Summary
granting Rule 54(b) motion while denying simultaneously-filed motion to stay
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CV 02-528-BR.
June 15, 2004
LAUREN J. PAULSON, Aloha, OR, Attorney for Plaintiff.
DAVID G. HOSENPUD, LEAH C. LIVELY, Lane Powell Spears Lubersky, LLP, Portland, OR, Attorneys for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Pamela A. Wachner's Motion to Stay (#164) and Motion for Entry of Appealable Order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) (#165). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Wachner's Motion to Stay and GRANTS Wachner's Motion for Entry of Appealable Order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).
BACKGROUND
This Court previously granted the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Aramark Educational Services, Inc., and Jeff Marsh as to Wachner's Claims of sexual harassment and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5). See Op. and Order (issued Jan. 30, 2004).
Marsh counterclaimed against Wachner for defamation based on the allegedly false statements that Wachner made to others about Marsh's use of his computer at work to download pornography. The trial of Marsh's Counterclaim is set for July 8, 2004.
WACHNER'S RULE 54(B) MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT Standards
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action . . . or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.
A final judgment is "an ultimate disposition" of an individual claim. Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 236 (1956). Because severance under Rule 54(b) is consistent with the final judgment rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and only a final judgment may be severed, the court has discretion to determine whether any just reasons for delay exist. James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064, 1068 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2002). See also In re First T.D. Inv., Inc., 253 F.3d 520, 531 (9th Cir. 2001). The "issuance of a Rule 54(b) order is a fairly routine act that is reversed only in the rarest of instances." Id.
In the exercise of its discretion to determine whether any just reasons for delay exist, the court may consider the following factors:
[W]hether the claims under review were separable from the others remaining to be adjudicated and whether the nature of the claims already determined was such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once even if there were subsequent appeals.Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980). Thus, even though a court may not have dismissed the claims of all of the parties, the court may enter a final judgment as to those parties whose claims were dismissed. If the court finds there is no just reason for delay, that final judgment becomes appealable immediately. James, 283 F.3d at 1068 n. 6.
Discussion
Wachner asserts the claims on which the Court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants are separate from the Counterclaim asserted by Marsh in spite of the fact that the allegations underlying the claims resolved against Wachner are germane to Marsh's Counterclaim. Accordingly, Wachner seeks entry of a final judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) so that she may appeal the Court's decision immediately. Aramark and Marsh do not oppose entry of a final judgment.
The Court finds Marsh's Counterclaim is independent of Wachner's claims and entry of a final judgment on Wachner's claims will not result in the appellate court having to decide the same issues twice. Accordingly, the Court concludes there is no reason for the Court to delay entry of a final judgment in favor of Aramark and Marsh as to Wachner's claims.
WACHNER'S MOTION TO STAY TRIAL OF MARSH'S COUNTERCLAIM Standards
A federal district court has the inherent power to control its own docket and calendar. Mediterranean Enter., Inc. v. Ssangyong Constr. Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1983). The district court should weigh the following competing interests to determine whether to exercise its discretion to stay proceedings:
[T]he possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go froward, and the orderly course of justice measured in terms of simplifying or complicating issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected from a stay.CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936)). See also Cohen v. Carreon, 94 F. Supp.2d 1112, 1115 (D. Or. 2000).
Wachner asserts a stay of the defamation trial will promote a "just, speedy, and economic resolution of all matters arising out of these actions" because there will be a need for only one jury trial if she is successful on her appeal. Wachner asserts a stay would not prejudice Marsh because his defamation claim "is based on the same sequence of events that brought [Wachner] here."
Marsh contends he will be prejudiced by the delay if the Court grants Wachner's Motion because of loss of evidence. The events giving rise to the Counterclaim allegedly occurred in 2002. Marsh has six witnesses, all present or former employees, and Marsh point outs the transient nature of employment by Aramark at Pacific University. Accordingly, the prejudice Marsh will allegedly suffer arises from the likely loss of witnesses available to testify if the trial is delayed an additional two years pending a decision by the Ninth Circuit on Wachner's appeal.
Marsh also asserts Wachner would not be prejudiced by trying the defamation Counterclaim now because the issue involved is narrow and does not involve the same breadth of evidence, witnesses, or law presented by Wachner's claims.
As noted, the Court has concluded Marsh's defamation Counterclaim is independent of Wachner's discrimination claims. In addition, the Court finds persuasive Marsh's argument that he may be prejudiced by loss of witnesses if the trial is delayed. On the other hand, any prejudice to Wachner resulting from trying Marsh's defamation Counterclaim is speculative because Wachner may not prevail on her claims on appeal. Moreover, Wachner herself moved for entry of a final judgment under Fed R. Civ. P. 54(b) so that she could appeal that judgment immediately. Any additional economic expense arising from the necessity of a second trial, therefore, is a risk Wachner created.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court DENIES Wachner's Motion to Stay (#164) and GRANTS Wachner's Motion for Entry of Appealable Order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) (#165).
IT IS SO ORDERED.