Opinion
No. 33735.
May 22, 1939.
1. DRAINS.
Under statutes providing that assessment on drainage district land should continue to be a lien on land until paid and declaring that land should not be sold for less than amount of all taxes due on land at time of sale, the Legislature did not intend to discharge drainage district land from accruing of taxes during period it is held by the state under a tax sale (Code 1930, sections 4469, 4470, 4488, 4502).
2. DRAINS.
Though taxes accruing on drainage district land are held in abeyance during time land is held by the state under a tax sale, the taxes do accrue subject to the state's superior right, and when the state parts with its title, land is not freed from lien of taxes until they are paid in full, and proceedings may be had under statute to collect assessments levied during time when the state held title (Code 1930, sections 4469, 4470, 4488, 4502).
APPEAL from chancery court of Washington county; HON. J.L. WILLIAMS, Chancellor.
D.H. Waits, of Greenville, for appellant.
Comes D.H. Waits, appellant in the above styled cause, and says that he adopts the brief of the attorney-general, filed amicus curiae, as his brief in this cause.
W.W. Pierce, Assistant Attorney General, amicus curiae.
The word "taxes" in its broadest sense includes drainage benefit assessments.
McLain v. Meletio, 166 Miss. 1.
The right to enforce payment of drainage benefit assessments is governed by the same general principles as that of state and county taxes, from which it necessarily follows that if state and county taxes are not collectible by the state while the title to the land is vested in the state, then by the same rule or token drainage districts have no right to reach back and proceed against such land for drainage district taxes for the period of time the title to the land was owned by the state by virtue of a tax sale for state, county and drainage district taxes.
The levy and collection of benefit assessments is purely a statutory proceeding in the derogation of the common law.
25 R.C.L. 172, sec. 86.
If it had been the intent of the Legislature that the assessments placed against any individual tract of land would run from year to year, regardless of whether it was subject to taxation for other purposes or not, then it would not have been necessary for the Legislature to have required that the board of supervisors make an annual levy sufficient to meet obligations of the district. The very fact that the Legislature provided that it should be the duty of the board of supervisors to make an annual tax levy at the same time county tax levies are made is persuasive that it was the intent of the Legislature to place such a levy on the lands within the district as would be sufficient to meet the obligations of the district.
Section 4470, Code of 1930.
The tax collector is required to collect drainage taxes at the same time he collects state and county taxes. He is enjoined that he shall not accept any sum less than the aggregate amount of state, county and drainage district taxes. It is further clear that should any of the taxes including drainage taxes be not paid at maturity the tax collector shall sell the land for all taxes due thereon, including drainage taxes. If no person bid therefor the whole amount of taxes and all costs, the tax collector is required to strike the land off to the state. The owner is given the right to redeem both from the state and county taxes and drainage district taxes. If no redemption is effected, then the land commissioner is authorized to sell the land in the same manner as he sells other tax lands but is restricted in his right to sell such land for an amount less than the amount for which it was sold to the state.
Sections 4472 and 4488, Code of 1930; Robins v. Donovan Creek Dist. No. 2, 152 Miss. 872.
In order to arrive at the proper conclusion with reference to whether or not drainage taxes accrue on land while the title to such land is vested in the state, it is necessary to determine the status of drainage districts in their relation to the state.
In Standard Oil Co. v. National Surety Co., 143 Miss. 841, the court had before it this identical question and there arrived at the conclusion that a drainage district was a governmental agency and political subdivision of the state.
Therefore, accepting what the court there said as being the true status of drainage districts in their relation to the sovereign state from which the districts derive their power; and assuming that the word "taxes" in its broad sense includes drainage benefit assessments as the court so held in McLain v. Meletio, 166 Miss. 1; and further assuming that when land is sold to the state for non-payment of state, county and drainage district taxes, all taxes remain in abeyance while the title remains in the state, it would logically follow that good governmental policy would prohibit the accrual of taxes on property for any purpose while the title is vested in the state. That appears to be the policy in this state.
