Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VanWagner

8 Citing cases

  1. Rippe v. Delbert Hooten Logging

    CA06-1277 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2007)

    2007); Crawford v. Single Source Transp. Fidelity Cas. Ins. Co., 87 Ark. App. 216, 189 S.W.3d 507 (2004). Objective findings are those findings which cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient, Crawford, supra, and are only necessary to establish the existence and extent of an injury, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VanWagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d 522 (1999). In the case before us, appellant relies primarily on Dr. Vann Smith's diagnosis of organic brain injury, which was based on neuropsychological testing performed on August 6, 2004. He also relies on his own testimony of his numerous symptoms, as well as the testimony of his long-time friends that he has suffered from numerous mental and cognitive problems since he was injured in 2004.

  2. Rippe v. Delbert Hooten Logging

    100 Ark. App. 227 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 17 times
    In Rippe v. Delbert Hooten Logging, 100 Ark. App. 227, 266 S.W.3d 217 (2007), and Parson v. Arkansas Methodist Hospital, 103 Ark. App. 178, 287 S.W.3d 645 (2008), we held that results of neuropsychological testing and a claimant's own testimony regarding his or her symptoms were not adequate to establish an organic brain injury by objective findings.

    2007); Crawford v. Single Source Transp. Fidelity Cas. Ins. Co., 87 Ark. App. 216, 189 S.W.3d 507 (2004). Objective findings are those findings which cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient, Crawford, supra, and are only necessary to establish the existence and extent of an injury, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VanWagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d 1522 (1999). In the case before us, appellant relies primarily on Dr. Vann Smith's diagnosis of organic brain injury, which was based on neuropsychological testing performed on August 6, 2004. He also relies on his own testimony of his numerous symptoms, as well as the testimony of his long-time friends that he has suffered from numerous mental and cognitive problems since he was injured in 2004.

  3. Wise v. Norwood-Lynda McDougald, Inc.

    2007 AWCC 43 (Ark. Work Comp. 2007)

    The burden of proof shall be by a preponderance of the evidence, and the resultant condition is compensable only if the alleged compensable injury is the major cause of the disability or need for treatment. Ark. Code Ann. ยง 11 โ€” 9 โ€” 102(4)(E)(ii) I further note that a claimant is not required to establish the causal connection between a work โ€” related incident and an injury by either expert medical opinion or by objective medical evidence. See Wal โ€” Mart Stores, Inc. v. Vanwagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d 522 (1999). In the present instance the claimant had worked as a log truck driver for seventeen years and had only worked for the respondents for a year and a half.

  4. Hales v. L H Logging

    2004 AWCC 31 (Ark. Work Comp. 2004)

    Objective medical evidence while necessary to establish the existence and extent of an injury, is not essential to establish a causal relationship between the injury and the work related accident. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.VanWagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d 522 (1999). Except in the most obvious cases, the existence of a causal relationship may require the assistance of expert medical evidence.

  5. Long v. L J Mechanical

    2003 AWCC 179 (Ark. Work Comp. 2003)

    The courts have held that the objective medical findings requirement of A.C.A. ยง 11-9-102(4)(D) does not apply to the causation element of compensability. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.v. VanWagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d 522 (1999); Stephens Truck Linesv. Millican, 58 Ark.App. 275, 950 S.W.2d 472 (1997). There is ample evidence of objective medical findings of injury to the claimant's right knee, including a torn medial meniscus observed and repaired by Dr. Mulhollan during his February 13, 2003 arthroscopy, and a torn posterior cruciate ligament revealed on a January 28, 2003 MRI.

  6. Payne v. McExpress, Inc.

    2003 AWCC 171 (Ark. Work Comp. 2003)

    Even if it is conceded solely for purpose of argument that Dr. Dube's opinion as to causation is not to be credited, case law establishes that the causation element of compensability need not be established by medical opinion. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VanWagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d 522 (1999); Stephens Truck Lines v. Millican, 58 Ark.App. 275, 950 S.W.2d 472 (1997). Therefore, even if Dr. Dube's opinion as to causation is deemed not to be credible (a conclusion I do not believe to be proper), such a conclusion would not in any way operate to defeat claimant's claim.

  7. Garrett v. Rehabilitation

    2002 AWCC 102 (Ark. Work Comp. 2002)

    While medical evidence is not required to show a causal connection, claimant must show proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Wal-MartStores, Inc. v. VanWagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d 522 (1999). Where claimant's case for causation rests mainly on her own testimony, the issue is that of credibility and one that is left to the discretion of the Commission. Gansky v. Hi-Tech Engineering, 325 Ark. 163, 924 S.W.2d 790 (1996).

  8. Stone v. Aztec Paving and Heavy Construction, Inc.

    2000 AWCC 72 (Ark. Work Comp. 2000)

    Bates v. Frost Logging Co., 38 Ark. App. 36, 827 S.W.2d 664 (1992). However, objective medical evidence of a causal connection between the condition for which claimant seeks treatment and the work-related incident need not be demonstrated in all cases. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Van Wagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d 522 (1999). In Van Wagner, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated: