Opinion
FA176103073S
09-13-2018
Luther WADE, III v. LaDonna WADE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Shluger, J.
The plaintiff, who is a resident of Waterford, Connecticut, initiated this action for dissolution of marriage. At the time, the defendant was a resident of Waterford, Connecticut. The court finds that it has jurisdiction and that all statutory stays have expired. A limited contested trial was held before the undersigned on September 11, 2018. Both parties appeared at trial and were self-represented.
The court has fully considered the criteria of General Statutes § § 46b-81, 46h-82, 46b-84, 46b-56c, and 46b-62, as well as the evidence, applicable case law, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and arguments in reaching the decisions reflected in the orders that issue in this decision.
FACTUAL FINDINGS
The court finds that the following facts were proven by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. The plaintiff and the defendant, whose maiden name was Bolin, were married on May 24, 1997, in Washington state.
2. One of the parties has resided continuously in the state of Connecticut for at least one year prior to the commencement of this action.
3. The marriage of the parties has broken down irretrievably without the prospect of reconciliation.
4. There have been born to the wife two children since the date of the marriage, but only one, Luther Wade IV, is under 18. Both children are in college. The husband also has a daughter who they raised as their own, and who lives with the wife. The wife continues to care for the children and her step child; the husband pays child support but is not close with the children.
5. Neither party has received assistance from any State or local agency.
6. The parties have been separated since 2013 with the husband vacating the marital residence.
7. The husband, 44, is a Navy veteran with a VA disability pension for seizures he experiences. He is employed by the State of Connecticut Department of Transportation and has a second job at a hotel and earns $92,000 from his two jobs.
8. The defendant, 48, has an illness but is asymptomatic. She works in a laundry mat part-time, earning $6,000 per year and receives regularly recurring gifts from her mother of $6,000 per year. She is a self-employed grant writer and expects to earn $38,000 next year. Despite her limited income, the wife has existed on her own and has accumulated no debt.
9. There presently exists as marital assets the husband’s State pension, his Jeep with no equity, and her Kia worth $12,000 with a loan balance of $1,100.
10. There presently exists as marital debt the daughter’s student loan in the wife’s name in the amount of $10,000.
11. The court finds that if this were an intact family, it is likely that the parents would have provided post-majority educational support to the children; so the court will enter an order regarding post-majority educational support pursuant to CGS § 46b-56c.
12. The presumptive child support figure based on the guidelines presented to the court is $250 per week which the husband is paying.
13. The children will be able to stay on the father’s State health insurance until they are 26.
14. The parties stipulated and agreed that regarding the son, who will turn 18 in November, there will be joint custody with primary residence to the wife. The parties further stipulated and agreed that they would share equally the husband’s State pension, that he would retain his Jeep motor vehicle, that the wife would retain the Kia motor vehicle, and that he would pay child support in the amount of $250 per week.
15. The parties disagreed about alimony, the payment of the Kia car loan, paying for their children’s college, and the division of the husband’s VA disability benefits. The husband offered that he could continue to pay the $250 per week child support as post-majority educational support when his child support obligation terminates in November. This breaks down to $13,000 per year, which is approximately 50% of the children’s out-of-pocket educational costs. The daughter is attending the University of Connecticut at Storrs on full scholarships except for the payment of books. The son is attending Springfield College, and the out-of-pocket family contribution is $25,000 per year. It is uncertain if the daughter will enjoy the same scholarship at UCONN in future years.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
C.G.S. § 46b-81 provides:
(a) At the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a marriage or for legal separation pursuant to a complaint under section 46b-45, the Superior Court may assign to either spouse all or any part of the estate of the other spouse. The court may pass title to real property to either party or to a third person or may order the sale of such real property, without any act by either spouse, when in the judgment of the court it is the proper mode to carry the decree into effect.
(b) A conveyance made pursuant to the decree shall vest title in the purchaser, and shall bind all persons entitled to life estates and remainder interests in the same manner as a sale ordered by the court pursuant to the provisions of section 52-500. When the decree is recorded on the land records in the town where the real property is situated, it shall effect the transfer of the title of such real property as if it were a deed of the party or parties.
(c) In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after considering all the evidence presented by each party, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates. "[T]he purpose of property division is to unscramble the ownership of property, giving to each spouse what is equitably his." O’Brien v. O’Brien, 161 Conn.App. 575, 586 (2014). When assigning the parties’ property in a marriage dissolution, § 46b-81(c) in relevant part requires the court to consider "the length of the marriage, the causes for the ... dissolution of the marriage ... the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates." The court has wide latitude in applying those criteria to the particular circumstances of the case, and although the court must consider all the statutory criteria in dividing property in a dissolution action, it does not need to make an express finding as to each criterion. Lopiano v. Lopiano, 247 Conn. 356, 374-75 (1998).