Section 3108, Code of 1930.
The court has jealously guarded this policy by consistently holding that when the title to property is vested in the state or a municipality it is exempt from taxation which means that taxes do not accrue thereon.
Meridian v. Phillips, 65 Miss. 362; Warren County v. Nall, 78 Miss. 726; Dees v. Kingman, 119 Miss. 199; Penick v. Willis Cotton Co., 119 Miss. 822; Alvis v. Hicks, 150 Miss. 306; Weems v. City of Laurel, 100 Miss. 335; Wildberger v. Shaw, 84 Miss. 442.
We realize that by section 3152, Mississippi Code of 1930, land sold to the state is required to be assessed at its proper value, if the time for redemption has not expired but this assessment is required only for purposes of redemption. The statute itself shows that to be the purpose of it. It is to safeguard the state and other political subdivisions in the collection of their revenue during that period of redemption, guaranteed to the owner by section 79 of the Constitution of 1890.
Carrier Lbr. Co. v. Quitman County, 156 Miss. 396.
Drainage districts are subordinate agencies of the state.
Standard Oil Co. v. National Surety Co., 143 Miss. 841; Howie v. Panola-Quitman Dr. Dist., 168 Miss. 387.
Taxes for general governmental purposes and for local improvements are alike in that the levy of each is in the exercise of the state's taxing power, and must be for a public purpose.
Cox v. Wallace, 100 Miss. 525; Howie v. Panola-Quitman Dr. Dist., 168 Miss. 387.
Can it be the law that a tax for one public purpose will accrue on real property while the title is in the state and at the same time will not accrue for another public purpose on the same land under the same circumstances? On what reasonable basis can such a rule be said to rest or have for its foundation?
When the land was sold by the state the land commissioner was required by statute (sections 4488 and 6044, Mississippi Code 1930, and chapter 174, Laws 1936) to certify the amount of taxes due the county, and subordinate taxing units including the drainage district, and it then becomes the duty of the auditor to issue his warrant in favor of the proper county and subordinate agencies. Therefore, when all the statutes are harmonized we are forced to the conclusion that drainage taxes like all other taxes do not accrue on land while the title is in the state.
For purposes of taxation generally, taxes on land, the title to which was in the state, is not collectible for any year in which the title was in the state of the first day of January.
Wildberger v. Shaw, 84 Miss. 442.
We realize that this court in Howie v. Panola-Quitman District, 168 Miss. 38, and in Covington v. Meletio, 168 Miss. 497, held that the sale of lands in a drainage district for state and county taxes did not relieve the land of the liens for drainage taxes thereafter to become due. The court also held that the lien for drainage taxes, and the lien for state and county taxes were of as nearly equal dignity as it was legislatively possible to make them; that neither of the liens necessarily displaces the other. For the purpose of this argument, we accept that at its face value but if that be true, where will the contentions of the appellee in this cause lead us to? If the drainage district can enforce payment of drainage taxes on land while the title is in the state, then the right of the drainage district is superior to that of the state. The drainage district as a subordinate agent of the state hath greater power than its creator, the state. This court would not for one moment entertain a claim by the state that it could go back and sell the land here included for state and county taxes for the years in which the title was vested in the state.
We would not for one moment contend before this court that the sale of the land to the state freed the land of the statutory lien placed thereon in the creation of the district and that is not our contention here. Our contention is that the drainage district cannot enforce collection of annual drainage tax levies made upon the land while the title is in the state because there is no person as contemplated by our statutes in ownership so that the taxes may attach as a valid obligation during the time the title is vested in the state.
Ernest Kellner, of Greenville, amicus curiae.
