Cummings v. Hartford, 70 Conn. 115, [121-22], 38 A. 916 [1897]." Wade v. Bridgeport, 109 Conn. 100, 109, 145 A. 644 (1929). The trial court's instructions thus echoed this principle.

In this case, the court as the trier of facts, found that Norton was not an agent of the city authorized to receive or transmit notice of an accident. This conclusion must be permitted to stand because Norton's position as superintendent of sewers and the general duties inherent in that position do not form an adequate basis for holding as a matter of law that he was an agent for the purpose of receiving and communicating notice of accidents of this sort; see Derby v. Connecticut Light Power Co., 167 Conn. 136, 141-42, 355 A.2d 244 (1974); Wade v. Bridgeport, 109 Conn. 100, 109, 145 A. 644 (1929); and because there is no evidence presented either in the record or in the appendices to the briefs which would support the defendant's claim that Norton was so authorized. Even if USFG had succeeded in proving that Norton was an agent for the purpose of receiving notice of an accident, there would be the further question of whether the injury was such that a duty to report would arise.

Ruocco v. United Advertising Corporation, 98 Conn. 241, 247, 119 A. 48. When a cause of danger to public travel exists on private land adjoining a public highway, the liability of the owner of the land for an injury from it depends on its dangerous character with reference to public travel rather than its exact location. It need not be immediately at the boundary of the highway. Crogan v. Schiele, 53 Conn. 186, 196. 1 A. 899 It is true that the plaintiff in this case was not on the highway at the time she fell but the Railway Company had thrown its land open to general travel by those passing along the street and so in effect had invited the public to use it; and it thereby became obligated to use reasonable care to protect them from injury. Lindblade v. United States Rubber Co., 102 Conn. 396, 400, 128 A. 707; Wade v. Bridgeport, 109 Conn. 100, 106, 145 A. 644. Whoever built the fence, it was on the Railway Company's wall and it was its duty to maintain it. That duty continued, under the facts of this case, unless and until the duty passed to another. The duty could not be avoided or shifted to the Hallock Company by the removal of the tracks or even by the abandonment of the use of the land, if there had been found to have been one. It is significant in that regard that, in the order of the public utilities commission permitting the removal of the tracks, poles and wires, it was expressly provided that it was "without the loss of franchise so to operate."

The law is clear that, if what was done by such owners, or either of them, toward keeping the walk free from stones, either rendered the walk reasonably safe at the time of the accident under all the circumstances and conditions surrounding the city, or was an act which, if done by the city, would have been sufficient to show reasonable care by it under all the circumstances and conditions, such act would relieve the city of liability. Kristiansen v. Danbury, 108 Conn. 553, 559, 143 A. 850; Wade v. Bridgeport, 109 Conn. 100, 108, 145 A. 644. The court made no reference to this principle of law in its charge, although the significance of its application in the light of the defendant's evidence that it was swept by the abutting owners, is apparent. "`It is the duty of the court in every case to give to the jury sitting in that case such instructions as are applicable to the issues raised and sufficient for their guidance in coming to a verdict in the case before them.'"

Notice to Lupien, foreman of the water plant, was not notice to the city. (43 C.J., sec. 1831; Wade v. City of Bridgeport, 109 Conn. 100, 145 A. 644; City of Catlettsburg v. Sutherland, 247 Ky. 540, 57 S.W.2d 512; Corey v. City of Ann Arbor, 134 Mich. 376, 96 N.W. 477; City of Danville v. Vanarsdale, 243 Ky. 338, 48 S.W.2d 5; Bello v. City of Cleveland, 106 Ohio St. 94, 138 N.E. 526; MacDermid v. City of Seattle, 93 Wn. 167, 160 P. 290; Atchison, T. S.F. Ry. Co. v. Benton, 42 Kan. 698, 22 P. 698; Congar v. Chicago etc. Ry., 24 Wis. 157, 1 Am. Rep. 164; City of Indianapolis v. Ray, 52 Ind. App. 388, 97 N.E. 795; Chicago L. C. Co. v. Garner, 132 Iowa, 282, 109 N.W. 780.) The city was bound to exercise reasonable care to keep its water supply pure.

