Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2872-11T1
06-05-2014
LISA B. WALDORF, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOHN H. WALDORF, Defendant-Appellant.
John H. Waldorf, appellant pro se. Lisa B. Waldorf, respondent pro se.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Messano and Hayden.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hunterdon County, Docket No. FM-10-322-07.
John H. Waldorf, appellant pro se.
Lisa B. Waldorf, respondent pro se. PER CURIAM
Defendant John H. Waldorf appeals from the December 21, 2011 final judgment of divorce (JOD) entered after trial. Defendant contends that the judge erred in awarding permanent alimony to plaintiff Lisa B. Waldorf, imputing income when setting the amount of his alimony obligation, ordering him to pay part of plaintiff's counsel fees, and requiring him to maintain a life insurance policy to secure his obligations. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the award of permanent alimony, the award and amount of attorney's fees, and the requirement to maintain life insurance, but we reverse and remand for reassessment of the amount of the permanent alimony award and, if necessary, the amount of the life insurance needed to secure the award.
I.
The record reveals that the parties were married on August 28, 1995, and had one child, born in 1996. Defendant was a professional engineer, who worked for various companies throughout the marriage, regularly making a six-figure income. Plaintiff had a bachelor's degree in history and psychology and a law degree, but she never practiced law. When she met defendant, she was the chief editor for two legal publications, earning less than half of defendant's salary.
In 1991, plaintiff was diagnosed with lupus, which defendant knew when they married. As a result of the lupus, plaintiff experienced significant joint complications, skin rashes, fatigue, and multi-day migraine headaches. Plaintiff also suffered from two related autoimmune disorders, Sjogren's disease and Raynaud's phenomenon.
Due to her deteriorating physical condition, in 2001, plaintiff began working part-time, and in July 2003, she stopped working altogether. She applied for Social Security disability benefits (SSD), and the Social Security Administration found her totally disabled in 2003. At the time of trial, plaintiff's SSD payments amounted to $2044 per month, plus $1100 per month in derivative benefits for her son. She also received Medicare, which covered eighty percent of her medical costs, but did not cover her prescription drug costs.
Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on April 23, 2007.In a June 18, 2007 pendente lite order, the court ordered defendant to pay plaintiff unallocated support of $5700 per month. In an October 4, 2007 consent order, the parties agreed to increase support by $180.68 per month due to an increase in the monthly home equity loan payment. The court also ordered defendant to maintain health insurance for plaintiff and their son, which defendant cancelled three times during the course of the litigation, and life insurance, which was canceled due to defendant's non-payment of the premiums.
On October 29, 2008, plaintiff filed an amended complaint for divorce, claiming that defendant committed fraud against her and seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
In September 2009, defendant was terminated from his position due to a company reorganization. In January 2010 defendant left the country and went to live in Guatemala for a brief period before returning to the State. Defendant remained unemployed until August 23, 2010, when he began a job with a consulting firm. The firm furloughed defendant in March 2011. He was scheduled to start another job with the same firm at the end of July 2011 making $55 per hour, with a forty-hour week and the possibility of overtime.
During the pendency of this case, defendant was constantly behind in making support payments; at the start of trial he was over $19,000 in arrears. Defendant, who was pro se during most of the litigation, made numerous motions for a reduction in pendente lite support, which were all denied. Defendant was incarcerated for non-payment of support in November 2010, and in early April 2011 until May 26, 2011.
The trial judge conducted the trial over fifteen non-consecutive days from October 2010 to July 2011. On December 21, 2011, the judge issued a JOD and a comprehensive oral opinion. The judge found plaintiff and her witnesses to be credible. In contrast, he found defendant was incredible, "testifying in a way that perjured himself," and was out of touch with logic and reality. He also observed that defendant was singularly motivated to hurt plaintiff both financially and non-financially. The judge found defendant's witness, Debra Frank, defendant's girlfriend, "largely unhelpful," but noted that she was "well-off" and was helping defray defendant's living expenses.