The bill of complaint was filed on March 6, 1939, and on the same day, without notice to the defendant and notwithstanding his decision in the former suit, between the same parties involving the same issues, that the taxes or assessments were collectible, the chancellor issued the fiat of injunction; on the same day the injunction bond was filed and the injunction issued upon which is endorsed acceptance of service; on the next day, March 7, 1939, the defendant filed its answer and motion to dissolve the injunction; one week later, on March 14, 1939, without any notice to him so far as the record discloses, the attorney-general was permitted to appear as amicus curiae in the cause, when the motion to dissolve the injunction was heard and sustained and a final decree entered dismissing the bill of complaint; the appeal bond was filed March 17, 1939.
In this connection the court will bear in mind that no appeal lies from the refusal to grant a fiat for the issuance of a temporary injunction.
State Board of Barber Exms. v. Broom, 161 Miss. 679.
If the chancellor upon the application for the temporary injunction in this cause had adhered to his decision in the former suit between the same parties for the collection of the same taxes or assessments that said taxes were collectible, the temporary injunction would have been denied and there could have been no appeal to this court. In dissolving the temporary injunction and dismissing the bill of complaint it is apparent that the chancellor did adhere to his decision in the former suit.
The foregoing facts create a compelling and irresistible inference that this cause is not a real suit between the parties but simply an effort by the parties to secure an adjudication by this court of the abstract legal question of whether or not drainage taxes or assessments against lands owned by the state are collectible after the state sells such lands regardless of whether the taxes and assessments in this cause are otherwise valid. Courts do not entertain such suits.
Muskogee Gas, etc., Co. v. Haskell, 38 Okla. 358, 132 P. 1098, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 190. Percy Farish and D.S. Strauss, all of Greenville, for appellee.
The fact that the land in the instant case was sold to the state for non-payment of taxes and title matured in the state did not in any way extinguish or abate the unpaid portion of the assessment originally levied, nor was that portion of the assessment which matured during the period title to the land was in the state abated, but upon the state divesting itself of the title to such land the district has a right to enforce against the land that portion of the tax which matured during such period.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi has had occasion to deal with the question of the liability of land sold to the state for taxes during the time the title to the land was in the state, the land having been subsequently patented by the state. The court has harmonized the conflicting provisions in the various statutes with reference to the predominancy of an ad valorem sale over a benefit assessment, and in every case in which the question has been presented the court has harmonized the seeming conflict by holding that the provisions relative to the ad valorem tax and the provisions relative to the benefit assessment were of equal dignity and that a sale under one or the other of these taxes does not displace the lien of the other.
Carrier Lbr. Co. v. Quitman County, 156 Miss. 396; Seward v. City of Jackson, 165 Miss. 478; Howie v. Panola-Quitman Dr. Dist., 168 Miss. 387; Covington v. Meletio, 168 Miss. 497; Turley v. St. Francis County, 287 S.W. 196; Wyatt v. Beard, 15 S.W.2d 990; Hopper v. Chandler, 36 S.W.2d 398; Miller v. Watkins, 110 S.W.2d 531, 111 S.W.2d 466.
In the Carrier case, supra, our court held the statutes on taxation must be construed together and viewed as a whole, and that when land is sold to the state for taxes the taxes of the subordinate agencies are in abeyance until the state disposes of the land, and it will be noted that the court states, while not passing upon the question, that any diminution or abatement of a tax theretofore levied would be in violation of section 100 of the Constitution.
In levying the assessment of benefits and providing for a sale of the bonds against such benefits assessment provision had to be made to secure the payment of the bonds issued under the drainage law. Security was effected through the use of the words that the drainage assessment should remain in effect against the land until the same had been paid. On the faith of this provision bonds were issued and sold, and on the faith of a proposed assessment to cover the payment of the bonds, the various land owners consented to the levy of the tax against their lands. Any diminution of the assessment would be a breach of faith with the purchasers of the bonds and would be a breach of faith with the other land owners in the district to the extent that the assessment against any particular land is abated or held unenforceable. It operates to cause the other lands in the district to pay a larger proportion of the tax in order to make up for the deficiency created by such abatement.
