropriate action to eject persons of undesirable character from the premises or knowingly permitting irresponsible, vicious or drunken persons to be in and about the premises (Glen.

Although our research discloses no Florida precedent precisely on point, it has been recognized in other jurisdictions that a tavern keeper's failure to control the actions of an intoxicated person who disturbs another person on the premises due to absence of capable attendants or supervisors may establish sufficient causation to raise the issue of liability. See Waldron v. Hammond, 71 Wn.2d 361, 428 P.2d 589 (1967), which affirmed a jury's verdict in plaintiff's favor, where a bar was left in control of a woman unable or unwilling to prevent an assault by one patron on another; Gorby v. Yeomans, 4 Mich. App. 339, 144 N.W.2d 837 (1966), which affirmed a jury verdict on similar facts; and Bartosh v. Banning, 251 Cal.App.2d 378, 59 Cal.Rptr. 382 (1967), in which no bartender, operator or employee was present in the bar at the time of the assault, and error was found in the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that failure to have a supervisor in the bar was failure to provide ordinary care. In the case sub judice, we conclude it is a factual question whether the fronton operator's alleged failure to supervise its tavern patrons, one of whom allegedly assaulted another patron as a result of drinking on the premises, could have proximately caused petitioner's injury; therefore, it was error to dismiss the third amended complaint.

Secondarily, plaintiff contends that defendant negligently caused his injuries because of a failure of its employees to properly supervise and regulate the conduct of patrons on the premises, thus permitting an atmosphere of violence to be created which culminated in the subsequent assaults outside the premises. [3] We have no quarrel with plaintiff's thesis to the effect that a tavern keeper, though not an insurer of the safety of his patrons, owes them the duty to exercise reasonable care and vigilance to protect them from reasonably foreseeable injury, mistreatment or annoyance at the hands of other patrons. Indeed, we have so held in Waldron v. Hammond, 71 Wn.2d 361, 428 P.2d 589 (1967), and Miller v. Staton, 58 Wn.2d 879, 365 P.2d 333 (1961). Assuming, without deciding, that the tavern keeper's duty and responsibility may, under certain circumstances, extend to tortious acts committed outside the confines of the tavern by patrons who have departed the tavern, it is certain that a significant key to such liability is the foreseeability of the injury complained of. This, in turn, presents a question of fact insofar as it bears upon the issues of negligence and proximate cause.

A higher standard of care, involving an affirmative duty to protect persons from the conduct of third parties, has been assigned to certain "special relationships", including common carrier and passenger, e.g., Zorotovich v. Washington Toll Bridge Auth., 80 Wn.2d 106, 491 P.2d 1295 (1971); tavern keeper and patron, e.g., Waldron v. Hammond, 71 Wn.2d 361, 428 P.2d 589 (1967); landowner and invitee, e.g., McKinnon v. Washington Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n, 68 Wn.2d 644, 414 P.2d 733 (1966); psychiatrist and mental patient, e.g., Petersen v. State, 100 Wn.2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983); and school district and pupil, e.g., McLeod v. Grant Cy. Sch. Dist. 128, supra. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 320 (1965).