In the JOD, the judge, among other relief, (1) granted plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of their son; (2) ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $64 per week in child support and $2000 in permanent alimony per week through a wage garnishment; (3) ordered defendant to maintain medical insurance for their son; (4) awarded plaintiff $98,889.34 in counsel fees and costs from defendant; and (5) placed a constructive trust on defendant requiring him to maintain a $500,000 life insurance policy naming plaintiff as beneficiary. This appeal followed.
Defendant was arrested on October 19, 2012, on a bench warrant issued for failure to pay support. On December 17, 2012, the Supreme Court ordered defendant's release from jail and stayed his incarceration pending appeal, conditioned on his continued payment of $1000 per week alimony and obtaining employment through which wages could be garnished within thirty days of the order.
On appeal, defendant (1) challenges the judge's imputation of a higher salary to him and the award of $2000 per week permanent alimony to plaintiff; (2) argues that the judge abused his discretion in awarding counsel fees against him; and (3) asserts that the judge abused his discretion in ordering him to maintain a $500,000 life insurance policy. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we determine that the judge did not abuse his discretion in awarding counsel fees to plaintiff or in requiring defendant to maintain a life insurance policy. We also find that the judge was reasonable in imputing a higher salary to defendant and in awarding permanent alimony. However, the resultant permanent alimony award amount did not appropriately consider and balance the equities. As such, we remand for recalculation. Once the amount of permanent alimony is recalculated, the amount of the life insurance may need to be reevaluated to reflect the amount being secured by the insurance. Defendant's remaining arguments do not warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Defendant amended his notice of appeal to confine the appeal to these three issues. In many places in the brief defendant complains about other issues that he deems erroneous, but we will address only the ones in the amended notice of appeal and in the point headings of the brief. R. 2:6-2(a)(5); Mid-Atl. Solar Energy Indus. Ass'n v. Christie, 418 N.J. Super. 499, 508 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 207 N.J. 190 (2011).
Although not part of this appeal, a change in the amount of alimony may necessitate recalculation of child support under the Guidelines.
II.
In divorce actions, the court may award alimony of several different types, including permanent alimony, depending on what is appropriate to the individual circumstances of the parties. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b). The alimony statute "reflect[s] the important policy of recognizing that marriage is an adaptive economic and social partnership[.]" Cox v. Cox, 335 N.J. Super. 465, 479 (App. Div. 2000). In determining the appropriateness and amount of alimony, the court should consider, among other things, the parties' needs and their respective ability to pay, the duration of the marriage, the age and health of the parties, the standard of living established during the marriage, the earning capacities and employability of the parties, the equitable distribution the parties receive after the divorce, and "[a]ny other factors which the court may deem relevant." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b).
The supporting spouse's obligation turns on the parties' economic life during the marriage, and the supporting spouse has an obligation "'to contribute to the maintenance of the dependent spouse at the standard of living formerly shared.'" Glass v. Glass, 366 N.J. Super. 357, 370 (App. Div.) (quoting Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 150 (1980)), certif. denied, 180 N.J. 354 (2004). Thus, the standard of living during the marriage serves as the "touchstone" for alimony. Crews v. Crews, 164 N.J. 11, 16 (2000). Whenever possible, the alimony award should be set at an amount that will "enable each party to live a lifestyle 'reasonably comparable' to the marital standard of living." Id. at 26 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(4)). "'The standard of living during the marriage is the way the couple actually lived, whether they resorted to borrowing and parental support, or if they limited themselves to their earned income.'" Glass, supra, 366 N.J. Super. at 371 (quoting Hughes v. Hughes, 311 N.J. Super. 15, 34 (App. Div. 1998)).
Courts may award alimony "as the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just . . . ." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. "Although '[c]ourts must consider the duration of the marriage' when fixing alimony, 'the length of the marriage and the proper amount or duration of alimony do not correlate in any mathematical formula.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 432 N.J. Super. 129, 152 (App. Div. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Lynn v. Lynn, 91 N.J. 510, 517-18 (1982)), certif. granted, 217 N.J. 52 (2014). "'Where the circumstances of the parties diverge greatly at the end of a relatively short marriage, the more fortunate spouse may fairly be called upon to accept responsibility for the other's misfortune -- the fate of their shared enterprise.'" Hughes, supra, 311 N.J. Super. at 33 (quoting Lynn, supra, 91 N.J. at 518). "As to the duration of alimony, '[t]he extent of actual economic dependency, not one's status as a wife, must determine the duration of support as well as its amount.'" Cerminara v. Cerminara, 286 N.J. Super. 448, 460 (App. Div.) (alteration in original) (quoting Lepis, supra, 83 N.J. at 155), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 376 (1996).