For this court to hold that the assessments maturing during the time title to the land was in the state is abated and cancelled would be to that extent a diminution of the tax and against the express provisions of the drainage act.
Carrier Lbr. Mfg. Co. v. Quitman County, 156 Miss. 396; Seward v. City of Jackson, 165 Miss. 478; Howie v. Drainage District, 168 Miss. 387; Covington v. Meletio, 168 Miss. 497.
It will be noted that as the cases arose the Supreme Court of this state has in each and every instance sustained the validity of the benefit assessment as originally imposed, and where there has been a conflict between the statute covering the benefit assessments and some other statute with reference to the ad valorem taxes the provisions of the two sections were harmonized, each held to be all inclusive and all exclusive. But the court was particular in each case to hold that the lien and sale for the ad valorem tax would not displace the lien of the benefit assessment and did not extinguish such lien.
At no time in the history of this state has it been the intent of the Legislature that the State of Mississippi should receive a benefit from these drainage districts in connection with lands owned by it without bearing its just and proper burden of the expense of the district.
A drainage district having been organized which proved beneficial to the lands owned by the state and used by it in its penitentiary system recognizing the impropriety of receiving the benefit without assuming any burden, in 1918 the state made provision for the payment of its proportionate part of the expenses of the district.
Chapter 213, Laws of 1918; Chapter 267, Laws of 1924; Chapter 174, Laws of 1936.
That at no time did the Legislature intend a cancellation of a drainage assessment by reason of sale of land to the state for taxes is further disclosed by section 4488, Code of 1930, which provides that the land commissioner shall account for the "drainage tax accrued subsequently to the sale for taxes."
We think it clear from the principles announced by our court and by the Supreme Court of Arkansas the drainage assessments maturing during the time the title to the land is in the state are suspended and upon the state parting with its title the assessments maturing thereon during this period become enforceable against the land; that at no time were the assessments cancelled or extinguished by reason of the tax sale or ownership by the state.
The land remained subject to the lien of the drainage assessment, and a sale of the land to the state does not abate the tax, but merely suspends the enforcement of same while the title is in the state.
As held in the Seward case and in the Howie case, if 6044 should be held applicable but in conflict with 4469 and 4438, the three sections would be harmonized, each being held all inclusive and all exclusive and under the authority of those cases as well as the Meletio case the assessment lien would be held to remain only suspended and not abated by reason of the sale to the state.
Certainly the court will not, by implication, extend the meaning of section 6044, in the face of the legislative declaration that the drainage lien shall remain unaffected by anything except payment. More particularly when the provisions of section 6044 have been limited and restricted by the act of 1936 to cover only state, county and levee taxes, and the drainage lien is expressly excepted from the provisions of that section; that is to say, state, county and levee taxes alone are in abeyance while the state holds title to the land.
We respectfully submit, while the title to the land is vested in the state, the assessments maturing against the land are unenforceable through a sale of the land; that such assessments so maturing are not extinguished or abated, and as soon as such land becomes privately owned, the assessments so maturing are enforceable and the land can be sold if payment is not made.
Argued orally by D.H. Waits, for appellant, by W.W. Pierce, amicus curiae, and by H.P. Farish and D.S. Strauss, for appellee.
D.H. Waits purchased 160 acres of land from the state, which land had been sold for taxes, and the title to which had become absolute in the state as to state and county taxes. This land is described as Southwest quarter of section 30, township 17, range 7 west, and is situated in the Black Bayou Drainage District. The bill alleged that the land was sold on the first Monday of April, 1931, for taxes due thereon for the year 1930, including drainage taxes; and was struck off and sold to the state of Mississippi; that not being redeemed from the said sale, the title to the land matured in the state, and on the 6th of September, 1934, patent No. 20946 was issued to the complainant, the patent being recorded in book No. 254, at page 589, of the records of Washington county. The Black Bayou Drainage District was organized under chapter 195 of the Laws of 1912, and amendments thereto, on September 4, 1916; and in connection therewith an assessment roll of total benefits to all the lands in the district, amounting to $1,494,349, was duly and legally prepared and filed by the commissioners of the district, and legally approved by the board of supervisors of Washington county, as provided by section 7, chapter 269, Laws of 1914. It was alleged that on the said assessment roll benefits in the sum of $2880 were assessed against this land, now owned by the complainant, as the total benefit to accrue thereto by reason of the improvement proposed by the district; and that on June 18, 1917, there was apportioned against the total benefits the sum of $740,745, plus 6% per annum interest, and bonds in the sum of $700,000 were ordered to be issued by the district, and by the board of supervisors.
