Opinion
No. CV 06 4000894 S
August 5, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PETITION
The petitioner, Sylvester Waldren, has brought this amended habeas corpus petition in two counts, alleging that his incarceration is illegal. In count one, the petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective in representing him. In count two, he alleges actual innocence. Thus, the petitioner alleges that his conviction rests upon the deprivation of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment to the United States and Connecticut constitutions. The respondent denies the material allegations in the petition and denies that the petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief. The respondent also raised a special defense of procedural default, which it later withdrew at trial. Presently, the petitioner is in the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections in the State of Connecticut.
The matter came before the court for a trial on the merits on April 17, 2008. Witnesses included the petitioner and the petitioner's trial counsel, David Channing. In addition, the petitioner submitted 3 exhibits and the respondent submitted 2 exhibits into evidence. Based on the court's review of the testimony and evidence, judgment enters denying the habeas corpus petition.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The petitioner was the defendant in State v. Waldren, in the Judicial District of Waterbury on two separate files: Docket Number CR 04-327734, in which he was charged with two counts of sexual assault in the first degree, two counts of sexual assault in the second degree and two counts of risk of injury to a minor under sixteen years of age; and Docket Number CR04-337138, in which he was charged with four counts of injury or risk of injury to a minor, four counts of sexual assault in the fourth degree and one count of sexual assault in the third degree.
On October 26, 2005, the petitioner entered pleas of guilty before the court, Iannotti, J., on docket number CR04-337138 to two counts of risk of injury to a minor under sixteen in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 and assault in the third degree in violation of § 53a-63. The petitioner's guilty pleas were entered under the Alford doctrine. On Docket Number CR04-337138, the petitioner was sentenced to 20 years incarceration, execution suspended after 7 years followed by 15 years of probation on each of the two counts of injury or risk of injury to a minor, to run concurrently with each other. On the one count of assault in the third degree, the petitioner was sentenced to one year incarceration, to run concurrently with the prior sentences. On Docket Number CR04-327734 he pleaded guilty to one count of risk of injury to a minor in violation of § 53-21(a)(2). He was sentenced to 7 years to serve, concurrently with the sentences in Docket No. CR04-337138. The total effective sentence was 20 years to serve, execution suspended after 7 years followed by 15 years of probation.
"'Under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), a criminal defendant is not required to admit his guilt, but consents to being punished as if he were guilty to avoid the risk of proceeding to trial . . . A guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is a judicial oxymoron in that the defendant does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state's evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry of a guilty plea nevertheless.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stevens, 278 Conn. 1, 3 n. 2 (2006)." Poulin v. Commissioner of Correction, 103 Conn.App. 303, 306 n. 4 (2007).
At the time the petitioner entered his guilty pleas, the state's attorney recited the factual basis for each of the cases, and which need not be restated for purposes of the instant matter. Judge Iannotti thoroughly canvassed petitioner to ensure the pleas were knowing, voluntary, intelligent and with the advice of counsel.
The restatement of facts in support of the convictions is located at pages 10-16 of the plea transcript. Petitioner's Exhibit 7 (Transcript, May 9, 1997).
Additional facts will be discussed as necessary.
DISCUSSION
A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to adequate and effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages of criminal proceedings . . . This right arises under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and Article First, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution . . . Pretrial negotiations implicating the decision of whether to plead guilty is a critical stage in criminal proceedings . . . and plea bargaining is an integral component of the criminal justice system and essential to the expeditious and fair administration of our courts . . .
Although [the] decision [to plead guilty or proceed to trial] is ultimately made by the defendant, the defendant's attorney must make an informed evaluation of the options and determine which alternative will offer the defendant the most favorable outcome. A defendant relies heavily upon counsel's independent evaluation of the charges and defenses, applicable law, the evidence and the risks and probable outcome of a trial. The right to effective assistance of counsel includes an adequate investigation of the case to determine facts relevant to the merits or to the punishment in the event of conviction . . .
In Strickland v. Washington, [ 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)], the United States Supreme Court adopted a two-part standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during criminal proceedings: the defendant must show: (1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . and (2) that defense counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense . . .
The first part requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the [s]ixth [a]mendment . . . In determining whether such a showing has been made, judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential . . . The reviewing court must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct . . .
The second part requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable . . . The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome . . .
In Hill v. Lockhart, [ 474 U.S. 52, 57-58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)], the court determined that the same two-part standard applies to claims arising from the plea negotiation process and that the same justifications for imposing the prejudice requirement in Strickland were relevant in the context of guilty pleas. Although the first half of the Strickland test remains the same for determining ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea negotiation stage, the court modified the prejudice standard . . . [I]n order to satisfy the prejudice requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial . . . The Hill court also stated that the petitioner must show that such a decision to plead not guilty would have been based on the likelihood that the introduction of the evidence or the defense that was not identified because of ineffective assistance of counsel would have been successful at trial.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Valentin v. Commissioner of Correction, 94 Conn.App. 751, 754-56 (2006).
