Wadford v. Gillette

17 Citing cases

  1. O'Neal v. O'Neal

    254 N.C. App. 309 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that, because the power of attorney that a purported agent utilized to transfer the alleged principal's property into trusts was a nullity and of no legal effect, the deeds executed pursuant to that non-existent POA were void ab initio

    Ordinarily, when a mentally incompetent person executes a contract or deed before their condition has been formally declared, the resulting agreement or transaction is voidable and not void. E.g. , Chesson v. Pilot Life Ins. Co. , 268 N.C. 98, 102, 150 S.E.2d 40, 43 (1966) ; Reynolds v. Earley , 241 N.C. 521, 524, 85 S.E.2d 904, 906 (1955) ; Wadford v. Gillette , 193 N.C. 413, 420, 137 S.E. 314, 317 (1927). But a contract or deed executed after a person has been adjudicated incompetent is absolutely void absent proof that the person's mental capacity was restored prior to executing the instrument.

  2. Motter v. Patterson

    68 F.2d 252 (10th Cir. 1933)   Cited 10 times

    Assuming, but not admitting, that Patterson's mental condition affected the contract of sale between the two corporations, it at most rendered the contract voidable. The contract of an insane person, who has not been so adjudged, is voidable but not void. Ash v. Wulf, 127 Kan. 301, 273 P. 432; Doris v. McFarland, 113 Conn. 594, 156 A. 52; Haddock v. Callahan Grocery Co., 163 Ga. 204, 135 S.E. 747; Dean v. Estate of Atwood (Iowa) 212 N.W. 371; Wadford v. Gillette, 193 N.C. 413, 137 S.E. 314; Feild v. Koonce, 178 Ark. 862, 12 S.W.2d 772, 68 A.L.R. 1303; Czyrson v. Roseau County Nat. Bank, 172 Minn. 420, 216 N.W. 224; Cawby v. Kurtz, 209 Ky. 275, 272 S.W. 746. This is the rule in Missouri where the deeds and the bill of sale were delivered and the purchase price paid. Brann v. Missouri State L.I. Co. (Mo.App.) 226 S.W. 48; Hill-Dodge Bank. Co. v. Loomis, 140 Mo. App. 62, 119 S.W. 967. The contract being voidable merely, no ratification was necessary to give it validity.

  3. Chesson v. Insurance Co.

    268 N.C. 98 (N.C. 1966)   Cited 13 times
    Vacating a jury's finding of causation because "[t]here [was] no competent evidence" on the question and it was instead "left to conjecture"

    Carawan v. Clark, supra at 216, 13 S.E.2d at 238. Accord, Wadford v. Gillette, 193 N.C. 413, 137 S.E. 314. Its failure to establish each of these propositions, in the absence of unusual circumstances, would result in an annulment of the cancellation. Lawson v. Bennett, 240 N.C. 52, 81 S.E.2d 162; Dougherty v. Byrd, 221 N.C. 17, 18 S.E.2d 708. Cf.

  4. Tomlins v. Cranford

    227 N.C. 323 (N.C. 1947)   Cited 12 times

    Beard v. R. R., 143 N.C. 137; Wood v. Sawyer, 61 N.C. 251 (277); In re Craven, 169 N.C. 561, 86 S.E. 587. Furthermore there was evidence, other than the adjudication, that plaintiff did not have sufficient mental capacity to know and understand what she was about when she signed the deed. A deed executed by a person who has been adjudged to be insane, sans proof of restoration of sanity, is void. Wadford v. Gillette, 193 N.C. 413, 137 S.E. 314. For this reason, perhaps, defendants' knowledge or want of knowledge of plaintiff's mental condition was immaterial. This we need not decide, for the jury found, on competent evidence coming from defendants, that they had notice of plaintiff's insanity.

  5. Walker v. McLaurin

    227 N.C. 53 (N.C. 1946)   Cited 8 times
    In Walker, the defendants presented evidence that their deceased father "did not have sufficient mental capacity" to enter into a valid lease and option-to-purchase agreement with the plaintiff.

    But we do think there is some evidence tending to show ratification of the contract on the part of at least some of the defendants. An agreement entered into by a person who is mentally incompetent, but who has not been formally so adjudicated, is voidable and not void. Carawan v. Clark, 219 N.C. 214, 13 S.E.2d 237; Wadford v. Gillette, 193 N.C. 413, 137 S.E. 314; Beeson v. Smith, 149 N.C. 142, 62 S.E. 888; Ellington v. Ellington, 103 N.C. 54, 9 S.E. 208; Riggan v. Green, 80 N.C. 237; 28 Am. Jur., 714; 17 C. J. S., 484. Four of the six defendants testified that in their opinion their father, S. J. McLaurin, did not have sufficient mental capacity, on 27 April, 1940, to enter into a valid contract.

