]; In re 1973 John Deere 4030 Tractor, see note 32, supra [Claim for recovery of stolen property.]; Wade v. Geren, 1987 OK 81, ¶ 13, 743 P.2d 1070 [Vacate adoption.]; Smith v. Johnston, 1978 OK 142, ¶ 13, 591 P.2d 1260 [Damage from the negligent installation of electrical wiring.

Matter of Adoption of L.D.S., 2006 OK 80, ¶ 6, 155 P.3d 1. Finally, even if the three month period for challenging a final decree of adoption had passed before the Department discovered the adoptive father's misleading testimony, we have determined that the stated time period for challenge remains subject to the discovery rule. See, Wade v. Geren, 1987 OK 81, ¶ 12, 743 P.2d 1070. Title 10 O.S.2001 § 7505-6.1 is entitled "[I]nterlocutory decree" and provides:

; In re 1973 John Deere 4030 Tractor, 1991 OK 79, ¶ 10, 816 P.2d 1126 (Claim for recovery of stolen property.); Wade v. Green, 1987 OK 81, ¶ 13, 743 P.2d 1070 (Vacate adoption.); Smith v. Johnston, 1978 OK 142, ¶ 13, 591 P.2d 1260 (Damage from the negligent installation of electrical wiring.)

With a caveat we footnote, infra, in reference to failure of adoption cases, Oklahoma has also placed itself in the majority column. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated in Wade v. Geren, 743 P.2d 1070, 1075 (Okla. 1987): "But the [lower] court recognized that when the adoption decree had to be set aside it could not simply weigh or compare households; absent a showing of unfitness the father as natural parent would be entitled to custody as against anyone else" (alteration added). Previously, in Grover v. Phillips, 681 P.2d 81, 83 (Okla. 1984), the court recognized that if the parent is deemed fit, custody with the parent is in the "best interests" of the child regardless of how much better off the child might be thought to be in the custody of third-party.

Nowhere in the opinion, though, did the court indicate whether the father would have a separate cause of action against the defendants for their fraudulent conduct. In an analogous case, the court in Wade v. Geren, 743 P.2d 1070 (Okla. 1987), vacated an adoption decree based upon fraudulent representations concerning the identity of the unwed biological father made by the child's maternal grandparents, who sought her adoption. Accord Petition of Doe, 159 Ill.2d 347, 351, 202 Ill. Dec. 535, ___, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182 (1994) (invalidating adoption and commenting "the fault here lies initially with the mother, who fraudulently tried to deprive the father of his rights, and secondly, with the adoptive parents and their attorney, who proceeded with the adoption when they knew that a real father was out there who had been denied knowledge of his baby's existence"); In re Adoption of Murphy, 53 Ohio App.3d 14, 18, 557 N.E.2d 827, 832 (1988) (invalidating adoption proceeding because "actionable fraud attended the placement and initial adoption proceedings" of unwed biological father's child). Cf. Robert O. v. Russell K., 80 N.Y.2d 254, 590 N.Y.S.2d 37, 604 N.E.2d 99 (1992) (declining to vacate adoption, which unwed biological fathe

1978), cert. denied sub nom. Strouse v. Winter, 441 U.S. 945, 99 S.Ct. 2165, 60 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1979); see also Sumter v. Allton, 278 Ark. 621, 648 S.W.2d 55 (1983); Wade v. Geren, 743 P.2d 1070 (Okla. 1987). Since Hernandez's action is barred under any interpretation of the Alaska statute, we need not determine whether AS 25.23.140(b) is subject to a discovery rule.

A stranger to the judgment roll of an adoption proceeding may bring an action to vacate the adoption decree if he or she possesses a legally protectible interest that is impaired by the decree. Matter of B.C., 749 P.2d 542, 544-545 (Okla. 1988); Wade v. Geren, 743 P.2d 1070, 1073-1074 (Okla. 1987). As we are about to explain, Tariah failed to show that he possessed an interest deserving of protection within the adoption proceeding, and we need not address his contention as to what Terri did or did not know.

The father's immediate and persistent actions are central. See In re Appeal of H.R., 581 A.2d 1141, 1160 (D.C.Ct. App. 1990) (lead opinion); Wade v. Geren, 743 P.2d 1070 (Okla. 1987). "When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by `com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,' his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause."

Other state courts have agreed that, notwithstanding any state law to the contrary, an unwed father who has grasped the opportunity to establish a relationship with his child retains the right to withhold his consent to an adoption. See, e.g., Walker v. Campbell, 711 N.E.2d 42 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), opinion vacated after settlement, Walker v. Campbell, 719 N.E.2d 1248 (In.1999) ; In re Hood, 930 S.W.2d 575, 578–79 (Tenn.App.1996) (statute that permitted mother to make adoptive placement without putative father's consent violated putative father's substantive due-process rights); Wade v. Geren, 743 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Okla.1987) (putative father's substantive due-process rights attached when he had expended great amount of time, effort, and resources to take on the responsibility for rearing the child and for having the opportunity to develop an emotional bond with the child). This court first discussed the "opportunity interest" established by Lehr in M.V.S. v. V.M.D., supra.

Services on Behalf of Huggins v. Heidler, 629 So.2d 1073 (Fla.App.2d Dist.1994); Matter of Michael H. v. Carole S.D., 198 A.D.2d 414, 604 N.Y.S.2d 573 (N.Y.A.D.2d Dept.1993); In re Paternity of Nathan T., 174 Wis.2d 352, 497 N.W.2d 740 (Wisc.App.1993); Buss and Smith v. Buss, 161 Wis.2d 935, 469 N.W.2d 249 (Wisc.App.1991); Wade v. Geren, 743 P.2d 1070, 1987 OK 81 (Okla.1987); Ely v. Derosier, 123 N.H. 249, 459 A.2d 280 (N.H.1983); Luedtke v. Koopsma, 303 N.W.2d 112 (S.D.1981); Matter of Robertson v. Collings, 101 Misc.2d 808, 421 N.Y.S.2d 999 (N.Y.Fam.Ct.1979). Examples of such relevant evidence include blood tests, an informal acknowledgment, and cohabitation of the mother and father at the time of conception.