Dehnart's testimony about purchasing the hammer for the crimes and the medical examiner's testimony were sufficient to establish that a hammer was used to kill the victims. It can further be assumed that the jurors brought with them the common knowledge of how a hammer can be used. The record does not indicate that there was anything extraordinary about this hammer that required its presence to explain the wounds or manner in which they were inflicted. Cf. State v. Carter, 955 S.W.2d 548, 561 (Mo.1997) (concluding demonstrative gun probative where used to show how shell casings would eject from it); Lvnn v. State. 860 S.W.2d 599, 603–04 (Tex.Ct.App.1993) (holding that demonstrative weapon was probative when there was issue as to force required to pull the trigger); see also Wade v. State, 204 So.2d 235, 238–39 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1967) (admitting master brake cylinder).As the probative value of the hammer was not significant, not much in the way of unfair prejudice is necessary to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting it.
The State claimed only that it was similar. See Wade v. State, 204 So.2d 235, 238-39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967) (approving admission of object similar but not identical to object used in crime). Further, Ingman was subject to cross-examination on the extent to which the weapon resembled the object she had seen in Chamberlain's possession the night of the murders.
The replica was the same size as the component exhibits and was a reasonably exact reproduction of the assembled weapon in Williams' photograph. See Brown v. State, 550 So.2d 527, 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) ("The demonstrative exhibits which the state used during the victim's testimony . . . in order to depict the knife before it was broken and the extent of the victim's stab wounds, were sufficiently accurate replicas to be allowable within the trial court's discretion."); Wade v. State, 204 So.2d 235, 238-39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967) (finding that trial court did not err by admitting demonstrative evidence when it was relevant to the issues in the case and when it was a reasonably exact replica of the object involved); Robinson v. State, 145 So.2d 561, 562 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962) (concluding that scale model of the death weapon did not mislead or confuse the jury and was appropriately identified by the state's expert witness). Finally, the probative value of the replica outweighed any prejudicial effect because the replica was used to explain the manner in which the components could have been combined to build a weapon and the manner in which the weapon was consistent with the victim's head injury.See § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2000).
We question whether the court's salutary desire to avoid having prospective jurors influenced by comments they might have overheard sufficiently overrode Moore's right to a public trial, because the court created the courtroom overcrowding by seeking to simultaneously empanel three juries. Assuming that overcrowding may constitute a valid reason for closing a courtroom, as we held in Wade v. State, 204 So.2d 235, 239 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967), that closure may be no broader than necessary to protect that interest. In Wade, the crowding stemmed from the nature of the case, not from the court's desire to promote judicial economy by empaneling three juries at once.
Demonstrative exhibits to aid the jury's understanding may be utilized when relevant to the issues in the case, but only if the exhibits constitute an accurate and reasonable reproduction of the object involved. See Wade v. State, 204 So.2d 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Alston v. Shiver, 105 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1958). The determination as to whether to allow the use of a demonstrative exhibit is a matter within the trial court's discretion.
DeCastro v. State, 359 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) ("appellant was not promised anything in return for his statement in this case . . . the promise of methadone treatment was not used as an inducement for him to confess." [emphasis supplied]); Wade v. State, 204 So.2d 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); see, State v. Jones, 26 Ariz. App. 66, 546 P.2d 43 (1976); State v. Creekmore, 208 Kan. 933, 495 P.2d 96 (1972); People v. White, 63 A.D.2d 752, 404 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1978); cf. Presnell v. State, 241 Ga. 49, 243 S.E.2d 496 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 439 U.S. 14, 99 S.Ct. 235, 58 L.Ed.2d 207 (1978); State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 388 A.2d 218 (1978); Townes v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 683, 204 S.E.2d 269 (1974); contra, Tatum v. State, 585 S.W.2d 957 (Ark. 1979). The recent case of Slaten v. State, 367 So.2d 562 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978), writ denied, 367 So.2d 569 (Ala. 1979), is precisely on point.
" See also Brown v. State, Fla.App. 2nd, 181 So.2d 578; Gregory v. State, Fla.App. 2nd, 181 So.2d 547; Wade v. State, Fla. App.2d, 204 So.2d 235. In the absence of a request by defense counsel that the jury be excused during the investigation of the voluntariness of a confession, or in the absence of any objection to such testimony being taken before the jury, such proceedings before the jury do not constitute reversible error unless the court at the conclusion of the investigation finds the confession to have been involuntarily given.
". . . [T]he court has a duty to maintain the dignity of the law in the courtroom which also includes the protection of witnesses under examination." See also: Wade v. State, Fla.App. 1967, 204 So.2d 235; Atkins v. State, Fla.App. 1968, 210 So.2d 9; Illinois v. Allen (1970), 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353. Notwithstanding appellant's contention that the court erred in requiring witness to stand while testifying, we express the view that the appellant has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced in fact by the action of the trial court and has further failed to demonstrate that the trial judge abused her discretion.
We hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant the defendant's motion for mistrial and for a curative instruction to the jury. Cf. Wade v. State, Fla.App. 1967, 204 So.2d 235. The conviction and adjudication for arson in the third degree are affirmed.
That rule was adhered to in Gregory v. State, Fla.App., 181 So.2d 547, and Wade v. State, Fla. App., 204 So.2d 235. Appellant admits that he made no objection while he was acting as his own attorney in the case at bar but suggests that greater latitude should be afforded him since he is not an attorney. No authority for the proposition is advanced, and we know of none which might be applicable when a defendant discharges his appointed trial counsel and insists on representing himself.