In fact, our Supreme Court has held that an established dedication to public use shifts control, and with it liability, to the municipality. Wade v. Bridgeport, 109 Conn. 100, 106, 145 A. 644 (1929). See also General Statutes §§ 52-557f to 52-557g (owners and lessees not liable for injury on land made available to public for recreational purposes).

"[T]he duty of the city of Bridgeport to use reasonable care in keeping all of its sidewalks reasonably safe for travel by pedestrians is commensurate with its right of control, and that extends to all sidewalks necessary for public convenience." Wade v. Bridgeport, 109 Conn. 100, 103, 145 A. 644 (1929). "General Statutes § 13a-149 provides in part: Any person injured in person or property by means of a defective road or bridge may recover damages from the party bound to keep it in repair.

Although I will not grant the motion to dismiss for the reasons stated, I do not base my decision on the fact that the Town was in fact not misled by the notice given because a Town police officer investigated the accident scene the same day it occurred. As said in Wade v. Bridgeport, 109 Conn. 100, 109 (1929): "Notice to a policeman [sic] ordinarily is not notice to the municipality except where it is shown that he [sic] is charged with the duty of remedying or reporting defects." The statute specifies exactly to whom notice must be given and it would water down the notice provision and the protection it was meant to give to the towns if any claim of inaccuracy could be met by an assertion that another agent of town government investigated the accident and that constituted sufficient notice.

The defendant City is entitled to the benefit in so far as the discharge of its duty is concerned, of what was so done by him. Wade vs. Bridgeport, 109 Conn. 100, 108.

The rule has often been stated in connection with defects in streets or sidewalks. Central Union Telephone Co. v. City of Conneaut, 167 F. 274 ( C.C.A. 6 1909); City of Albany v. Black, 216 Ala. 4, 112 So. 433 ( Sup. Ct. 1926); Wise v. City of Los Angeles, 9 Cal.App.2d 364, 49 P.2d 1122 ( Dist. Ct. App. 1935), rehearing denied 50 P.2d 1079 (1935); City of Denver v. Deane, 10 Colo. 375, 16 P. 30 ( Sup. Ct. 1887); Wade v. City of Bridgeport, 109 Conn. 100, 145 A. 644 ( Sup. Ct. Err. 1929); City of Columbus v. Ogletree, 102 Ga. 293, 29 S.E. 749 ( Sup. Ct. 1897); City of Joliet v. Looney, 159 Ill. 471, 42 N.E. 854 ( Sup. Ct. 1896); Lifschitz v. City of Chicago, 150 Ill.App. 201 (1909); City of Muncie v. Hey, 164 Ind. 570, 74 N.E. 250 ( Sup. Ct. 1905); City of Hammond v. Jahnke, 178 Ind. 177, 99 N.E. 39 ( Sup. Ct. 1912); Smith v. City of Des Moines, 84 Iowa 685, 51 N.W. 77 ( Sup. Ct. 1892); City of Harlan v. Parsons, 202 Ky. 358, 259 S.W. 717 ( Ct. App. 1924); Blake v. City of Lowell, 143 Mass. 296, 9 N.E. 627 ( Sup. Jud. Ct. 1887); Delgado v. Town of Billerica, 323 Mass. 483, 82 N.E.2d 591 ( Sup. Jud. Ct. 1948); Edwards v. Common Council of Village of Three Rivers, 96 Mich. 625, 55 N.W. 1003 ( Sup. Ct. 1893); Engel v. City of Minneapolis, 138 Minn. 438, 165 N.W. 278, L.R.A. 1918 B, 647 ( Sup. Ct. 1917); Miller v. Town of Canton, 112 Mo.App. 322, 87 S.W. 96 ( Ct. App. 1905); Andrews v. City of Butte, 116 Mont. 69, 147 P.2d 1020 ( Sup. Ct. 1944); Twogood v. City of New Yor