The court described "this crime" in the singular, not different crimes comprised of different elements, and the court appeared, by using the words "some kind," to lump together all of the alternative phrases into a single improper purpose element. Additional support comes from Wade v. State , 624 P.2d 86 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981), in which the OCCA said, " Section 1289.16 requires that the act be done with at least one of several specified intents or purposes, including to threaten, or to injure by mental or emotional intimidation." Id. at 89 (emphasis added).

The Court has had few opportunities to review section 2803(22). In Wade v. State, 624 P.2d 86, 91 (Okl.Cr. 1981) the appellant challenged the use of a court minute introduced to prove a prior conviction from Louisiana. The appellant claimed the exhibit was inadmissible hearsay as it did not state it was a final judgment, nor did it in any way state that the judgment was pronounced in accordance with the verdict.

¶ 95 The Court has had few opportunities to review section 2803(22). In Wade v. State,624 P.2d 86, 91 (Okla. Cr. 1981) the appellant challenged the use of a court minute introduced to prove a prior conviction from Louisiana. The appellant claimed the exhibit was inadmissible hearsay as it did not state it was a final judgment, nor did it in any way state that the judgment was pronounced in accordance with the verdict.

The trial court probably should have given the appropriate accomplice instructions. However, in Wade v. State, 624 P.2d 86, 90 (Okla. Cr. 1981), citing Plummer v. State, 515 P.2d 256 (Okla. Cr. 1973), this Court held that where there is overwhelming evidence of guilt and the presence of sufficient corroborating testimony, the failure to so instruct is harmless. In this case, Appellant himself corroborated Ms. Watson's testimony, when he testified and admitted that he shot the victim in self-defense and in defense of Ms. Watson. Title 22 O.S. 1981 § 742[ 22-742] mandates that other evidence that "tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense" must be present.

We will now consider only the remaining allegations of error which relate to the convictions for burglary and kidnapping. First, we consider Appellant's claim that an instruction should have been given which would have informed the jury that Cannon was an accomplice and that his testimony must therefore be corroborated. While it is true that such an instruction would have been warranted, we find the lack of this instruction to be at most, harmless error. Maxwell v. State, 742 P.2d 1165 (Okla. Cr. 1987); Smith v. State, 727 P.2d 1366 (Okla. Cr. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033, 107 S.Ct. 3277, 97 L.Ed.2d 780; VanWoundenberg v. State, 720 P.2d at 334; Wade v. State, 624 P.2d 86 (Okla. Cr. 1981). Not only was there corroborating evidence from independent witnesses, Appellant's own confession admits his complete complicity in the two crimes. We do not find that the lack of this instruction prejudiced Appellant requiring reversal.

Therefore, when modifying a sentence, this Court has analyzed the apparent reasoning behind the jury assessment of punishment so that the resentencing does not do violence to it. See e.g. Scott v. State, 751 P.2d 758 (Okla. Cr. 1988), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1114, 109 S.Ct. 3176 104 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1988) (prosecutorial misconduct); Treece v. State, 753 P.2d 377 (Okla. Cr. 1988) (prosecutorial misconduct); Wade v. State, 624 P.2d 86 (Okla. Cr. 1981) (cumulative trial error).See e.g. Clopton v. State, 742 P.2d 586 (Okla. Cr. 1987); Ellis v. State, 749 P.2d 114 (Okla. Cr. 1988).

Cr. 1983). Moreover, as we noted in Wade v. State, 624 P.2d 86, 91 (Okla. Cr. 1981), the rationale for exempting sentencing proceedings from the rules of evidence is to provide the widest range of relevant information to guide the judge in imposing sentence. Second stage jury sentencing proceedings involving new findings of fact are not within the reason for the rule.

However, in view of appellant's failure to request a cautionary instruction, the error, if any, has been waived. Wade v. State, 624 P.2d 86 (Okla. Cr. 1981). As his fifth assignment of error, the appellant alleges that the trial court's instructions concerning whether Pam Logan was an accomplice were so confusing and contradictory that fundamental error occurred.

Furthermore, because the evidence is overwhelming, and in fact, would be sufficient to convict without Baker's testimony, we find that the appellant was not prejudiced by the failure to instruct. See Plummer v. State, 515 P.2d 256 (Okla. Cr. 1973), and Wade v. State, 624 P.2d 86 (Okla. Cr. 1981). Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit.

Cf. Young v. City of Tulsa, 563 P.2d 156 (Okla. Cr. 1977); Wade v. State, 624 P.2d 86 (Okla. Cr. 1981); and Groskins v. State, 52 Okla. Cr. 197, 4 P.2d 117 (1931). Where a statute creates and defines an offense, an indictment or information which does not allege all the essential elements constituting the offense is insufficient.