Opinion
No. 04-1040-T/An.
October 7, 2004
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The plaintiff, Roy Lee Wade, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various defendants, including Mark Davidson, the Sheriff of Chester County, Tennessee; John Doe, an unidentified Deputy Sheriff for Chester County; Harry Cooper, the Chief of Police for the City of McKenzie, Tennessee; Virgil Bush, Jr., a McKenzie police officer; and the City of McKenzie. Plaintiff alleged that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when he was stopped and arrested without reasonable suspicion, and falsely imprisoned.
On June 9, 2004, the Court entered an order granting summary judgment to the McKenzie defendants. Plaintiff subsequently sought permission to file an amendment to his complaint, and on August 17, 2004, an order was entered by the Magistrate Judge stating that leave of Court was not required. Therefore, on August 27, 2004, plaintiff filed an amendment adding the City of Henderson, Tennessee, the Henderson Police Department, and John Doe II, a City of Henderson police officer, as defendants. Plaintiff alleged that the unknown Henderson police officer stopped him without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment on behalf of the City of Henderson and John Doe II (the "Henderson defendants"). Plaintiff has filed a response to the motion.
Plaintiff originally filed his motion to amend on July 20, 2004; however, the motion was denied by the Magistrate Judge on the grounds that plaintiff did not file a certificate of consultation as required by the Local Rules. The motion to amend was renewed on August 9, 2004.
The Henderson Police Department is not a separate, suable entity apart from the City of Henderson. See Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). Therefore, to the extent that plaintiff attempts to assert separate claims against the "Henderson Police Department", those claims are dismissed.
The defendants interpret the amendment to the complaint as raising a defamation claim. In his response, however, plaintiff states that he is not alleging any claim of libel or slander.
Motions for summary judgment are governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. If no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party may support the motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other proof or by exposing the lack of evidence on an issue for which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The opposing party may not rest upon the pleadings but must go beyond the pleadings and "by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
"If the defendant . . . moves for summary judgment . . . based on the lack of proof of a material fact, . . . [t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff."Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). However, the court's function is not to weigh the evidence, judge credibility, or in any way determine the truth of the matter but only to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.Id. at 249. Rather, "[t]he inquiry on a summary judgment motion . . . is . . . `whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a [trier of fact] or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Street v. J.C. Bradford Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52). Doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial are resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970).
On July 3, 2003, plaintiff was driving in Henderson, Tennessee with a friend, Desmond Keith Echoles, as a passenger in the car. (Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 1; Echoles Aff. ¶ 2.) Henderson Police Chief Tommy Davis states in his affidavit that on that day his department received a complaint of a reckless driver on U.S. Highway 45 North. The complainant gave a license plate number and a description of the vehicle. (Davis Aff. ¶ 9.) When an officer located and stopped the car on Highway 45, it turned out to be the vehicle that plaintiff was driving. Plaintiff states that the officer told him that they "had just flipped off a white woman," which he denies. (Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 2; Echoles Aff. ¶ 3.)
The officer also discovered that there was an outstanding warrant for plaintiff's arrest from Carroll County, Tennessee, and plaintiff was taken into custody on that warrant. (Davis Aff. ¶ 9; Pl.'s Aff ¶ 3.) Plaintiff attempted to tell the officer that he had the wrong person, but the officer refused to listen. Plaintiff was handcuffed and taken to jail, and was then transported to Carroll County where he was booked, fingerprinted and incarcerated until he made bond. (Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 3-6; Echoles Aff. ¶ 3-4.)
The Henderson defendants first contend that plaintiff's § 1983 claims against them are barred by the statute of limitations. Under Tennessee law, such claims are subject to the one-year statute of limitations contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3). See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985) (because § 1983 contains no statute of limitations, federal courts apply the most analogous state statute of limitations, which is that for personal injury actions); Sharpe v. Cureton, 319 F.3d 259, 266 (6th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff argues in his response to defendants' motion that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the charges against him were dismissed with prejudice on October 2, 2003. This contention is based on plaintiff's assertion that "the basis of this cause of action is malicious prosecution." However, nowhere in plaintiff's original complaint or the amendment to the complaint does he allege a cause of action for malicious prosecution. The complaint clearly states, in paragraph 15:
Plaintiff Roy L. Wade, Jr. alleges that on or about July 3, 2003 he was falsely arrested and falsely imprisoned as he was driving in Chester County, Tennessee. Plaintiff alleges that a County Sheriff's deputy referred to herein as John Doe stopped him with the allegation that he `had flipped of (sic) a white woman', when in fact he had not and the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to make the stop.
