Opinion
20210513-CA
06-23-2023
Benjamin Lamar Wadman, Appellee, v. Trisha Wadman, Appellant.
Jill L. Coil, Stephen J. Oliphant, and Gabrielle G. Jones, Attorneys for Appellant Daniel S. Drage, Attorney for Appellee
Second District Court, Ogden Department The Honorable Reuben J. Renstrom No. 954900752
Jill L. Coil, Stephen J. Oliphant, and Gabrielle G. Jones, Attorneys for Appellant
Daniel S. Drage, Attorney for Appellee
Judge Ryan M. Harris authored this Opinion, in which Judges Gregory K. Orme and Michele M. Christiansen Forster concurred.
HARRIS, JUDGE
¶1 Benjamin Wadman and Trisha Wadman are the parents of a son (Son) who is now in his early thirties. In the parties' original divorce decree, entered in 1995, Benjamin was ordered to pay child support, which he did until Son's high school class graduated. In 2021, Trisha filed a petition with the court, asserting that Son is "incapacitated" and has been for many years, and asking the court to require Benjamin to continue to pay child support despite Son's age. The district court dismissed Trisha's petition, and Trisha appeals. We agree with Trisha that-at least at this procedural stage and at least on the basis of the reasons given-the court should not have dismissed her petition.
On appeal from a motion to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations in the petition to modify "as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable" to the petitioner. See Zubiate v. American Family Ins. Co., 2022 UT App 144, n.2, 524 P.3d 148 (quotation simplified). Additional facts described in this section are drawn from the parties' 1995 divorce decree, as well as from certain other parts of the court file that both parties, in their respective appellate briefs, have relied on as authoritative. We thus follow the parties' lead in reciting the relevant background facts not only from Trisha's petition to modify-which is rather spare on facts-but also from other sources in the historical court file that the parties jointly cite and about which there is apparently no dispute.
¶2 Benjamin and Trisha married in 1989 and had one child together-Son-who was born in 1990. Early in his life, Son was diagnosed with tuberous sclerosis, a condition that caused him to experience seizures and migraine headaches, and that necessitated surgery and other serious medical procedures. The severity of the effects of the condition were not fully known when Son was diagnosed, and his symptoms have fluctuated throughout his life. As Trisha describes it, Son "suffers from severe and frequent seizures that require[] constant supervision and care," and she reports that Son now "has the developmental function of a seven-year-old," even though he is in his thirties and "can appear otherwise 'normal' at a glance." Trisha asserts that Son is "incapacitated from earning a living and is not able to support [him]self by [his] own means."
Because several of the individuals involved in this case share (or once shared) the same last name, we often refer to them by their first names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality. We recognize that Trisha now uses a different surname, but in the interest of continuity we refer to her as Trisha Wadman, in keeping with the case caption.
¶3 Benjamin and Trisha divorced in 1995, when Son was just five years old. In the original divorce decree-which was arrived at by stipulation, with both sides represented by counsel-Trisha was awarded physical custody of Son, and Benjamin was awarded parent-time and ordered to pay $282 in monthly child support, as calculated by the child support guidelines existing at the time. The decree made no mention of Son's medical condition, even though the parties were aware of the diagnosis at that point. And the decree was silent with regard to the duration of Benjamin's child-support obligation.
¶4 Throughout his childhood and adolescent years, Son resided primarily with Trisha, and had periodic parent-time with Benjamin, who timely made child support payments as ordered. Son's medical condition improved somewhat as he approached his teenage years, but even Benjamin agrees that Son was still "learning disabled and ha[d] special educational needs."
¶5 In 2009, when Son was a senior in high school, he participated in a graduation ceremony with his high school class, but he did not receive a diploma and remained in school afterward, until the age of 21, on an "IEP non-diploma track." Benjamin stopped paying child support soon after Son's graduation ceremony.
¶6 Even after exiting the school system, Son has continued to reside with Trisha, who has been providing necessary care for Son. Trisha asserts that providing care for Son has affected her ability to find employment. For a brief period, Trisha and Son moved to Colorado, but they returned to Utah to be closer to family. According to Trisha, Son's disability has always been present, but she asserts that his symptoms worsened in about 2013. Trisha asserts that Son will always require constant supervision and care, and will never be able to live independently. Son has medical insurance through Medicaid and receives monthly food assistance and Social Security disability payments. Trisha claims that Benjamin has rarely provided financial assistance for Son since he left the school system.