"It is well settled that in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must prove both prongs of the Strickland test. A reviewing court [therefore] can find against a petitioner on either ground, whichever is easier." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lacks v. Commissioner of Correction, 87 Conn.App. 225, 231, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 922 (2005).
The petitioner claims that attorney Channing failed to: 1) secure or otherwise arrange to have witnesses interviewed or seek expert witnesses for trial; 2) present relevant evidence to the trial court judge; 3) adequately investigate the factual basis and/or evidence to support the issues claimed; 4) adequately prepare an argument on behalf of the petitioner; 5) adequately introduce exculpatory evidence; and 6) determine and/or inform the court that the petitioner was in a state of depression and had been on suicide watch prior to the scheduled plea date and, therefore, was incapable of entering his pleas knowingly and voluntarily as required by statute. As a result of these allegations, the petitioner asserts that his counsel's representation of him was not within the range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in criminal law. The petitioner claims that, had he gone to trial, the jury's decision would have been different.
The petitioner's trial counsel has extensive experience representing persons accused of crimes. Attorney Channing has defended criminal cases for the past 13 years. For the past 13 years he has worked as a public defender in the Division of Public Defender Services. During this time, he has represented thousands of criminal defendants. In 2000, he began working at the Waterbury Judicial District. While serving as a public defender, he has defended persons charged with serious felonies, completed approximately 20 trials, and negotiated well over 1,500 cases.
Attorney Channing testified regarding his representation of the petitioner. He was appointed to represent the petitioner about two weeks after the petitioner's arraignment. After interviewing the petitioner, he filed motions to procure discovery of the state's case. He investigated the case thoroughly. After researching the cases, counsel for the petitioner filed motions. Attorney Channing and the petitioner viewed the forensic interview of the victims.
An evidentiary hearing was held on a motion to suppress, where the petitioner sought to suppress his personal diary and some graphic photographs. The motion to suppress the evidence was denied by the court. The unsuppressed evidence was damaging to the petitioner's cases. The petitioner understood the damaging nature of the pornographic pictures and personal diary. Trial counsel discussed with the petitioner his theory of defense and about testifying on his own behalf.
Counsel for the petitioner was aware that the petitioner was on suicide watch. He sent Julie King, his social worker, to speak with the petitioner regarding the petitioner's competency to stand trial. After the interview, counsel concluded that the petitioner's competency to stand trial was not an issue in the case.
Attorney Channing reviewed all options with the petitioner after the motion to suppress was denied by the court. Attorney Channing successfully negotiated a plea agreement acceptable to the petitioner. Attorney Channing advised the petitioner to plead guilty. The petitioner did not want a trial and elected to plead guilty under Alford in the case involving the twin boys. On the other case, he pleaded guilty and admitted his guilt to the court. As stated in attorney Channing's testimony regarding the assistance rendered by him to the petitioner, it "was the best I could do for him." The petitioner was aware that one of the witnesses was reluctant to testify against him.
The actions taken by attorney Channing, described above, were well within the "wide range of reasonable professional assistance" required by Strickland. Andrades v. Commissioner of Correction, 108 Conn.App. 509, 512, 948 A.2d 365 (2008). Moreover, the evidence against the petitioner was strong, and he was likely to be convicted at trial, even admitting as much himself. Attorney Channing credibly testified that the petitioner said he "would like to make a deal." Despite the petitioner's retrospective assertions, this court is not convinced that anything attorney Channing could have done would have encouraged him to not plead guilty and elect to go to trial. Thus, he has failed to establish that any prejudice resulted from his guilty pleas. Based on the evidence presented, therefore, the court concludes that petitioner has failed to show that attorney Channing was ineffective in representing him.
The petitioner, in the second count, claims that he is innocent of the crimes with which he was charged and convicted after pleading guilty. "In Miller [v. Commissioner of Correction, 242 Conn. 745, 794, 700 A.2d 1108 (1997)], our Supreme Court held that the proper standard for evaluating a freestanding claim of actual innocence . . . is twofold. First, the petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that, taking into account all of the evidence — both the evidence adduced at the original criminal trial and the evidence adduced at the habeas corpus trial — he is actually innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted. Second, the petitioner must also establish that, after considering all of that evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom as the habeas court did, no reasonable fact finder would find the petitioner guilty of the crime." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilson v. Commissioner of Correction, 104 Conn.App. 224, 246, 932 A.2d 481 (2007). Here, the petitioner acknowledged that the state had enough evidence to convict him if he were to go to trial on the case involving the two boys. On the other case, he admitted his guilt. During the habeas trial, the petitioner failed to offer evidence of actual innocence other than his own testimony that he was innocent. The court does not find his testimony credible, and he has, therefore, fallen far short of the "clear and convincing" standard enunciated in Miller.
Based on the foregoing, the petitioner has failed to prove the claims asserted in the amended petition and, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is denied. Petitioner's counsel shall prepare and file the judgment file within thirty days.