However, we cannot consider these documents and this testimony as evidence, because they are hearsay. See Waldrip v. Head, 279 Ga. 826, 828(II)(A), 620 S.E.2d 829 (2005) (noting that, even absent an objection, “the restrictions on hearsay evidence exist for the very purpose of forbidding such baseless speculation conducted without the truth-seeking benefits of proper evidentiary procedure”). The habeas court concluded that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in preparing and presenting mental health evidence.

We need not decide whether Lewis can show cause to excuse the procedural default to his Brady claim, see id. at 824–827(2)(a), 493 S.E.2d 900 (finding cause to excuse a procedural default where the State breached a “constitutional duty” to disclose information forming the basis of the claim), because we are satisfied that Lewis has failed to establish the requisite prejudice. See Waldrip v. Head, 279 Ga. 826, 829–830(II)(B), 620 S.E.2d 829 (2005) (rejecting a petitioner's attempt to avoid procedural default regarding certain alleged Brady violations because prejudice was not established). “Because [Lewis'] underlying claim is a constitutional claim involving the denial of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, Brady, 373 U.S. at 86, 83 S.Ct. 1194, the underlying claim and the prejudice analysis necessary to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test are coextensive.”

The Warden also placed in the record a report by David Griesemer, M.D. However, as Lance correctly noted in a written objection, this unsworn statement was inadmissible hearsay that should not have been considered by the habeas court. See Waldrip v. Head, 279 Ga. 826, 828(II)(A), 620 S.E.2d 829 (2005). But see OCGA § 9-14-48(a) (providing that a habeas court " may receive proof by ... sworn affidavits" ).

Although we do not consider this written report to establish the truth of the matters asserted in it, we do consider it as an indication of the facts known to the defense psychologist at the time of his evaluation and his conversation with defense counsel. Compare Waldrip v. Head, 279 Ga. 826, 828 (II) (A) (620 SE2d 829) (2005) (refusing to consider inadmissible hearsay on appeal despite the absence of any objection). The essential details of what conclusions the psychologist reached are contained within his testimony in the habeas record. He testified that he administered a personality inventory, but that he had to disregard the results because he believed Cook had attempted to manipulate the outcome.

"In order to preserve an issue for collateral review under Georgia law, a timely objection must be made at trial and raised on appeal in accordance with Georgia procedural rules." Devier v. Zant, 3 F.3d 1445, 1454 (11th Cir. 1993); accord Waldrip v. Head, 620 S.E.2d 829, 835 (Ga. 2005) ("Claims not raised on direct appeal are barred by procedural default[.]").

As to the state habeas court's analysis "that the 'Summary Report' was not Brady material," the Georgia Supreme Court expressly noted several deficiencies in the state habeas court's reasoning that it was not Brady material. Waldrip v. Head, 620 S.E.2d 829, 832-33 (Ga. 2005). First, the Georgia Supreme Court pointed out that the state habeas court's reliance on Foster v. State, 374 S.E.2d 188 (1988), was misplaced as the Georgia Supreme Court "explicitly noted in Foster that that case did not involve the constitutional right to exculpatory information under Brady."

To that end, absent a showing of either cause to excuse the default and actual prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(d) precludes state habeas review of any issue not preserved for collateral attack in a state court by timely objecting and raising the issue on appeal. See Devier, 3 F.3d at 1454-55 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(d) and upholding a finding of procedural default on numerous claims); see also Waldrip v. Head, 620 S.E.2d 829, 835-36 (Ga. 2005) (“Claims not raised on direct appeal are barred by procedural default, and in order to surmount the bar to a defaulted claim, one must meet the ‘cause and prejudice' test.”); Black v. Hardin, 336 S.E.2d 754, 755 (Ga. 1985) (“The rule now may be stated as follows: a failure to make timely objection to any alleged error or deficiency or to pursue the same on appeal

To that end, absent a showing of either cause to excuse the default and actual prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(d) precludes state habeas review of any issue not preserved for collateral attack in a state court by timely objecting and raising the issue on appeal. See Devier v. Zant, 3 F.3d 1445, 1454-55 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(d) and upholding a finding of procedural default on numerous claims); see also Waldrip v. Head, 620 S.E.2d 829, 835-36 (Ga. 2005) (“Claims not raised on direct appeal are barred by procedural default, and in order to surmount the bar to a defaulted claim, one must meet the ‘cause and prejudice' test.”); Black v. Hardin, 336 S.E.2d 754, 755 (Ga. 1985) (“The rule now may be stated as follows: a failure to make timely objection to any alleged error or deficiency or to pursue the same on appeal ordinarily will preclude review by writ of habeas corpus

To that end, absent a showing of either cause to excuse the default and actual prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(d) precludes state habeas review of any issue not preserved for collateral attack in a state court by timely objecting and raising the issue on appeal. See Devier, 3 F.3d at 1454-55 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(d) and upholding a finding of procedural default on numerous claims); see also Waldrip v. Head, 620 S.E.2d 829, 835 (Ga. 2005) (“Claims not raised on direct appeal are barred by procedural default, and in order to surmount the bar to a defaulted claim, one must meet the ‘cause and prejudice' test.”); Black v. Hardin, 336 S.E.2d 754, 755 (Ga. 1985) (“The rule now may be stated as follows: a failure to make timely objection to any alleged error or deficiency or to pursue the same on appeal ordinarily will preclude review by writ of habeas corpus.”).

To that end, absent a showing of either cause to excuse the default and actual prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice, O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(d) precludes state habeas review of any issue not preserved for collateral attack in a state court by timely objecting and raising the issue on appeal. See Devier v. Zant, 3 F.3d 1445, 1454-55 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-14-48(d) and upholding a finding of procedural default on numerous claims); see also Waldrip v. Head, 620 S.E.2d 829, 835 (Ga. 2005) (“Claims not raised on direct appeal are barred by procedural default, and in order to surmount the bar to a defaulted claim, one must meet the ‘cause and prejudice' test.”)