Although Son's benefit payments are not specifically discussed in the petition to modify, Trisha's attorney explained at oral argument before the district court that the total amount of Son's monthly benefit payments are apparently less than what Trisha believes Benjamin should be paying in monthly child support given what she alleges his current income to be.
¶7 In February 2021, when Son was 30 years old, Trisha filed a petition to modify. In her petition, Trisha asserted that Son "is incapacitated," and that Son therefore still qualifies as a "child" for child support purposes. See Utah Code § 78B-12-102(7)(c) (defining "child," for child support purposes, to include "a son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated from earning a living and . . . is not able to support self by own means"). Trisha also asserted that the parties' incomes had changed significantly since the decree was last modified. Accordingly, she asked "that child support be modified (or established or re-established)," and that Benjamin be ordered to pay at least $918 per month in child support. She also asked for the order to be "effective as of January 2021," but for the court to "also permit retroactive support back to the month that the original child support order expired."
¶8 Benjamin moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that his "child support obligation stopped when [Son] turned 18 and graduated from his normal, expected high school class," especially given that the divorce decree did not acknowledge Son's disability or order that child support be paid past high school graduation. Benjamin also argued that Trisha had not demonstrated the existence of a "substantial and material change in circumstances" since entry of the original decree.
¶9 After full briefing and argument, the district court granted Benjamin's motion. The court noted that there was apparently "no dispute that [Son] is unable to support himself" and that he "resides with [Trisha] full-time." However, the court did not believe it had authority to order child support past age 21 because "the parties did not include any provisions in their stipulated [d]ecree suggesting that child support should continue past the child's minority." The court was also concerned that the parties may have "specifically bargained for the absence of this provision in the [d]ecree." The court therefore dismissed Trisha's petition.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 Trisha now appeals the court's dismissal of her petition. "We review a decision granting a motion to dismiss for correctness, granting no deference to the decision of the district court." Bylsma v. R.C. Willey, 2017 UT 85, ¶ 10, 416 P.3d 595 (quotation simplified). Moreover, the district court's decision was driven, in large part, by its interpretation of a statute, and we grant lower courts no deference on matters of statutory interpretation. State v. Thurman, 2022 UT 16, ¶ 13, 508 P.3d 128 ("We review questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusions." (quotation simplified)).
ANALYSIS
¶11 Under Utah law, parents are obligated to provide financial support for their children. Our legislature has mandated that "[e]very child is presumed to be in need of the support of the child's mother and father," and that "[e]very mother and father shall support their children." Utah Code § 78B-12-105(1). And our supreme court has stated that all parents have "the duty to support the children [they have] brought into the world, and this duty is inalienable." State, Dep't of Human Services ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah 1997) (quotation simplified).
¶12 The central question presented by Trisha's petition is whether Son qualifies as a "child" whose parents must provide financial support. In the Utah Child Support Act (the Act), our legislature has provided a statutory definition of "child" that is to be used in calculations of child support. We set forth that definition here in full, because it is important to our analysis:
(7) "Child" means:
(a) a son or daughter under the age of 18 years who is not otherwise emancipated, self-supporting, married, or a member of the armed forces of the United States;
(b) a son or daughter over the age of 18 years, while enrolled in high school during the normal and expected year of graduation and not otherwise emancipated, self-supporting, married, or a member of the armed forces of the United States; or
(c) a son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated from earning a living and, if able to provide some financial resources to the family, is not able to support self by own means.
Utah Code § 78B-12-102(7) (emphasis added). Trisha asserts that Son falls into the third category in the statutory definition of "child," because he is "a son . . . of any age who is incapacitated from earning a living."