A significant factor to consider when determining a supporting spouse's ability to pay alimony is his or her potential to generate income. Miller v. Miller, 160 N.J. 408, 420 (1999). When setting a proper alimony award, "a judge must examine not only each party's income, but also his or her earning ability." Gnall, supra, 432 N.J. Super. at 159. "Income may be imputed to a party who is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed." Golian v. Golian, 344 N.J. Super. 337, 341 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Dorfman v. Dorfman, 315 N.J. Super. 511, 516 (App. Div. 1998)). This necessitates a finding of "intentional conduct without just cause." Ibid.
In a review of an alimony award, we defer to the trial judge's findings. Overbay v. Overbay, 376 N.J. Super. 99, 106 (App. Div. 2005). We will not overturn an alimony award unless we find
that the trial court clearly abused its discretion or failed to consider all of the controlling legal principles, or we must otherwise be satisfied that the findings were mistaken or that the determination could not reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record after considering all of the proofs as a whole."'[F]ailure to consider all of the controlling legal principles requires a remand.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Boardman v. Boardman, 314 N.J. Super. 340, 345 (App. Div. 1998)). "'A trial judge's decision to impute income of a specified amount will not be overturned unless the underlying findings are inconsistent with or unsupported by competent evidence.'" Overbay, supra, 376 N.J. Super. at 106-07 (quoting Storey v. Storey, 373 N.J.Super. 464, 474-75 (App. Div. 2004)).
[Gonzalez-Posse v. Ricciardulli, 410 N.J. Super. 340, 354 (App. Div. 2009).]
The trial judge acknowledged in his opinion that plaintiff sought alimony of $4167 per month and that defendant suggested $1884 per month, but the judge rejected both proposed amounts. The judge found that plaintiff had a critical need for alimony due to her disability and that defendant out-earned her throughout the marriage. The judge also found that plaintiff had no ability to meet her needs. He then reviewed plaintiff's case information statement (CIS) in detail and calculated a monthly need of $8635, which, according to the judge, still left plaintiff short each month.
This document was not included in the record.
From our review of the record, it appears that the judge reduced plaintiff's monthly needs by the child support and derivative SSD benefits she received but not by the amount of SSD she received each month. Her SSD payments should reduce her monthly needs when calculating alimony. See Gifford v. Benjamin, 383 N.J. Super. 516, 520 (App. Div. 2006) (holding, in area of child support, that SSD, as opposed to SSI, can be used to calculate support as it is "non-means-tested" and "designed to replace lost income").
On the other hand, the judge found that defendant "offered very little testimony about his needs, in fact almost none." Defendant testified that he had personal expenses of $3100 per month, but provided "no backup." The judge reviewed defendant's five CISs filed during the litigation and used the one dated April 22, 2011, as the basis for his decision. Although defendant showed a monthly budget of $9603, the judge deducted $6100 that he had listed for support, $2000 for COBRA payments that he no longer had, and $500 for rent that he was not paying because he lived with his girlfriend, leaving defendant's remaining listed monthly expenses totaling $1503.
The judge noted that the parties had been married four months shy of twelve years when the complaint was filed, but they lived together for a few months before the marriage, which indicated "a level of economic intertwinement which puts this marriage at 12 years[.]" The judge further found that "plaintiff's dependency and needs by far outweigh[ed] the duration as the controlling factor" that necessitated permanent alimony.
