6. Where there was no prayer in the pleadings for a division or partition of the property, the trial judge did not err in failing to charge the jury that it could make an equitable division of an automobile in which each of the parties owned one-half interest and award the entire interest in the same to the plaintiff or to the defendant. See Wade v. Wade, 222 Ga. 389, 391 (2) ( 149 S.E.2d 816) (1966) and cits. Furthermore, the appellant is in no worse a position with regard to the automobile after the jury verdict, which left both parties with the half interest which they already possessed. 7. The appellant contends that the judgment was excessive in that it required his payment within 90 days of $750 for child support and $500 for attorney fees, or a total of $1,250, whereas the evidence showed his income for that period would be only $1,385.
While alimony is not permitted the wife under such a factual situation ( Wilcox v. Wilcox, 221 Ga. 113 ( 143 S.E.2d 166)), yet in the present case where the plaintiff's petition alleged desertion by the wife and also alleged cruel treatment and the decree of the court did not specify on which ground the divorce was granted, and the evidence (based upon the husband's testimony) would authorize a divorce upon either ground, it will be construed as having been granted upon the ground (cruel treatment) which would be consistent with the remainder of the decree and not upon the ground (desertion) which would make other parts of the decree inconsistent. See Wade v. Wade, 222 Ga. 389 (1) ( 149 S.E.2d 816), and citations. 2.
The whole verdict should be examined. It "shall have a reasonable intendment and shall receive a reasonable construction." OCGA ยง 9-12-4; Wade v. Wade, 222 Ga. 389, 391 (1) ( 149 S.E.2d 816) (1966). The parts are connected. This was one jury and one case and one set of circumstances.