It was alleged that in the year 1921 a second bond issue, in the sum of $150,000 was issued by the district, and an additional tax of $160,000 was levied against the lands in the district, apportioned against the original assessed benefits, the total of the two levies amounting to $900,745, with interest at 6% per annum, was levied and assessed against the real property in the district by the board of supervisors, in proportion to the assessment of benefits thereon, to be paid in annual installments, the total tax bearing interest at 6% per annum annually, payable on December 15th of each year.
It was further alleged that in the year 1932 the drainage district, finding itself in financial difficulties, in regard to the holders of the bonds then unpaid and outstanding, issued refunding bonds in the sum of $653,000; and the assessment theretofore levied against the district was reapportioned and rearranged, so as to meet the maturity of the refunding bonds of 1932, and taxes were relevied by the drainage district; which bonds were validated by the Chancery Court of Washington County, Mississippi. That the said drainage district issued refunding bonds again in 1934, which were sold and delivered to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the maturities of the bonds were re-arranged, and unpaid taxes theretofore levied against the district were attempted to be re-levied, to agree with the maturities of the bonds directed to be issued and sold to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. This bond issue was validated by the Chancery Court of Washington County.
It was then alleged that the drainage district was claiming the right to have the said land sold by the sheriff and tax collector for drainage taxes, or benefit assessments, together with interest thereon, which was alleged to have accrued on the land while the title thereto was vested in the state, the amount of said claim being $783.84.
The bill alleged that the drainage taxes or benefit assessments for the years 1931, 1932, 1933 and 1934, while the title to said land was vested in the state, did not accrue thereon, but on the contrary, were in abeyance during that time; and that the said assessments are uncollectible and, unenforceable, in that said lands were not subject to assessment so long as the title was vested in the state; that the assessment for drainage taxes or benefit assessments did not attach to said lands during the ownership of the state, and therefore the lands are not subject to sale therefor; and that the sale of the lands by the sheriff and tax collector on April 4, 1931, for non-payment of state, county and drainage taxes exhausted the right of the said drainage district to have the lands sold for such failure, and that the lands cannot be sold again for failure to pay a tax levy thereon while the title was vested in the state under the previous tax sale.
It was then alleged that the drainage commissioners have required the board of supervisors of Washington county to have the lands in question sold for the drainage assessments levied thereon while the title to them was in the state, and if permitted to do so, complainant will be subjected to the damages and penalties accruing from such sale by the sheriff, which will work irreparable damage to complainant, and cast a cloud, doubt and suspicion upon his title, which he is entitled to have removed by the court. And the complainant prayed for process to issue against the Black Bayou Drainage District, and its commissioners, commanding them to appear, answer or demur to the bill of complaint, waiving answer under oath; and prayed for an injunction restraining and enjoining the said district and commissioners from enforcing the collection of the assessments maturing while the title to the land was in the state; and that a temporary restraining order be issued, and, on final hearing, be made perpetual. The complainant deraigned title, as required by law; answer was filed, and the case came on for trial on an agreed statement of facts, as follows:
"It is agreed by and between the complainant and the defendant in the above styled cause that in the original order levying the tax in the Black Bayou District, the said tax or assessment was ordered spread over a period of years; and the unpaid portion of the tax was ordered to bear interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum. In the orders in connection with the issuance of the refunding bonds in 1932 and 1934, the unpaid portion of the original benefit assessment was ordered to be paid in installments, and spread over a period of years. The tax in controversy in the instant litigation, was a part of the tax ordered to be paid in the original order spreading the tax over a period of years, and a part of the tax as rearranged in 1932 and 1934. It has not been paid to the Land Commissioner or to the drainage district. In addition thereto annual levies of assessment were made, in conformity to the original levy.
