Wade v. Lockhart

8 Citing cases

  1. Pool v. Wyrick

    703 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1983)   Cited 9 times

    Under these circumstances in order to avoid even further delay, it is appropriate to vacate the district court's judgment denying the appellant's Rule 60(b) motion and remand for further consideration. See Wade v. Lockhart, 674 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1982); Seemiller v. Wyrick, 663 F.2d 805, 807-808 (8th Cir. 1981). If within ninety days from the date of this Court's opinion the state court has not rendered a decision on the appellant's Rule 27.26 motion, the district court should vacate its dismissal of Pool's habeas petition and consider the case on its merits. Should the state court render a decision adverse to the appellant on his Rule 27.26 motion within the ninety-day period, the district court should reconsider whether Pool must still exhaust his state remedies.

  2. Guzman v. Bittinger

    5:23-CV-05088-RAL (D.S.D. Sep. 30, 2024)

    Wade v. Lockhart, 674 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1982).

  3. Jones v. Solem

    739 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1984)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that a year-long delay in processing petitioner's post-conviction motion in state court did not warrant federal intervention, and that her challenge to the validity of her conviction would not be rendered moot by her release on parole

    However, in several cases where petitioners have not obtained any state-court ruling on post-conviction motions after inordinate delay, this Court has remanded to the District Court with directions to consider the habeas petition on the merits if the state court still has not rendered a decision within a stated period of time. See, e.g., Pool v. Wyrick, 703 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (no ruling on post-conviction motion after nearly three years); Wade v. Lockhart, 674 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1982) (no decision on post-conviction motion after more than two years). In Mucie, the State did not file a response to petitioner's motion for post-conviction relief for nearly a year, and the State court did not pass on the motion for over thirty months.

  4. McMillan v. Chief Judge, Cir. Ct., Greene Cty

    711 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1983)   Cited 3 times
    Finding request for injunction against further delay in deciding motion was moot where motion had already been denied

    Pool v. Wyrick, 703 F.2d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Seemiller v. Circuit Court Clerk of St. Charles County, 640 F.2d 175, 176 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). See also Wade v. Lockhart, 674 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1982) (vacating district court's dismissal of federal habeas petition for failure to exhaust where petition was pending in state court for well over two years). A three-year delay is substantial and may amount to a deprivation of constitutional rights.

  5. White v. Cockrell

    NO. 3-03-CV-1230-K (N.D. Tex. Jun. 17, 2003)

    Deters v. Collins, 985 F.2d 789, 795-96 (5th Cir. 1993). See also Carpenter v. Young, 50 F.3d 869, 870-71 (10th Cir. 1995) (two-year delay creates presumption that state appellate process is ineffective); Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528. 530-01 (9th Cir. 1990) (four-year delay); Wade v. Lockhart, 674 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1982) (two-year delay); Matthews v. Johnson, No. 3-97-CV-1475-T (N.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 1996), rec. adopted by ORDER (N.D.Tex. Oct. 23, 1996) (four-year delay). Petitioner has failed to show that the delay in this case, while certainly regrettable, results from an inadequate state procedure.

  6. Matthews v. Cockrell

    3:02-CV-913-M (N.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2002)

    Vail v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 630, 632 (5th Cir. 1983); Shelton v. Heard, 696 F.2d 1127, 1129 (1983). See also Carpenter v. Young, 50 F.3d 869, 870-71 (10th Cir. 1995) (two year delay creates presumption that state appellate process is ineffective); Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1990) (four year delay); Wade v. Lockhart, 674 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1982) (two year delay). However, the delay must be solely attributable to inadequate state procedures and impinge on the petitioner's due process rights.

  7. Harris v. Kuhlman

    601 F. Supp. 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)   Cited 21 times
    Finding that seven-year delay might impair petitioner's defense if he were retired, even though review of petitioner's claims suggested "very little chance of reversal"

    The state cannot complain of lack of exhaustion when it itself was responsible for this failure. See Breazeale v. Bradley, 582 F.2d 5, 6 (5th Cir. 1978) (delay of state remedy for over a year amounted to "a prolonged sleep, [which] in state remedies as in the rest of us, may safely be said to evince exhaustion"); see also Pool v. Wyrick, 703 F.2d 1064, 1066 (8th Cir. 1983); Wade v. Lockhart, 674 F.2d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 1982); Sapienza v. Vincent, 534 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir. 1976). Petitioner's request for habeas corpus relief is appropriate.

  8. Smith v. Wyrick

    558 F. Supp. 600 (W.D. Mo. 1983)   Cited 3 times
    In Smith v. Wyrick, 558 F. Supp. 600, 602-3 n. 1 (W.D.Mo. 1983), we cited controlling Eighth Circuit precedent which provided that in a section 2254 action a federal court must hold an evidentiary hearing "if relevant facts are in dispute and a fair evidentiary hearing was not granted in the state court."

    See Mucie v. Missouri State Department of Corrections, supra. An order similar to that entered in Seemiller was recently entered by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Wade v. Lockhart, 674 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1982). Wade vacated and remanded an outright dismissal of a State prisoner's habeas petition for failure to exhaust.