(4) Augmentation of a record on appeal is provided for in rule 12(a) of the California Rules of Court. The function of the augmentation procedure is to supplement an incomplete but existing record ( Wagner v. Chambers (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 14, 21 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 334]), and the rule is to be construed liberally ( People v. Gaston (1978) 20 Cal.3d 476, 483 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 205, 573 P.2d 423]). Augmentation is not available, however, for the purpose of adding material that was not a proper part of the record in the trial court.

It is settled that on a clerk's transcript alone there is a conclusive presumption on appeal that findings by the trial court are supported by the evidence and may not be disturbed. ( Wagner v. Chambers (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 14 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 334].) Here, no findings were made nor is there any indication in the trial court's minute order that evidence other than that before us in documentary form was presented or considered.

( Sanchez v. Grace Methodist Episcopal Church, 114 Cal. 295 [46 P. 2]; Murray v. Title Ins. Trust Co., supra; see Anderson v. Citizens Sav. etc. Co., supra, 185 Cal. 386; Wagner v. Chambers, 232 Cal.App.2d 14, 19 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 334]; Pinsky v. Sloat, 130 Cal.App.2d 579, 585 [ 279 P.2d 584].)

In the case before us, declarations by Pacific of ownership of the land and certification of accuracy of the tract map by Merchants have heretofore been discussed. There is an initial and obvious difference between such declarations and the deed to the Los Angeles Railway Company in Wagner v. Chambers, 232 Cal.App.2d 14 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 334], for the deed contained a reverter clause upon abandonment by grantee. None such is contained in the deed from Merchants to Pacific.

If substituted service without any use of the right We return to the alternative claim that the subsequent dedication of public streets adjacent to the rights of way transferred a public street easement in the ways. It appears that after the conveyance by respondent's predecessors of the subject right of way, public streets on either side of Crenshaw, Leimert and Santa Barbara were dedicated by subdivision map a somewhat similar situation developed on both sides of Vermont. The subdivision maps show that the rights of way were separated from the subdivided lots by a colored line--the sketch reproduced in Wagner v.Chambers, 232 Cal.App.2d 14, 17, 42 Cal.Rptr. 334, typifies the situation on Vermont. It is appellant's position that the dedication of land for a public street, when the dedicating instrument shows the street to be bounded by a railroad right of way, conveys an interest to one-half of the right of way abutting the street.

According to appellants, the effect of the challenged finding is a "leap-frogging" across Marshfield Way, thus making inoperative the presumptions declared by the statutes set forth below. Cited and relied on is the holding of this court in Wagner v. Chambers, 232 Cal.App.2d 14 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 334], where, if we had adopted appellants' argument, there would have been a similar but much more extensive "leap-frogging." With respect to Lot 31, there is no such problem since the property thus conveyed abutted directly upon the southerly line of the right-of-way, to-wit, by metes and bounds description "along the said southerly line of the right of way to a point. . . ."

"[8]. Plaintiffs cite California Civil Code § 831, California Code of Civil Procedure § 2077, and Anderson v. Citizen Savings and Trust Co. (1921) 185 Cal. 386, 392-393 for the proposition that, when deeds are involved, land described in the deed as bounded by a public highway or street shall be considered as extending to the center of the street or highway unless it is clearly stated otherwise. As explained in Wagner v. Chambers (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 14, 19, this rule applies when the abutting streets at issue are actually part of the subdivision tract owned in fee by the grantor, so that title to half of the abutting streets passes to the grantee. In Millyard v. Faus (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 76, 83, the court noted that the general rule is that where lots are sold by number and not by metes and bounds, and reference is made to a registered map and plat which show that the property abuts on a street or highway, the conveyance carries to the center of street.

Its function is to supplement an incomplete but existing record.'" (Wagner v. Chambers (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 14, 21.) The augmentation Andrew requests is particularly unfair because it does not include a reporter's transcript of the preceding two days of trial.

Its function is to supplement an incomplete but existing record.'" (Wagner v. Chambers (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 14, 21.) As we also noted at the outset, permitting such augmentation after briefing has been completed would be particularly unfair to Daley.

As a motion to augment the record, the instant motion cannot stand, since such motion cannot be used to create a record but solely to supplement an incomplete but existing record. Wagner v. Chambers, 232 Cal.App.2d 14, 42 Cal.Rptr. 334 (1965). A clerical error may be corrected so that the record may truly reflect the court's action.