{¶36} As an officer of the court and not the parties, Cornachio cannot be considered a receiver of process for J & J Slyman, L.L.C., or Garfield Mall Shopping Center, and notice may not be imputed onto these parties simply because Cornachio may have received notice of a suit pending against him in his professional capacity. Indeed, Ohio courts have made clear that a plaintiff may not bring a corporation into court through service of summons upon its receiver, absent an order of the court requiring the receiver to defend the company's lawsuits.Wade v. Franklin, 50 Ohio App. 174, 176, 197 N.E. 796 (6th Dist.1934); accord C. & M. RR. Co. v. Orme, 1 Ohio C.D. 285 (Ohio Cir. 1885) (now the 5th District). Accordingly, without more, Palmer's conclusory allegations that these entities had notice cannot support her contentions that she properly changed all parties through amendment under Civ.R. 15(C).

LLOYD, J. In the action in the Court of Common Pleas, to reverse the judgment in which this proceeding in error was instituted, George Wade sought to have set aside as fraudulently procured a judgment theretofore rendered in the Court of Common Pleas in favor of the defendant, The Wabash Railway Company. That judgment was affirmed by this court on June 25, 1934, Wade v. Franklin et al., Receivers, 50 Ohio App. 174, 197 N.E. 796. On May 13, 1932, Wade commenced an action in the Court of Common Pleas against The Wabash Railway Company, and Walter S. Franklin et al. as receivers thereof, to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by him on October 5, 1930, and September 21, 1931.