Opinion
24A-CR-1153
10-23-2024
Arron Andre Waldeck, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Cara Schaefer Wieneke Wieneke Law Office, LLC Brooklyn, Indiana. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Jennifer Anwarzai Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Henry Circuit Court The Honorable Kit C. Dean Crane, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 33C02-1901-F5-6.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Cara Schaefer Wieneke Wieneke Law Office, LLC Brooklyn, Indiana.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Jennifer Anwarzai Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana.
Brown and Pyle, Judges concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
May, Judge.
[¶1] Arron Andre Waldeck appeals the trial court's order that she serve the rest of her suspended sentence in prison. Waldeck argues the order was an abuse of discretion because her probation violations were "minor[.]" (Appellant's Br. at 7.) We disagree with Waldeck's characterization of her violations and affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On November 11, 2019, Waldeck pled guilty to Level 5 felony escape. The court sentenced Waldeck to four years in prison, with the possibility of a sentence modification upon successful completion of Recovery While Incarcerated, a substance abuse rehabilitation program. After completing the program, Waldeck filed a petition to modify her sentence. The court granted her petition after a hearing on October 20, 2021, and ordered Waldeck to serve 138 days of home detention followed by two years of probation.
[¶3] On April 6, 2022, Waldeck began probation. The conditions of probation required Waldeck to submit periodic urinalysis drug screens, abstain from consuming alcohol or drugs, and report any new criminal charges within fortyeight hours. Between June 2022 and May 2023, Waldeck tested positive for methamphetamine nine times and THC one time. On June 9, 2023, the State filed a petition to revoke probation, and the court issued a warrant for Waldeck's arrest.
[¶4] On November 8, 2023, Officer Dan Beasley of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department responded to a call for a disturbance at Waldeck's residence. Waldeck twice told Officer Beasley that her name was "Arron Haney." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 14.) After confirming her correct legal identity, Officer Beasley arrested Waldeck for the outstanding warrant and the false statement about her identity. The State charged Waldeck with Class A misdemeanor false identity statement on November 9, 2023. The State filed an amended petition to revoke probation on November 20, 2023, alleging the facts underlying the criminal charge constituted an additional probation violation.
[¶5] On April 18, 2024, the court held a revocation hearing. Waldeck did not dispute the evidence presented but testified the alleged false identity was her "future married name" and the positive drug tests were due to a legal prescription. (Id. at 14-15.) The court discussed Waldeck's criminal history, which includes a conviction of possession of a controlled substance, two convictions of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, and a conviction of public intoxication. Due to her criminal history, in addition to the fact that she provided false information to Marion County authorities, the court explained that Waldeck's credibility "frankly, doesn't exist." (Id. at 17). In its written order, the trial court indicated it found Waldeck violated the terms of probation based on the positive drug tests. (App. Vol. 2 at 173.) In the process of revoking Waldeck's probation and ordering her to serve the remainder of her sentence incarcerated, the court also "noted [Waldeck's] attempt to avoid this Court's arrest warrant by providing false information to Marion County authorities." (Id.)
At the hearing, the trial court found "the State of Indiana has proven by [a] preponderance of the evidence that you violated probation as alleged in both petitions." (Tr. Vol. 2 at 17.) We accordingly interpret the trial court's written order to indicate it found both violations, but it used the drug violation to justify revocation of probation and the false informing violation to justify the sanction imposed.
Discussion and Decision
[¶6] Waldeck argues the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to serve the balance of her suspended sentence. "'Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.'" Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)). The decision to offer probation and the related conditions are matters for the trial court to determine. Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 616. Similarly, probation revocation is within the discretion of the trial court, and we review only for abuse of discretion. Id. Such an abuse occurs "where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or when the trial court misinterprets the law." Id. (internal citations omitted).
[¶7] Probation revocation is a two-step process. Trammel v. State, 45 N.E.3d 1212, 1215 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015). First, the State is required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant violated the conditions of probation. Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 615. Next, the trial court determines the sanction to impose for the violation. Trammel, 45 N.E.3d at 1215. "The violation of a single condition of probation is sufficient to revoke probation." Luke v. State, 51 N.E.3d 401, 421 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016), trans. denied. However, a trial court is not required to revoke probation, even if the probationer admits a violation. May v. State, 58 N.E.3d 204, 207 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) ("Even in the face of a probation violation, the trial court may nonetheless exercise its discretion in deciding whether to revoke probation."). In the event of a probation violation, the court may choose to continue probation with or without modification, extend probation, or order execution of all or part of the original sentence. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). Probation violation sanctions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hammann v. State, 210 N.E.3d 823, 832 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023).
[¶8] Waldeck admits the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate she violated probation. However, she argues the nature of the violations does not warrant the sanction imposed because she committed "minor violations." (Appellant's Br. at 9). We disagree.
[¶9] Waldeck has history of drug and alcohol abuse, including multiple convictions of operating a vehicle while intoxicated since 2008. After she completed drug court in 2016, three separate cases against her were dismissed, including charges of possession of a controlled substance. In the case at issue, the trial court placed Waldeck on probation only after she had successfully completed a substance abuse program during incarceration. However, within three months of release from incarceration, Waldeck tested positive for methamphetamine, and ultimately, over the next twelve months, she tested positive for methamphetamine a total of nine times and THC one time. This cannot be considered a minor violation of her probation. See, e.g., Overstreet v. State, 136 N.E.3d 260, 264 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019) ("positive drug screens are hardly mere 'technical' violations of probation"), trans. denied; cf. Johnson v. State, 62 N.E.3d 1224, 1231 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (violating probation by leaving at the wrong time but going to the right place, in light of defendant's limited intellectual function, constituted a minor violation).
[¶10] Additionally, Waldeck has been given multiple opportunities to succeed at probation, which twice before was revoked. See Overstreet, 136 N.E.3d at 264 (holding the trial court had shown Overstreet considerable leniency, including eight previous probation violations, and did not abuse its discretion by ordering Overstreet to serve the entire suspended sentence following an additional violation).
[¶11] Given Waldeck's history of substance abuse and failures to follow the conditions of probation, the trial court was not required to be lenient following her new violations. Consequently, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Waldeck to serve the balance of her suspended sentence in prison. See id. (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Overstreet to serve balance of five-year suspended sentence based on three positive drug screens, because Overstreet had been given numerous attempts at treatment for "his ongoing struggle with substance abuse").
Conclusion
[¶12] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Waldeck to serve the balance of her previously suspended sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[¶13] Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.