The best evidence of legislative intent is the text of the statute. Wade v.State, 348 S.C. 255, 259, 559 S.E.2d 843, 844 (2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted). If the terms of the statute are clear, the court must apply those terms according to their literal meaning.
In an analogous case, however, this Court previously held that a statute revoking inmate credits for prisoners submitting frivolous claims or giving false testimony should not be applied to PCR applicants. In Wade v. State, 348 S.C. 255, 559 S.E.2d 843 (2002), the petitioner filed a PCR application, which was denied. The PCR judge also revoked petitioner's inmate credits under section 24-27-200 of the Inmate Litigation Act (ILA) for testifying falsely at the PCR hearing.Id. at 257, 559 S.E.2d at 844.
Our state Supreme Court has advised that "courts are not confined to the literal meaning of a statute where the literal import contradicts the real purpose and intent of the lawmakers." Wade v. State , 348 S.C. 255, 259, 559 S.E.2d 843, 845 (2002). Given the legislative intent, we are constrained to construe Proviso 117.190 as prohibiting a mask mandate such as the University has imposed.
Wade v. State, 348 S.C. 255, 263, 559 S.E.2d 843, 847 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Wade v.State, 348 S.C. 255, 259, 559 S.E.2d 843, 844 (2002). The best evidence of legislative intent is the text of the statute.
He has no further PCR remedies available to him. See Wade v. State, 559 S.E.2d 843, 847 (S.C. 2002) ("An individual under PCR effectively is granted one chance to argue for relief and must do so within a year of his final appeal"). Accordingly, the petitioner meets the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
Section 2244(d)(2) therefore did not toll the limitation period during the pendency of respondent's first federal habeas petition.") Therefore, the merits of the issues could not be reached even if the issues could be raised by way of a second petition. Moreover, the petitioner's direct appeal and PCR proceedings have been completed, and any attempt by the petitioner to raise these issues in state court at this time would be time-barred or successive. Wade v. State, 348 S.C. 255, 264, 559 S.E.2d 843, 847 (2002) ("An individual under PCR effectively is granted one chance to argue for relief and must do so within a year of his final appeal"); S.C. Code § 17-27-90 ("All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this chapter must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental or amended application."). Petitioner admitted in his Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry # 28) that he is "procedurally barred from bringing any claims before the state's highest court and to return to S.C. Supreme Court now would be futility."
Section 2244(d)(2) therefore did not toll the limitation period during the pendency of respondent's first federal habeas petition.") Therefore, the merits of the issues could not be reached even if the issues could be raised by way of a second petition. Moreover, the petitioner's direct appeal and PCR proceedings have been completed, and any attempt by the petitioner to raise these issues in state court at this time would be time-barred or successive. Wade v. State, 348 S.C. 255, 264, 559 S.E.2d 843, 847 (2002)("An individual under PCR effectively is granted one chance to argue for relief and must do so within a year of his final appeal"); S.C. Code § 17-27-90 ("All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this chapter must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental or amended application."). Petitioner admitted in his Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry # 28) that he is "procedurally barred from bringing any claims before the state's highest court and to return to S.C. Supreme Court now would be futility."
In this case, because Petitioner did not file an application for PCR until March 8, 2005, the Magistrate Judge found that there was no tolling prior to the running of the limitations period. (RR at 11, citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (holding that if a state court rejects a petitioner's PCR application as "untimely, it was not `properly filed,' and he is not entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2)"); Wade v. State, 559 S.E.2d 843, 847 (S.C. 2002) ("An individual under PCR effectively is granted one chance to argue for relief and must do so within a year of his final appeal").) It is uncontested that Petitioner filed the instant action on April 26, 2006, well over two years after the running of the AEDPA's limitations period.
To interpret the statute in such a way as to bar parole consideration where, as here, the sentence alone is overturned and remanded for resentencing would lead to an absurd result. Wade v. State, 348 S.C. 255, 259, 559 S.E.2d 843, 845 (2002) ("However, a court must reject a statute's interpretation leading to absurd results not intended by the Legislature."). Dingle's argument that the remand of his Sumter County sentences was a "subsequent conviction" rendering him ineligible for parole is erroneous, and specific performance of the plea bargain can still be accomplished.