"If the amount claimed to be due on the land in controversy, together with the amounts claimed to be due by other parcels of land theretofore sold to the state, and which are situated in said district, is not collectible, then there must be, to the extent of the original assessment of benefits, a larger proportion of said benefit assessment paid by the other parcels of land in said district, and which were not sold to the state."
The Attorney-General filed an application to be admitted as attorney amicus curiae, which was allowed. On the hearing the court dismissed the bill, and allowed an appeal to this court.
Chapter 195, Laws of 1912, as amended by subsequent acts, is contained in chapter 107, Code of 1930. By section 4469 of the Code the assessment of benefits provided for is as follows: "The chancery court or chancellor in vacation shall at the same time that the assessment of benefits is filed, or at any subsequent time, when called upon by the board of commissioners of the district so to do, enter upon the minutes of the chancery court an order which shall have all the force of a judgment providing that there shall be assessed upon the real property of the district a special assessment, or levy, to pay the estimated cost of the improvement, with not less than ten (10) per cent., added for unforeseen contingencies, the amount to be assessed upon each tract of land included within the district shall be such part of the estimated cost of the improvement as the assessment of benefits against such tract bears to the assessment of benefits against all the real property in the district, and which said assessments are to be paid in annual installments, not to exceed ten (10) per cent., in any one year, as provided in such order, but if any landowner elects he may pay the whole amount of the assessment against his land before it becomes due, or at any time thereafter, or all or any part of said assessment at any time he sees fit, provided such payment is made before any bonds are issued by the district.
"The assessment or assessments so levied shall be a lien on all of the real property of the district from the time that the same is levied by the chancery court or chancellor in vacation in an amount not to exceed the total amount of estimated benefits on all the real property in the district, and shall be entitled to preference to all demands, executions, encumbrances or liens whatsoever, and shall continue until such assessment, with any penalty and costs that may accrue thereon, shall have been paid. The remedy against such assessment shall be by appeal to the Supreme Court, and such appeal must be taken within twenty days from the time that said assessment has been made by the chancery court, or chancellor in vacation, and on such appeal the presumption shall be in favor of the legality of the assessment."
By section 4470 the board of supervisors is directed to make an annual tax levy at the same time as the county tax levy is made, or at any succeeding regular meeting, in an amount not exceeding the installment of assessments levied for that year sufficient to meet the obligations of the district.
It will be seen from a reading of section 4469, above set out in full, that the assessment so levied shall be a lien on all real property in the district, from the time the same is levied by the Chancery Court or the Chancellor in vacation, in an amount not exceeding the amount of estimated benefits on all real property in the district, and shall be entitled to preference "to all demands, executions, encumbrances or liens whatsoever, and shall continue until such assessment, with any penalty and costs that may accrue thereon, shall have been paid. (Italics supplied.)
This lien on the land for benefits was made in the exercise of the taxing power, on the basis of the theory that the value of the land increased to the extent of the benefits assessed, and that the owner of the land received in benefits an amount equivalent to the taxes or lien assessed against it. It is true, the statute decreed that the state drainage tax shall be collected at the same time as the state and county taxes, and that the tax collector shall not accept an amount less than the state and county taxes, plus the drainage tax; and that at the sale, if no one bids the amount of the state, county and drainage taxes, the land shall be struck off to the state. See section 4488 of the Code, which provides, among other things, as follows: "The land commissioner in his monthly settlements with the treasurer on account of money received in the sale of lands which were theretofore sold to the state for taxes and in his report thereof to the auditor shall specify the amount of the drainage taxes and damages thereon, and the drainage taxes accrued subsequently to the sale for taxes, shall be placed to the credit of the proper drainage district."