  6. Dougherty v. Byrd

    18 S.E.2d 708 (N.C. 1942)   Cited 1 times

    Carawan v. Clark, 219 N.C. 214, 13 S.E.2d 237: "Thus, in an action to rescind a contract, as here, for that the plaintiff was, at the time, mentally incompetent, the plaintiff must show insanity or mental incompetency at the time the contract was entered into. Upon such showing the contract will be annulled unless it is made to appear — the burden being on the defendant — that the defendant (1) was ignorant of the mental capacity; (2) had no notice thereof such as would put a reasonably prudent person upon inquiry; (3) paid a fair and full consideration; (4) took no unfair advantage of plaintiff; and (5) that the plaintiff has not restored and is not able to restore the consideration or to make adequate compensation therefor. Wadford v. Gillette, 193 N.C. 413, 137 S.E. 314, and cases cited. Creekmore v. Baxter, supra ( 121 N.C. 31); Story Eq. Jur., sec. 227; Adams Eq., 183.

  7. Cox v. Cox

    18 S.E.2d 713 (N.C. 1942)   Cited 7 times
    In Cox v. Cox 221 N.C. 19, 18 S.E.2d 713, plaintiff at the September Term 1938 of Nash County Superior Court obtained a divorce a vinculo from defendant on the ground of two-year separation.

    Applicable to the legal situation thus produced, Justice Adams, in writing the opinion of the Court in Hood, Comr. of Banks, v. Holding, 205 N.C. 451, 455, 171 S.E. 633, says: "The rule is substantially uniform that a judgment against an insane person not previously declared insane is not void but voidable," and "in such an instance relief may be administered when sought as between the parties by motion in the cause, or by an independent action." Odom v. Riddick, 104 N.C. 515, 10 S.E. 609; Craddock v. Brinkley, 177 N.C. 125, 98 S.E. 280; Bank v. Duke, 187 N.C. 386, 122 S.E. 1; Clark v. Homes, 189 N.C. 703, 128 S.E. 20; Wadford v. Gillette, 193 N.C. 413, 137 S.E. 314. The former dismissal of a somewhat similar motion by Judge Bone cannot be relied upon by the plaintiff as constituting res judicata.

  8. Vestal v. Vending Machine Co.

    219 N.C. 468 (N.C. 1941)   Cited 26 times
    In Vestal v. Vending Machine Co., 219 N.C. 468, 14 S.E.2d 427, it was said: "This defendant excepts `to the rulings of the court and findings of fact upon which the judgment was signed.' His assignment of error is `that the court erred in its rulings and findings of fact.' This is a broadside exception and assignment of error. It fails to point out or designate the particular findings of fact to which exception is taken.

    When the testimony does not appear in the record it is presumed that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings. Bronson v. Paynter, 20 N.C. 527; Bernhardt v. Dutton, 146 N.C. 206; Wadford v. Gillette, 193 N.C. 413, 137 S.E. 314; Caldwell v. Robinson, 179 N.C. 518; Thornton v. Barbour, 204 N.C. 583, 169 S.E. 153. We are unable to discover any sufficient reason for disturbing the judgment denying the motion of the defendant Moseley to dismiss the action as to him for want of proper service. From the findings of fact contained in the judgment it appears that he has made a general appearance and subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the court.

  9. Carawan v. Clark

    13 S.E.2d 237 (N.C. 1941)   Cited 5 times

    Thus, in an action to rescind a contract, as here, for that the plaintiff was, at the time, mentally incompetent, the plaintiff must show insanity or mental incompetency at the time the contract was entered into. Upon such showing the contract will be annulled unless it is made to appear — the burden being on the defendant — that the defendant (1) was ignorant of the mental incapacity; (2) had no notice thereof such as would put a reasonably prudent person upon inquiry; (3) paid a fair and full consideration; (4) took no unfair advantage of plaintiff; and (5) that the plaintiff has not restored and is not able to restore the consideration or to make adequate compensation therefor. Wadford v. Gillette, 193 N.C. 413, 137 S.E. 314, and cases cited. Creekmore v. Baxter, supra; Story Eq. Jur., sec. 227; Adams Eq., 183.

  10. Gorham v. Insurance Co.

    214 N.C. 526 (N.C. 1938)   Cited 25 times

    Brooks v. Ins. Co., 211 N.C. 274, 189 S.E. 787; Diamond v. Service Stores, ibid., 632, 191 S.E. 358; Moore v. Ins. Co., 193 N.C. 538, 137 S.E. 580. For otherwise to hold as a matter of law that plaintiff's business activities as shown by defendant's evidence, destroy any excuse she may have for not acting in the present matter, would be not only to pass upon the contradictory evidence in the case, but also to suggest the validity of these transactions. Wadford v. Gillette, 193 N.C. 413, 137 S.E. 314. Often an insane person is capable of doing many intelligent acts. The rule is, that upon conflicting evidence, or if diverse inferences may reasonably be drawn therefrom, some favorable to the plaintiff and others favorable to the defendant, the case should be submitted to the jury under proper instructions from the court.