]" ( People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 752; see Valley Circle Estates, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 611; Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 284-285 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 354] .) Wagner v. State of California (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 922 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 489], cited by defendant, is inapposite. There, this court held that a cross-complaint for equitable indemnity, filed in an action based upon a patent deficiency in real property, was barred by the statute of limitations.
The motions alleged the same grounds as the demurrers originally filed and directed the court's attention to three cases decided after the filing of Judge Murry's ruling in which either Code of Civil Procedure section 337.1 or 337.15 was held to be constitutional. Regents of University of California v. Hartford Acc. Indem. Co. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 624 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 486, 581 P.2d 197]; Wagner v. State of California (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 922 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 489]; Eden v. Van Tine (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 879 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 215, 12 A.L.R.4th 856]. The various motions for judgment on the pleadings were granted on the basis that the deficiency in the building was "patent," the building was substantially completed more than four years prior to the death of appellant's mother and therefore the complaint was barred by the four-year statute of limitations.
The concept of promoting construction tends to harmonize with the public policy favoring the full enjoyment and use of real property." ( Wagner v. State of California (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 922, 929-930 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 489].) "A contractor is in the business of constructing improvements and must devote his capital to that end; the need to provide reserves against an uncertain liability extending indefinitely into the future could seriously impinge upon the conduct of his enterprise."
[Citations.]'" ( Preston v. Goldman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 108, 123 [ 720 P.2d 476], quoting Wagner v. State of California (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 922, 927 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 489].) "Whether a defect is apparent by reasonable inspection is a question of fact."
[Citations.]" ( Wagner v. Stateof California (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 922, 927 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 489]; see Baker v. Walker Walker, Inc. (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 746, 763 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 245]; Code Civ. Proc., ยงยง 337.1, subd. (e), 337.15, subd. (b).) In Mattingly v. Anthony Industries, Inc. (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 506 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 292], 13 years after the construction of a pool in an apartment complex, an 18-month-old child fell in and suffered injury.
(5) As Sandy argues, the purpose of section 337.15 is to protect contractors and other professionals and tradespeople in the construction industry from perpetual exposure to liability for their work. ( Regents of University of California v. Hartford Acc. Indem. Co. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 624, 633, fn. 2 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 486, 581 P.2d 197]; Wagner v. State of California (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 922, 929-930 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 489] .) The statute reflects a legislative concern that "expanding concepts of liability could imperil the construction industry unless a statute of limitations was enacted."
(1b) Turning to the merits of appellant's argument, we note that section 337.1 is a mere "economic regulation" since it touches neither upon a suspect class nor a fundamental right. "`In the area of economic regulation, the high court has exercised restraint, investing legislation with a presumption of constitutionality and requiring merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose.'" ( Wagner v. State of California (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 922, 929 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 489].) (See Schwalbe v. Jones (1976) 16 Cal.3d 514, 517-518 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 321, 546 P.2d 1033]; Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 392, 410 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 183, 546 P.2d 687]; Ganschow v. Ganschow (1975) 14 Cal.3d 150, 158 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 865, 534 P.2d 705].)
We think our holding is consistent with the probable determination of that question by the California Supreme Court, for reasons expressed by it in Safeway Stores v. NestKart, 21 Cal.3d 322, 146 Cal.Rptr. 550, 579 P.2d 441 (1978), a case involving similar, although not identical, issues. See also Wagner v. California, 86 Cal.App.3d 922, 927 n.1, 150 Cal.Rptr. 489 (Ct.App. 1978); County of Ventura v. City of Camarillo, 80 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1024, 144 Cal.Rptr. 296 (Ct.App. 1978). Compare Silveria v. Imperial Irrigation District, 85 Cal.App.3d 705, 707-08, 149 Cal.Rptr. 653 (Ct.App. 1978).
"[T]he purpose of section 337.15 is to protect contractors and other professionals and tradespeople in the construction industry from perpetual exposure to liability for their work. ( Regents[, supra,] 21 Cal.3d 624, 633, fn. 2 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 486, 581 P.2d 197]; Wagner v. State ofCalifornia (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 922, 929-930 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 489].) The statute reflects a legitimate concern that `expanding concepts of liability could imperil the construction industry unless a statute of limitations was enacted.'
) This language was removed by amendments and the section was enacted in its present form. (Stats. 1971, ch. 1569, ยง 1, p. 3148; see also, Wagner v. State of California (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 922, 931 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 489], dis. opn.) This deletion was highly significant, especially since section 337.1, a similar section providing a four-year statute of limitations for damages arising from patent defects, was in existence at the time, and specifically provided that it applies to "injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any such patent deficiency."