¶13 We agree with Trisha's reading of the statute. Despite Son's age-he is in his thirties-he still qualifies as a "child," for purposes of calculating child support, if he is "incapacitated from earning a living." See id. Under the plain language of the statutory definition of "child," parents have an obligation to financially support their incapacitated sons and daughters, regardless of how old they are. Id.; see also Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (stating that-under the then-applicable child support statute-the term "'[c]hild' includes 'a son or a daughter of whatever age who is incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient means,'" and holding that a parent was obligated to provide support for an incapacitated thirty-seven-year-old daughter); Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Utah 1980) ("It is clear that [the daughter's] condition has incapacitated her from earning a living . . . [and] she is likewise presently without sufficient means of self-support. As such, the trial court was justified in continuing support payments beyond her 21st birthday."); Garrand v. Garrand, 615 P.2d 422, 423 (Utah 1980) ("[T]his Court has recognized that when a child is so limited, either physically or mentally, that he is unable to support himself when he reaches his majority, his parents may be required to provide support beyond that time."); Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah 1976) ("[U]pon a showing that any of the children of the parties is either physically or mentally deficient or unable to support himself when he reaches his majority, the court's authority to require maintenance may extend past the date upon which the child attains his majority."). Utah's statutory scheme is not unusual in this regard. See Erica Fumagalli, A Survey of Post-Majority Child Support for Adults with Impairments, 29 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law 433, 442 (2017) (surveying the issue and noting that only "[n]ine states explicitly follow the traditional common law rule that parents' duty to pay child support ends after their child reaches the age of majority, regardless of any disability," and that the rest require some form of support for incapacitated adult children); see also Hays v. Alexander, 114 So.3d 704, 710 n.9 (Miss. 2013) (King, J., dissenting) (noting that the "majority of states impose a duty of support on parents of adult disabled children, particularly when the child was disabled during his or her minority," and collecting cases).
¶14 Despite the clarity of this statutory command, Benjamin asserts that, for three reasons, the district court was correct in dismissing Trisha's petition.
¶15 First, Benjamin argues that the Act's automatic adjustment statute operated to terminate his child support obligation. See Utah Code § 78B-12-219. This statute provides as follows:
When a child becomes 18 years old or graduates from high school during the child's normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later, . . . the base child support award is automatically adjusted to the base combined child support obligation for the remaining number of children due child support . . . unless otherwise provided in the child support order.Id. § 78B-12-219(1). Benjamin emphasizes that the child support order in effect at the time Son participated in his high school graduation ceremony made no provision for support payments to extend beyond Son's graduation. As he interprets the automatic adjustment statute, his obligation to pay child support therefore automatically terminated at the moment Son participated in the graduation ceremony with his high school class.
¶16 We acknowledge Benjamin's point that, in most cases, child support obligations do automatically adjust when children turn 18 or graduate from high school. But there are exceptions to this general rule. One of them is expressly stated in the statute: when the governing child support order "otherwise provide[s]." See id. As Benjamin points out, that express exception does not apply here, because the parties' decree did not make any provision for Benjamin's support obligation to extend beyond Son's high school graduation. In our view, however, there exists another exception that is implicit in the statute: when the child in question is incapacitated.
¶17 The automatic adjustment statute provides that, after a child turns 18 or graduates from high school, "the base child support award is automatically adjusted to the base combined child support obligation for the remaining number of children due child support." Id. (emphasis added). If the son or daughter in question remains a "child" under the statutory definition of that term, then the statute does not operate to remove that child from the support calculation. As noted above, the statutory definition of "child" has three subparts, here paraphrased: (1) a child younger than 18; (2) a child 18 or over but not yet graduated from high school; and (3) a son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated from earning a living. See id. § 78B-12-102(7). If Son is "incapacitated," he remained a "child" for statutory purposes regardless of his age and regardless of his high school graduation status. Id. § 78B-12-102(7)(c). Thus, the automatic adjustment statute, read together with the statutory definition of "child," does not prevent or limit a court's ability to order parents to financially support their incapacitated sons and daughters of any age.
Benjamin's citation to Hibbens v. Hibbens, 2015 UT App 278, 363 P.3d 524, is unavailing. In that case, the court applied the automatic adjustment statute because the children in question- who were not incapacitated-"both turned 18 and no longer qualified as children under the Act." Id. ¶ 22. Here, by contrast, Trisha alleges-in an assertion we must take as true for purposes of our analysis-that Son is incapacitated from earning a living and therefore still qualifies as a "child" under the Act.