The specific facts alleged in the complaint do not state a claim for malicious prosecution. Therefore, the Court construes the complaint as alleging only claims of false arrest and false imprisonment.
For claims of false arrest, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the arrest. See McCune v. Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 906 (6th Cir. 1988); Black-Hosang v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, 96 Fed. Appx. 372, 374 (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 2004). Similarly, the statute of limitations for false imprisonment claims begins to run when the plaintiff's detention ends. McCune, 842 F.2d at 907; Sanders v. Southards Supermarket, Inc., No. 99-6105, 2000 WL 1359638, at **2 (6th Cir. Sept. 14, 2000). As indicated, plaintiff initially filed his motion to amend the complaint to add the Henderson defendants on July 20, 2004, more than one year after his arrest on July 3, 2003. With regard to the claims of false imprisonment, nothing in the record specifies the exact date plaintiff was released from prison. However, he concedes that he did make bond, and it is plaintiff's burden to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Without specific evidence, the Court will not simply presume that plaintiff remained in jail for seventeen days prior to being released on bond. Thus, it appears that plaintiff's claims against the Henderson defendants are time-barred.
The defendants also contend that the amendment to the complaint does not relate back to the date of the original complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). That rule provides, in relevant part, that an amendment to a complaint relates back to the original complaint if:
(2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, or
(3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.
Notice to a new defendant may be actual or constructive. Berndt v. State of Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 884 (6th Cir. 1986).
The filing of a complaint against a "John Doe" defendant does not toll the running of the statute of limitations against that party. See Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996); Bufalino v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 404 F.2d 1023, 1028 (6th Cir. 1968). Thus, even if the amendment related back to the filing of the original complaint, the plaintiff's failure to identify John Doe II has resulted in the statute of limitations running as to that defendant.
Plaintiff argues that the amendment should relate back because counsel for the original defendants is also representing the Henderson defendants. However, that is only one factor that may be considered in determining whether a party has received constructive notice of the lawsuit. Id. (citing Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1980)). Other factors include whether the new defendants are employees or officials of the original defendants and what role, if any, the new defendants played in responding to the original complaint. 796 F.2d at 884.
In this case, the Court finds that the plaintiff's amendment does not relate back to the filing of the original complaint. The Henderson defendants are not related in any way to the original defendants, and the original complaint contains no allegations that would have put counsel on notice that the action should have been brought against either the City of Henderson or a Henderson police officer. Furthermore, there is no indication that the failure to include these defendants in the original complaint was the result of a mistake as to their identity. They are merely new defendants that the plaintiff sought to add after the statute of limitations had run.
In his memorandum in response to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff attempts to argue that he was "bewildered" and "confused" because of his arrest, and thus could not remember whether he had been arrested by the Chester County Sheriff's Department or the City of Henderson Police Department. However, plaintiff should have known who arrested him, and the Court finds that any confusion or forgetfulness on his part is insufficient to constitute a "mistake" concerning the identity of the Henderson defendants.
The Court concludes that there are no disputed issues of fact on the question of whether plaintiff's claims against the Henderson defendants are barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The defendants are, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this basis.
The defendants also contend that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the City of Henderson. A municipal defendant cannot be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior. There must be a showing that the constitutional violation stems from the enforcement of a governmental policy or custom. Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 694 (1978).
Plaintiff's amendment to the complaint contains no factual allegations whatsoever against the City of Henderson. He alleges only that the officer who stopped him was a Henderson police officer. When a plaintiff completely fails to allege any action by a defendant, it necessarily "appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief." Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985). Therefore, the City of Henderson is also entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this ground.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of the City of Henderson, the Henderson Police Department and John Doe II is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.