The Superior Court may assign to either spouse all or any part of the estate of the other spouse ... In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after considering all the evidence presented by each party, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the ... dissolution of the marriage ... the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates. Zern v. Zern, 15 Conn.App. 292, 295, 544 A.2d 244 (1988).
The only property to divide that is in dispute is the Kia loan and the VA pension. Since the husband is burdened by the disability, he should enjoy the disability pension. Moreover, the wife admitted that his seizures started in 1998, but then he was "pretty much seizure-free" from 1998 until 2012. They separated in 2013.
ALIMONY
C.G.S. § 46b-82 provides:
(a) At the time of entering the decree, the Superior Court may order either of the parties to pay alimony to the other, in addition to or in lieu of an award pursuant to section 46b-81. The order may direct that security be given therefore on such terms as the court may deem desirable, including an order pursuant to subsection (b) of this section or an order to either party to contract with a third party for periodic payments or payments contingent on a life to the other party. The court may order that a party obtain life insurance as such security unless such party proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such insurance is not available to such party, such party is unable to pay the cost of such insurance, or such party is uninsurable. In determining whether alimony shall be awarded and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall consider the evidence presented by each party and shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate, and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b-81, and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been awarded, the desirability and feasibility of such parent’s securing employment.
(b) If the court, following a trial or hearing on the merits, enters an order pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, or section 46b-86, and such order by its terms will terminate only upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the alimony recipient, the court shall articulate with specificity the basis for such order.
"The traditional purpose of alimony is to meet one’s continuing duty to support." Borkowski v. Borkowski, 228 Conn. 729, 735, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994).
TIME LIMITED ALIMONY
The court in Marino v. Marino, 131 Conn.App. 43 (2011) held:
The traditional purpose of alimony is to meet one’s continuing duty to support ... [C]ourts have begun to limit the duration of alimony awards in order to encourage the receiving spouse to become self-sufficient. Roach v. Roach, 20 Conn.App. 500, 506, 568 A.2d 1037 (1990). "[U]nderlying the concept of time limited alimony is the sound policy that such awards may provide an incentive for the spouse receiving support to use diligence in procuring training or skills necessary to attain self-sufficiency ... A time limited alimony award generally is for rehabilitative purposes but other reasons may also support this type of alimony award ... Another valid purpose for time limited alimony is to provide interim support until a future event occurs that makes such support less necessary or unnecessary ..." In Wolfburg, [supra, 27 Conn.App. 402] our review of the record revealed that the time limited alimony award was found to provide interim support until the minor child reached the age of majority ... This constituted a valid purpose for an award of time limited alimony. Other future events that may require interim support through an award of time limited alimony include occurrences such as a bond maturation, trust disbursement, or mortgage maturation. Ippolito v. Ippolito, 28 Conn.App. 745, 752, 612 A.2d 131, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 905, 615 A.2d 1047 (1992).
ORDERS
The court orders the following:
1. The parties shall share joint legal custody of the minor child with primary residence with the mother. The father’s access shall be reasonable and liberal.
2. The court finds the presumptive child support per the Child Support Guidelines to be $250 per week, and the court orders the plaintiff to pay that sum.
3. The court orders the plaintiff to pay periodic alimony to the defendant in the amount of $200 per week. Said alimony shall be taxable income to the recipient and shall reduce the gross income of the payor. Said alimony will terminate upon the earlier of 5 years, the death of either, or the payee’s remarriage. Alimony may be modified, suspended, reduced, or terminated as provided in Gen. Stat. § 46b-86(b).
4. The parties shall share equally the college costs of their children after all grants, scholarships, and loans have been exhausted, capped at the cost of an in-state University of Connecticut student. The husband may satisfy this obligation by continuing to pay $250 per week to the wife once the child support obligation terminates.
5. The father shall maintain medical and dental coverage for the children as available through his employment at a reasonable expense.
12. The wife shall take the dependency exemption or tax credit for the oldest child and the husband shall take the dependency exemption or tax credit for the younger child.
13. Each party shall be solely responsible for the debts and liabilities as set forth on their respective financial affidavits filed with the court except that the husband shall complete the payment of the Kia loan. He shall transfer ownership of said vehicle to the wife, but she shall insure it and pay for its care.
14. Each party is responsible for their own medical insurance.
15. The husband shall transfer 50% of the marital portion of his State pension to the wife by QDRO. The parties shall share the cost of the QDRO equally.
16. The payments and obligations referenced in these orders are intended to be family support/maintenance payments within the meaning of sections 523(a)(5) and 523(a)(15) of the United States Bankruptcy Code and not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Each party shall be solely responsible for all debts they have been ordered to pay and they shall hold harmless and indemnify the other thereon.
17. Dissolution may enter.
SO ORDERED.