¶18 Second, Benjamin argues that, pursuant to a different statute, "[c]ourts do not have the power to order child support for children beyond the age of 21." (Citing Utah Code § 15-2-1.) The statute Benjamin references is found in Title 15 of the Utah Code- a title captioned "Contracts and Obligations in General"-and is found in a statutory chapter governing the "Legal Capacity of Children." See id. Title 15, Chapter 2. The specific provision in question is titled "Period of minority," and reads in its entirety as follows: "The period of minority extends in males and females to the age of 18 years; but all minors obtain their majority by marriage. It is further provided that courts in divorce actions may order support to age 21." Id. § 15-2-1. We disagree with Benjamin's interpretation of this statute.
¶19 In our view, the statute simply authorizes-but does not compel-courts to require that child support payments, in certain circumstances, extend beyond age 18 up to age 21, even if the 19-or 20-year-old son or daughter no longer qualifies as a "child" under the statutory definition of that term provided in the Act. See id.; see also Thornblad v. Thornblad, 849 P.2d 1197, 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (stating that, even where a son "no longer qualifies as a 'child' under" the Act's definition of that term, section 15-2-1 authorizes a court to "order continued support until age 21" in "unusual circumstances"). Utah appellate courts, in interpreting this statute, have construed it as giving district courts "power to order continued [child] support until age 21 when it appears to be necessary and when the court makes findings of any special or unusual circumstances to justify the order." See Hibbens v. Hibbens, 2015 UT App 278, ¶ 19, 363 P.3d 524 (quotation simplified).
¶20 We see no conflict between section 15-2-1 and the Act's provisions regarding incapacitated sons and daughters. After all, section 15-2-1 does not so much as mention incapacitated sons and daughters, and does not operate to override the inclusion of those individuals in the statutory definition of "child" found in the Act. See Utah Code § 78B-12-102(7); see also Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2d 435, 436 (Utah 1978) (noting the existence of an "exception" to the usual age limitations of child support for "parents of adult children who are mentally or physically incapable of caring for themselves"). But even if we were to assume, for purposes of the argument, that there were some conflict between section 15-2-1 and the Act's definition of "child," the more specific statute would control. See Taghipour v. Jerez, 2002 UT 74, ¶ 11, 52 P.3d 1252 ("When two statutory provisions conflict in their operation, the provision more specific in application governs over the more general provision." (quotation simplified)); see also Floyd v. Western Surgical Assocs., Inc., 773 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("In accordance with general principles of statutory construction, the more specific statute . . . controls."). The Act's detailed definition of "child" is the more specific statute here because it is found in the "Utah Child Support Act" section of the code and directly addresses incapacitated sons and daughters, while section 15-2-1 is found in the "Contracts and Obligations in General" section and does not discuss incapacitated individuals at all. Thus, section 15-2-1 places no limits on a court's ability to order a parent to support an incapacitated son or daughter, regardless of age.
¶21 Finally, Benjamin asserts that the district court's dismissal of Trisha's petition was proper because the parties' 1995 divorce decree-which contained the governing child support order- made no mention of Son's disability or incapacitation, even though Son's "disability was known at the time of" the decree, and because the decree contained no provision requiring Benjamin to pay child support beyond Son's high school graduation. Benjamin suggests-without, on appeal, grounding this suggestion in any particular legal rule or doctrine-that the parties' failure to discuss Son's incapacitation or to provide for post-high-school support payments in the original decree operates to prevent Trisha from now claiming that he has any current obligation to pay child support for Son.
¶22 But we are aware of no legal rule-in either statute or case law-mandating that parents who do not, in an original decree, seek classification of a child as "incapacitated" are always thereby prevented from later asserting that a son or daughter has become incapacitated. In support of his argument, Benjamin directs us to Jefferies and Dehm, but his reliance on these cases is misplaced. Benjamin asserts that, in both of those cases, the parties and the trial courts made provision, in the original decrees, for lengthened support of an incapacitated child. See Jefferies, 752 P.2d at 910-12; Dehm, 545 P.2d at 526. But the appellate courts in Jefferies and Dehm simply did not grapple with the issue of whether such provisions must be included in original decrees. The mere fact that both of those cases may have involved original decrees with extended support provisions does not prove Benjamin's point. As we read those cases, nothing in them forbids a court from taking up the issue of a child's incapacity at a later point in the proceedings in connection with, for instance, a petition to modify.
