Opinion
Case No. 97-4101-SAC.
January 17, 2001.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case comes before the court on defendant Debra J. Snow's motion for attorneys' fees. (Dk. 147) Snow seeks attorneys' fees as a prevailing defendant, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (5)(k). Plaintiff opposes the motion.
As the Tenth Circuit recently stated:
While a prevailing plaintiff ordinarily is entitled to attorney fees, see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), a prevailing defendant in a civil rights action may recover attorney fees only "if the suit `was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant.'" Utah Women's Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt, 136 F.3d 707, 709 (10th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. 1933). This is a difficult standard to meet, to the point that rarely will a case be sufficiently frivolous to justify imposing attorney fees on the plaintiff. See Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1581 (10th Cir. 1995). The dismissal of claims at the summary judgment stage does not automatically meet this stringent standard. See Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1513 (10th Cir. 1995).Mitchell v. The City of Moore, Oklahoma, 218 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2000).
In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978), the Supreme Court examined when prevailing defendants may recover attorneys fees in Title VII actions. It concluded that "a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith" enabled defendants to recover attorneys fees. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421, 98 S.Ct. at 700.
In setting forth this standard, the Court underscored that district courts must resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. Id. at 421-22, 98 S.Ct. at 700.
Jane L. v. Bangerter 61 F.3d 1505, 1513 (10th Cir. 1995).
In her motion for attorneys' fees, Snow suggests multiple reasons why the court could have found plaintiff's claims to be baseless, but fails to mention the sole reason for the court's summary judgment in favor of Snow. Although Snow offered numerous reasons why the court should grant summary judgment in her favor, the court found only one controlling, in ruling: "It is well established that `under Title VII, suits against individuals must proceed in their official capacity; individual capacity suits are inappropriate.' Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 899 (10th Cir. 1996). See Lankford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 480 (10th Cir. 1994); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993)." (Dk. 145, p. 7).
Plaintiff further alleged that her suit against Snow was brought only in Snow's official capacity as President of the Union. The court ruled that because the union, and not Snow, would bear any liability for the alleged violations of law, and the union was a named party to the suit, Snow's presence in her official capacity as President of Local 6401 was unnecessary to plaintiff's potential relief, and dismissed her in her official capacity as well. No other basis for dismissing plaintiff's claims against Snow was discussed or relied upon by the court in its ruling regarding defendant Snow.
Plaintiff's pleadings with regard to defendant Snow's capacity are no model of clarity. But neither does the court find them so frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation as to warrant attorneys' fees. Although the law regarding Snow's individual liability was well established, the plaintiff arguably pled that Snow should be liable in her official capacity. The court's decision to dismiss Snow in that capacity was an exercise of the court's discretion, and not merely a rote application of pre-existing and well established law. Accordingly, defendant Snow's motion for attorneys' fees is denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT defendant Snow's motion for attorneys' fees (Dk. 147) is denied.