The judge determined that the marital standard of living was "a good one and a firmly middle class one, but it was funded by debt." The judge found that "[n]either party [would] be able to maintain the standard of living numerically, but the defendant ha[d] a much better chance of doing so." According to the judge's findings, defendant's expenses were "defrayed by a partner with whom he live[d]" and his earnings "maxed out at $156,000 in 2008 and $151,000 in 2009," which supported a high amount of permanent alimony. Moreover, the judge observed that plaintiff's earning ability was limited by her medical condition, but defendant's income was "limited only by his bad faith and his refusal to search earnestly for a job commensurate with his prior job and capacity." The judge found that these factors strongly weighed in favor of permanent alimony.
The judge made detailed findings regarding defendant's earning potential based upon his profession, extensive job experience, and past income. He concluded that defendant had the ability to pay for plaintiff's needs as well as his own, but he simply chose to "underemploy himself" by not seeking employment corresponding with his experience and "earnings history[.]" The judge used defendant's 2008 income "because that [was] the last full year of defendant's employment at American Water, which [was] a job that the defendant acquired clearly before the divorce planning and the divorce machinations began. It [was] also a year that represent[ed] . . . his earning capacity[.]" The judge then imputed a gross income of $3010 per week ($156,520 per year).
Based on the above factors, the judge ordered defendant to pay plaintiff permanent alimony of $2000 per week. He found that the amount was "robust enough to account for the fact that the defendant may depart the workforce and retire and therefore, the plaintiff need[ed] to make up for lost ground before that event happen[ed]."
We agree that an award of permanent alimony was reasonable under the circumstances here. Although twelve years is not an exceptionally long marriage, plaintiff's ailing health and inability to work created an actual economic dependency on defendant requiring him, as the more fortunate spouse, to accept responsibility for her misfortunes. See Hughes, supra, 311 N.J. Super. at 33; Cerminara, supra, 286 N.J. Super. at 460. Thus, to the extent possible, defendant must pay alimony commensurate with the standard of living the couple shared. See Glass, supra, 366 N.J. Super. at 370. The judge's award of permanent alimony in this case was not an abuse of discretion, and consequently we decline to overturn its award. See Gonzalez-Posse, supra, 410 N.J. Super. at 354.
We also find reasonable the trial judge's decision to impute a higher income to defendant based on his historical ability to earn. See Gnall, supra, 432 N.J. Super. at 159. The judge's finding that defendant is voluntarily underemployed and at times was voluntarily unemployed is fully supported in the record. See Golian, supra, 344 N.J. Super. at 341. Indeed, the record is replete with evidence that defendant's failure to earn his potential was "intentional conduct without just cause," ibid., warranting imputing income. Further, the trajectory of defendant's income was upward, culminating in a high income of $156,520 in 2008, which the judge found was the last year defendant worked without engaging in attempts to minimize his income. "Imputation of income is a discretionary matter not capable of precise or exact determination but rather requiring a trial judge to realistically appraise capacity to earn and job availability." Storey, supra, 373 N.J. Super. at 474. Here, the trial judge's use of defendant's highest salary was consistent with the evidence. See Overbay, supra, 376 N.J. Super. at 106-07. While the judge might have used other figures or methods to calculate a reasonable amount to impute, we do not find that the utilization of this amount constitutes an abuse of discretion.
III.
We reach a different conclusion about the quantum of the alimony award, which we view as a mistaken exercise of discretion. Defendant argues that the alimony award left him without sufficient funds for his reasonable expenses. We recognize that the records show that defendant was extremely uncooperative throughout the litigation, particularly about providing financial documents, which unnecessarily complicated and prolonged the litigation. Our examination of the record shows that the trial judge who handled the litigation was extremely patient with defendant despite his lack of cooperation, prevarication, and stalling tactics. Truly, here defendant was the architect of this flawed alimony award.
Indeed, defendant attached numerous financial documents to his final written summation, which were not admitted into evidence, were not subject to cross-examination and are not properly part of the record. See Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 452 (2007).
Defendant claims several times in his papers that the judge was biased against him. This claim is completely unsupported in the record. Unfavorable rulings against a party do not demonstrate bias. See Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 318 (App. Div. 2008).
