We agree. The district court relied upon Wadlow v. Kanaly, 182 Colo. 115, 511 P.2d 484 (1973), as authority for the award of attorneys' fees. In Wadlow, we stated that "when the question of the respective powers of two governmental bodies is at issue, it would be inequitable to require one official, acting in his official capacity, to personally bear the burden of attorneys' fees and costs generated in the suit."
Finally, because the provisions of Colo. Const. Art. XII, Sec. 11, which prohibit an increase or decrease in the salary of any elected public officer during the term of office for which he was elected, limit the discretion of county commissioners to determine fiscal policy, the trial court should have granted the plaintiff's requested relief. County commissioners have ultimate fiscal responsibility for county finances; they set department budgets within existing county revenue. Wadlow v. Kanaly, 182 Colo. 115, 511 P.2d 484 (1973). I.
The approval of the board of county commissioners is a discretionary power, not a ministerial duty to rubberstamp a county officer's decision. See Wadlow v. Kanaly, 182 Colo. 115, 511 P.2d 484 (1973); Johnson v. Board of Commissioners, 174 Colo. 350, 483 P.2d 1344 (1971). Consequently, Rule 106 (a)(2) does not apply to these facts.
Section 30-28-101(10)(d) grants boards of county commissioners the express power to grant exemptions from the provisions of title 30, article 28. Flowing from this grant of express power must be the implied power to adopt means to defray the costs of considering requests for exemptions. This is true particularly in light of the board of county commissioners' ultimate responsibility for the conduct of the county's fiscal affairs. Wadlow v. Kanaly, 182 Colo. 115, 511 P.2d 484. Regarding the reasonableness of the fee charged, appellants accurately state that the record contains no evidence.
The award of fees in this case is properly chargeable to the city of Rochester because the mayor was sued in his official capacity. Wadlow v. Kanaly, 182 Colo. 115, 511 P.2d 484 (1973); Zimmerman v. Miller, 237 Pa. 616, 85 A. 871 (1912); Lake Co., Inc. v. King County, 4 Wn.2d 651, 104 P.2d 599 (1940). The defendants also excepted to the denial of their motion for costs for the reproduction of documents furnished to the plaintiff in preparation for trial pursuant to court order.
See also Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 542 P.2d 371 (1975). Therefore, the decision of the board may be nullified only upon a clear showing that it abused its discretion by acting arbitrarily or unreasonably. Tihonovich v. Williams, supra; Wadlow v. Kanaly, 182 Colo. 115, 511 P.2d 484 (1973). No such showing was made.
Relying on the case of Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738, plaintiffs contend that such authority is not given the State Board but rather has been entrusted to Denver and the other counties. However, we find that case, as it has been restricted by Wadlow v. Kanaly, 182 Colo. 115, 511 P.2d 484, inapposite to the facts before us. Plaintiffs further argue, however, that the State Board abused its discretion because the wage schedule adopted differed substantially from the wage survey data upon which it was based.
The district attorney's subordinates hold office at his pleasure, see 1967 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 45-3-1(1), 1971 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 45-3-1(2), and the provisions of 45-3-3 subjecting the district attorney's appointments to "the approval of the board of county commissioners" do not empower the Board to veto his appointments by silence. If the Board objects to the district attorney's appointees, the burden is on the Board to show that there is no reasonable necessity for the part-time deputies the district attorney seeks to employ. See Wadlow v. Kanaly, 182 Colo. 115, 511 P.2d 484; and Johnson v. Board of County Commissioners, 174 Colo. 350, 483 P.2d 1344. There has been no such showing here. [3] We do not mean to suggest that part-time deputy district attorneys must be residents of the counties they serve or that payment by the county for services already rendered is in any way contingent upon a showing by the district attorney of the nature of those services or the actual time spent by the part-time deputy in the county receiving the services.
1983). See also Tihonovich v. Williams, 196 Colo. 144, 582 P.2d 1051 (1978); Wadlow v. Kanaly, 182 Colo. 115, 511 P.2d 484 (1973). Because the Board of County Commissioners has ultimate authority over the county budget, it can revise, alter, increase, or decrease the items it deems necessary in view of the needs of the various offices, Departments, Boards, Commissions, or other spending agencies, and the probable income of the local government.