Our reading of Dehm does not necessarily align with Benjamin's. We find no indication, in that case, that the parties' original decree contained any finding of incapacity or any order compelling the payor spouse to provide support beyond age 18. See generally Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976).
¶23 In fact, our supreme court has on at least one occasion affirmed a district court's post-decree modification that extended a parent's obligation to pay child support to an incapacitated son. See Garrand, 615 P.2d at 423. In that case, a parent sought to modify the divorce decree-which made no provision for child support beyond age 21-to require the other parent to pay continuing child support, even beyond age 21, for their incapacitated son. Id. at 422-23. The payor parent made an argument similar to the one Benjamin makes here, and asserted that, "inasmuch as the divorce decree awarded support for [the son] until he was 21," the payee parent's request for continuing child support beyond that age was barred by "res judicata." Id. at 423. But our supreme court rejected this argument and affirmed the district court's order modifying the decree to require continuing support past age 21. Id. The fact that the original decree did not contemplate child support past the age of 21 did not necessarily prevent the payee spouse from seeking modification. Id.; see also Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("The fact that one parent may not be under a current obligation to pay child support does not terminate that parent's responsibility to pay support in the future.").
¶24 In this same vein, the district court-in its order dismissing Trisha's petition-expressed concern that the parties, at the time of entry of the original decree, might have "specifically bargained for the absence of" any provision requiring Benjamin to pay child support for Son past high school. We reject this reasoning. "Utah courts have long held that the right to receive child support is an unalienable right, belonging to the child, and cannot be bartered away by the child's parent or parents." Fauver, 803 P.2d at 1278- 79. Because the right to future support payments belongs to Son, his parents are not legally permitted to bargain away his right to child support at some point in the future. See State ex rel. Utah State Dep't of Social Services. v. Sucec, 924 P.2d 882, 885-86 (Utah 1996) ("A child's right to support is not subject to being bartered away, extinguished, estopped or in any way defeated by the agreement or conduct of the parents." (quotation simplified)).
These principles do not apply with regard to spouses' claims to alimony, which can be bargained away. Thus, the district court's reliance on McQuarrie v. McQuarrie, 2021 UT 22, 496 P.3d 44, is misplaced. See id. ¶ 35 (concluding that a spouse's "alimony obligation terminated by operation of law because the decree did not specifically provide otherwise" (quotation simplified)).
¶25 And in this context, it makes practical sense to allow parents, where appropriate, to raise incapacity issues later, even if a child's incapacity is not discussed in the original child support order. In many situations, incapacity may occur after entry of a decree (e.g., if a child is involved in a debilitating accident). But even in situations where parents know a child has a disability, it may not be apparent at the time of the decree exactly how disabling the condition will become over time; in this case, for instance, we wonder whether Benjamin and Trisha knew, in 1995 when Son was just five, how his disability would manifest itself years later, when Son turned 18. After all, the applicable statutory language defines incapacity in terms of a child's ability "to support self by own means," and it will not always be apparent whether five-year-olds with certain medical conditions will be able to support themselves when they turn 18. For these reasons, and guided by the language of the applicable statutory definition of "child," we conclude that Trisha's petition is not subject to dismissal merely because the parties' original divorce decree did not discuss Son's incapacity and did not require Benjamin to pay child support beyond age 18.
¶26 Thus, we reject each of the three arguments Benjamin makes-and upon which the district court relied-in support of dismissal of Trisha's petition. We therefore conclude that the court erred by dismissing that petition for the reasons offered, and that Trisha has borne her burden on appeal of persuading us that the court's ruling was incorrect. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order of dismissal.
¶27 We note, however, that significant issues remain to be litigated in this case before Trisha will have established a right to receive continued child support payments from Benjamin. We identify, without deciding, some of these issues in an effort to provide guidance that will hopefully be useful on remand.
¶28 First, the court will need to take up the question of whether Son is incapacitated. In her petition, Trisha has alleged that Son is incapacitated, and the district court indicated that "there appears [to be] no dispute" on this point. Here on appeal, Benjamin does not appear to dispute Trisha's assertion that Son is in fact incapacitated. But whether undisputed or not, a judicial finding of incapacity needs to be made before Son can meet the statutory definition of "child." See Utah Code § 78B-12-102(7)(c). And no such finding has yet been made in this case.