The statute then directs that at the end of each month the Treasurer shall forward to each drainage district a statement of the amount of money to its credit, and on application of the drainage district shall issue a warrant on the treasury; and on application of the drainage district the Auditor of Public Accounts shall draw a warrant on the state Treasurer for the sum, and deliver it to the drainage district, which shall, in turn, deliver it to its treasurer and charge him therewith.
Under the law the drainage district was authorized to bid at the tax sale, to protect its interest in such case; and if it purchases at any tax sale under the terms of this section the board of commissioners, after the expiration of two years from the date of purchase, by an order entered on its minutes, may sell, lease or rent the land so purchased, the deed or lease to be executed by the president and secretary, under the seal of the district; but said lands not to be sold for an amount less than the price paid therefor, together with all subsequently accrued state, county, drainage and other taxes.
This declares that the policy of the law in regard to the land is that it shall not be sold for less than the amount of all taxes due on the land at time of the sale. It is also provided in this section that the drainage district shall pay all state, county and other taxes assessed against the land purchased by it at tax sales, under the provisions of this section, out of any funds belonging to the district in the treasury.
Taking the law as above stated, it is clear that it was not the purpose of the Legislature to discharge the drainage district lands from accruing of taxes during the period it is held by the state under a tax sale.
By section 4502, Code of 1930, chapter 269, Laws of 1914, it is provided that this article shall be liberally construed to promote ditching, drainage and reclamation of wet, swampy and overflowed lands; and the collection of assessments thereunder "shall not be defeated by reason of any omission, imperfection or defect in the organization of any district, or in the proceedings occurring prior to the judgment of the court confirming assessment of benefits and damages; but said judgment shall be conclusive that all prior proceedings were regular and according to law. And in case any assessment shall be held to be void for want of notice, the said commissioners may, upon motion, be permitted to give such owner due notice and ask for a time to be set by the chancery court, or chancellor in vacation, for hearing any and all objections that said landowner may have to such proceedings and the assessment, and the chancery court, or chancellor in vacation at such time may make such orders in reference thereto as justice may require and may assess such landowner his just proportion of the benefits received by him by such proposed work or the damages suffered by him by such proposed work, and thereupon such assessment as to such land shall be binding and conclusive."
While the state is not required to pay the taxes accruing on the land for drainage purposes, and such taxes are held in abeyance during the time it is held by the state, yet the taxes do accrue subject to the state's superior right, and when the state parts with its title, it does not free the land from such lien until the taxes are paid in full, and proceedings may be had under the statute to collect the assessments levied during the years when the state held the title, when the taxes were in abeyance. The bonds sold by the drainage districts are paid on assessments relatively equal to the lands held by the different property owners, each being assessed with the amount which his property is legally adjudged to have benefited. If the taxes are levied, although not collected during the period of the state's ownership, there is a basis upon which the drainage commissioner may operate in taking care of its obligations.
If the lands were freed from taxation during those years, it might be possible for a large amount of such lands to be freed from the obligation during that period, which would seriously impair the value of the bonds issued by the district, and their marketability, and would impose burdens on those paying their taxes, who would have to pay additional sums, which would be unjust and inequitable, and which was not within the contemplation of the Legislature in enacting the statutory plan. The principles controlling this case are announced in Howie v. Panola-Quitman Drainage District et al., 168 Miss. 387, 151 So. 154; Covington v. Meletio et al., 168 Miss. 497, 151 So. 735, and Seward v. City of Jackson, 165 Miss. 478, 144 So. 686.
It follows, from these cases, and from what we have said, that the drainage district was proceeding properly, and that the Chancellor was correct in dissolving the injunction sued out, and in dismissing the bill.
The judgment of the Chancery Court is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.