Even so, we are constrained to find that the amount of permanent alimony did not realistically account for defendant's ordinary monthly needs and the marital standard of living. The judge based his decision on defendant's last CIS, which listed only the bare bones of personal expenses of $1503, which defendant argues does not represent his actual needs and expenses. It did not account for, among other things, all state and federal taxes, medical insurance for defendant and his son, mandated life insurance, payment of the counsel fee award, debt service, or many ordinary "middle class" living expenses. While the judge eliminated defendant's rent claim because he was living with Frank, the judge assumed that Frank was completely subsidizing all defendant's other expenses without any specific detailed evidence in the record and without determining a specific amount of unearned income.
Although the judge used defendant's 2011 CIS information, the budget was plainly austere and incomplete, showing that defendant, who formerly lived what the judge termed a "firmly middle class" lifestyle, had a need of only $18,036 per year.Given defendant's self-represented status, and despite his consistent lack of cooperation, the judge should have fully questioned defendant about his expenses to reach a more realistic budget. Moreover, the judge did not make a finding that this amount allowed defendant to reasonably maintain the marital standard of living.
The judge discussed varying estimates of the marital expenses as between $18,000 and $12,000 per month.
Meanwhile, the judge awarded plaintiff $104,000 in alimony plus $3328 in child support per year from defendant, and she was receiving $37,728 per year SSD non-taxable benefits. Thus, after support is paid, plaintiff has $145,056 per year and defendant has $49,192 gross per year.
We appreciate the trial judge's difficulty in not being provided with definitive evidence addressing defendant's reasonable needs and expenses. Nevertheless, the record shows that the judge relied inordinately on the one obviously inadequate CIS and did not closely consider all other factors in setting alimony, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b), in particular, the marital lifestyle. While the court showed proper concern for the ability of the supported spouse to maintain a lifestyle reasonably comparable to the marital one, the court must also strive to maintain the marital lifestyle of the payor. Crews, supra, 164 N.J. at 26 ("The court should state whether the support authorized will enable each party to live a lifestyle 'reasonably comparable' to the marital standard of living." (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(4))).
Because of her unfortunate health condition, the needs of plaintiff are undoubtedly great. Yet, she only requested monthly alimony of $4167. Due to defendant's woefully incomplete budget in his CIS, the current alimony award would likely render defendant completely incapable of meeting his own genuine needs or approximating the former marital lifestyle. In addition to applying the statutory factors and reaching an alimony amount that allows both parties to achieve a reasonably comparable lifestyle, the result must be fair and equitable. Steneken v. Steneken, 183 N.J. 290, 302 (2005). Although defendant greatly contributed to the result by not providing the proper documents, the result here, while well-intentioned, did not achieve the requisite fairness and equity to both parties.
As alimony awards are required to "satisfy basic concepts of fairness," id. at 298, we must reverse and remand for the recalculation of defendant's permanent alimony obligation. We remand only on the narrow issue of the amount of the permanent alimony award.
IV.
Defendant challenges the award of attorney's fees to plaintiff, claiming he did not act in bad faith, plaintiff acted in bad faith, and he cannot afford to pay the fees. Rule 5:3-5(c) governs the award of fees in family actions and lists nine factors the court must consider. Essentially, "in awarding counsel fees, the court must consider whether the party requesting the fees is in financial need; whether the party against whom the fees are sought has the ability to pay; the good or bad faith of either party in pursuing or defending the action; the nature and extent of the services rendered; and the reasonableness of the fees." Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 94-95 (2005) (emphasis omitted).
Even when there is not a financial disparity between the parties, "where a party acts in bad faith the purpose of a counsel fee award is to protect the innocent party from unnecessary costs and to punish the guilty party." Welch v. Welch, 401 N.J. Super. 438, 448 (Ch. Div. 2008) (citing Yueh v. Yueh, 329 N.J. Super. 447, 461 (App. Div. 2000)). "The court should afford protection and impose punishment regardless of the assets available to the innocent party." Kelly v. Kelly, 262 N.J. Super. 303, 307 (Ch. Div. 1992). "[B]ad faith for counsel fee purposes relates only to the conduct of the litigation," not to "the underlying issue of marital fault[.]" Mani, supra, 183 N.J. at 95.
An award "of counsel fees is discretionary, and will not be reversed except upon a showing of an abuse of discretion." Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 46 (App. Div. 2011). "An abuse of discretion 'arises when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Ibid. (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).