¶29 Next, in connection with considering the question of Son's incapacity, the court-if it determines that Son is in fact incapacitated-may need to decide when Son became "incapacitated" within the meaning of the statutory definition. If the court finds that Son has been incapacitated all along-or, at least, that he was incapacitated at age 18-it may not need to grapple with the next part of the question. But if the court finds that Son only became incapacitated after Benjamin's child support obligation under the original order had expired, the court will then need to concern itself with whether, under Utah law, Son meets the statutory definition of "child." There may or may not be a distinction, in this context, between a son or daughter who becomes incapacitated before otherwise reaching adulthood, and one who becomes incapacitated only after reaching adulthood. See Hays v. Alexander, 114 So.3d 704, 710 n.9 (Miss. 2013) (King, J., dissenting) (suggesting that some states may draw a distinction between cases in which the child "was disabled during his or her minority" and cases in which the child became disabled later). Because this legal question is neither briefed nor squarely presented here, we do not attempt to answer it.
¶30 Third, if the court determines that Son is incapacitated and that the decree should be modified to impose an obligation on Benjamin to provide support, the court will then need to concern itself with the proper amount of any such obligation. The place to start any such inquiry, of course, is with the applicable child support guidelines. See Utah Code §§ 78B-12-210(1), -301. But in cases involving incapacitated sons and daughters, the statutory definition of "child" contemplates situations in which an incapacitated son or daughter is able "to provide some financial resources to the family." See id. § 78B-12-102(7)(c). Income earned by many "children"-e.g., children under the age of 18-is not typically accounted for in assessing the appropriate child support amount. But the situation may be different here, in light of the language of the statutory definition, and the court should consider the extent to which it needs to account for any income or other "financial resources" Son is able to generate. And in this same vein, the court may also need to consider whether Benjamin's support obligation should take the traditional form- payments to Trisha, presumably the custodial parent-or some other form (e.g., payments to a care facility).
¶31 Finally, if the court determines that Son is incapacitated and that the decree should be modified to impose an obligation on Benjamin to provide support, the court will need to concern itself with the retroactivity aspects of Trisha's petition. To the extent Trisha's petition truly seeks modification, any changes "may date back only to 'the month following service' of the petition to modify 'on the parent whose support is affected.'" See McFarland v. McFarland, 2021 UT App 58, ¶ 26, 493 P.3d 1146 (quoting Utah Code § 78B-12-112(4)). The original decree required Benjamin to pay $282 per month, and any increase in the amount of that obligation may date back only to March 1, 2021, the first day of the month following the filing of Trisha's petition.
Benjamin claims in his brief that "Trisha fails to allege any material or substantial change in circumstances to support modifying the decree." This could be seen as asking us to affirm the court's dismissal on an alternative ground. Trisha responds that the parties' incomes, as alleged in her complaint, have sufficiently changed to warrant modification of the amount of Benjamin's obligation. See Utah Code § 78B-12-210(8), (9). "An appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record." State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ¶ 9, 76 P.3d 1159 (quotation simplified). In our view, Benjamin's alternative theory for dismissal is not apparent on this record, so we decline to affirm on this ground.
¶32 But in her petition, Trisha also asks the court to order Benjamin to reimburse her for monthly child support payments- at a $282-per-month clip-dating all the way back to 2009, when Son participated in the graduation ceremony and Benjamin stopped making payments. It is somewhat unclear whether Trisha still seeks this particular relief, given some of her attorney's statements at oral argument before the district court, but if she does, the court will need to consider this request, and determine whether it is properly classified as one for modification or for enforcement. And the court may-depending on its other predicate rulings, and on the merits of other defenses Benjamin may raise-need to determine whether Trisha is entitled to recover these payments, considering that no judicial finding of "incapacity" was in effect between 2009 and now, and no order commanded Benjamin to make any such payments.
CONCLUSION
¶33 Under Utah law, parents are generally obligated to support their "incapacitated" sons and daughters "of any age." See Utah Code § 78B-12-102(7)(c). As discussed herein, the district court's reasons for dismissing Trisha's petition were faulty, and the court erred by dismissing that petition on those grounds at this procedural stage. We therefore vacate the court's order of dismissal, reinstate Trisha's petition, and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.