The trial judge detailed many incidents of defendant's bad faith, including allowing the health and life insurance to lapse several times despite court orders to maintain them, failing to attend mediation despite a court order, failing to pay support, numerous tax filing misrepresentations, non-disclosures on his CISs, re-directing mortgage bills without telling plaintiff even though she was responsible for paying them, cashing health insurance reimbursement checks not meant for him, attempting to get plaintiff's medical records despite a court order prohibiting it, and causing delay through purposeful lack of preparation. As to the other factors, the judge found that plaintiff's financial situation was dire, defendant had the ability to pay, plaintiff had primarily prevailed, defendant had previously been ordered to pay counsel fees, and plaintiff had to obtain eighteen orders to enforce pendente lite support and three to compel discovery. Thus, the judge ordered defendant to pay forty percent of plaintiff's counsel fees totaling $84,767.34, in addition to the $30,843 previously awarded during the pre-trial litigation.
The JOD provides for a total of $98,889.34, which included $14,122 defendant still owed on the prior attorney's fee awards.
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Our review of the record reveals that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion. See Barr, supra, 418 N.J. Super. at 46. The Rule 5:3-5(c) factors weigh heavily in favor of awarding counsel fees to plaintiff, especially the extreme bad faith demonstrated by defendant. We have no doubt that defendant's bad faith conduct caused plaintiff to incur pre-trial legal fees for enforcement and extra fees at trial. Plaintiff must be protected from such conduct. See Welch, supra, 401 N.J. Super. at 448. Here, even though once support has been paid there is no disparity between the parties' incomes, defendant's continuous and severe bad faith makes the court's decision to award counsel fees reasonable.
Defendant claims that plaintiff also acted in bad faith. The judge rejected this contention after reviewing each claimed act of bad faith. Even if some of plaintiff's conduct could be considered bad faith, plaintiff's actions were minute by comparison. Moreover, the award of only forty percent of plaintiff's counsel fees from the trial remediates any potential issue. We conclude that, among other factors, plaintiff's great need, defendant's ability to pay, and defendant's extreme bad faith warrant the award granted.
V.
Defendant also contends that the judge abused his discretion by ordering him to maintain a $500,000 life insurance policy. A court may order a party to maintain such insurance to ensure the party's obligations. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23; Claffey v. Claffey, 360 N.J. Super. 240, 263 (App. Div. 2003) ("Life insurance policies or trusts are frequently included in final judgments of divorce as security for support obligations."). All "relevant information should be considered by the trial court in determining, in the exercise of its discretion, an appropriate, fair and equitable amount of insurance coverage to be required as security for the continued and reasonable support of [the dependent spouse] in the event [the supporting spouse] predeceases [the dependent spouse]." Claffey, supra, 360 N.J.Super. at 264. Relevant factors may include the income capacity of the parties, the amount of alimony, eligible and mandatory retirement dates and potential modification of alimony caused thereby, the parties' financial circumstances, the eventual receipt of social security, and life expectancies. Ibid.
Here, the trial judge ordered defendant to maintain $500,000 in life insurance to secure his obligations because the judge had "no confidence that the defendant [was] going to honor its judgment and the plaintiff should have some means of collecting on the judgment." The judge selected this amount because that was the amount of insurance defendant had maintained during the marriage.
We are convinced that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in requiring defendant to maintain a life insurance policy. Especially in light of plaintiff's health condition, she would be left in dire straits should her support no longer be available. However, as we are remanding for recalculation of defendant's permanent alimony obligation, we also remand this issue solely as to the amount of the policy in light of any changes that might be made to the alimony award. On remand, the trial judge should look at all relevant factors to determine the appropriate amount of the policy. See ibid.
In sum, we affirm the JOD except for the amount of the permanent alimony award. We remand on the limited issue of the amount of alimony for a recalculation of defendant's permanent alimony after considering his reasonable expenses in light of his imputed income. To the extent that the alimony amount is changed, the court should consider the appropriate amount of life insurance, based on all relevant factors, including the recalculated alimony obligation.
Reverse and remand for proceedings in accordance with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION