A reasonable jury could not reach that conclusion. See Waaland v. Weiss, 643 N.Y.S.2d 635, 636-37 (2d Dept. 1996). CONCLUSION

Moreover, Dr. Ford's affirmation, submitted in support of the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, does not acknowledge or address the plaintiffs preterm labor condition for which she was apparently treated prior to the subject accident. The failure of Dr. Ford to reconcile her apparent preaccident diagnosis of preterm labor with her affirmed opinion that the preterm labor was caused by the March 29, 2006 accident, renders her expert opinion in support of summary judgment speculative, conclusory, and insufficient to meet the plaintiff's prima facie burden of proof on causation ( see Singh v City of New York, 71 AD3d 1121; Nicholson v Allen, 62 AD3d 766, 767; Zarate v McDonald, 31 AD3d 632, 633; Bennett v Genas, 27 AD3d 601; Giraldo v Mandanici, 24 AD3d 419, 420; Allyn v Hanley, 2 AD3d 470, 471; Lorthe v Adeyeye, 306 AD2d 252, 253; Ifrach v Neiman, 306 AD2d 380; Ginty v MacNamara, 300 AD2d 624, 625; Narducci v McRae, 298 AD2d 443, 444; Kallicharan v Sooknanan, 282 AD2d 573, 574; Waaland v Weiss, 228 AD2d 435). Because the plaintiff did not meet her prima facie burden entitling her to judgment as a matter of law, we need not address the sufficiency of the papers submitted by the defendants in opposition ( see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr, 46 NY2d at 855; Kouyate v Chowdhury, 76 AD3d 547; Perez v Johnson, 72 AD3d 777, 778; Safer v Silbersweig, 70 AD3d 921, 922; Gebav Obermeyer, 38 AD3d 597; Larrieut v Gutterman, 37 AD3d 424; Agha v Alamo Rent A Car, 35 AD3d 639; Schacker v County of Orange, 33 AD3d 903, 904).

The conclusory reasons for the default offered by the plaintiffs counsel were not substantiated by detailed facts and thus were insufficient to constitute a reasonable excuse ( see Montague v Rivera, 50 AD3d 656; Juarbe v City of New York, 303 AD2d 462). Further, the plaintiff failed to submit competent medical evidence demonstrating that she sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject automobile accident ( see Montague v Rivera, 50 AD3d 656; Itskovich v Lichenstadter, 2 AD3d at 407; Beale v Yepes, 309 AD2d 886; Waaland v Weiss, 228 AD2d 435, 436).

The conclusory reasons for the default offered by the plaintiffs counsel were not substantiated by detailed facts and thus were insufficient to constitute a justifiable excuse ( see Juarbe v City of New York, 303 AD2d 462; Shmarkatyuk v Chouchereba, 291 AD2d 487; Morris v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 191 AD2d 682). Further, the plaintiff failed to submit competent medical evidence demonstrating that he sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject automobile accident ( see Itskovich v Lichenstadter, 2 AD3d at 407; Beale v Yepes, 309 AD2d at 887; Waaland v Weiss, 228 AD2d 435, 436). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiffs motion to vacate the order dated May 19, 2000.

CPLR 5015 (a) permits a court to vacate a default in opposing a motion where the moving party demonstrates both a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious cause of action ( see Perez v Han Ki Man, 39 AD3d 521; Costanza v Gold, 12 AD3d 551; Oyebola v Makuch, 10 AD3d 600; Itskovich v Lichenstadter, 2 AD3d 406; Beale v Yepes, 309 AD2d 886; Waaland v Weiss, 228 AD2d 435). The Supreme Court correctly held that the plaintiffs presented a reasonable excuse for their failure to oppose the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

Therefore, the plaintiffs may not rely on Dr. St. Hill's affirmation to defeat the motion for summary judgment ( see Magarin v. Kropf, 24 AD3d 733, 734; Mahoney v. Zerillo, 6 AD3d 403; Friedman v. U-Haul Truck Rental, 216 AD2d 266, 267). The operative reports the plaintiffs submitted in opposition failed to causally relate the plaintiffs' injuries to the accident and, thus, were inadequate to raise any issue of fact ( see Bucci v. Kempinski, 273 AD2d 333; Waaland v. Weiss, 228 AD2d 435, 436). In opposition to the defendant's prima facie demonstration, the plaintiffs did not submit any competent medical evidence which would raise a triable issue of fact that either plaintiff was unable to perform substantially all of his or her daily activities for not less than 90 of the first 180 days subsequent to the accident ( see Davis v. New York City Tr. Auth., 294 AD2d 531; Sainte-Aime v. Ho, 274 AD2d 569, 570; Arshad v. Gomer, 268 AD2d 450).

The affirmed report of a dentist submitted in opposition to the motion failed to conclusively establish a causal relationship between the subject motor vehicle accident and the alleged injury to Melissa Conklin ( see Verrelli v. Tronolone, 230 AD2d 789). The affirmed report of the appellant's expert likewise established a prima facie case that the plaintiff Justin Cox in action No. 2 did not sustain a serious injury within the statutory definition ( see Gaddy v. Eyler, supra). Under the circumstances, where Cox was involved in another accident approximately five months after the subject accident, requiring surgery on his left knee, it is sheer speculation to conclude that the accident, which occurred on March 13, 2001, was the cause of the limitation of motion in straight leg raising found by Justin Cox's medical expert in 2003 ( see Waaland v. Weiss, 228 AD2d 435, 436). Therefore, the appellant's separate motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in action No. 2 on the ground that neither of the plaintiffs in that action sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) should have been granted.

Moreover, plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a meritorious cause of action. Plaintiff failed to submit competent evidentiary proof to establish "serious injury" within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) ( see LaMacchia v. Rogers, 8 AD3d 346; Sarot v. Yusufov, 301 AD2d 512; Mizrachy v. Jordan, 282 AD2d 210; Gache v. Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 202 AD2d 470; see also Sharp v. Lebron, 282 AD2d 733; Waaland v. Weiss, 228 AD2d 435).

The plaintiffs' counsel's bare allegations of law office failure on the part of prior counsel cannot serve as the basis to set aside a judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015 ( see Gourdet v. Hershfeld, 277 A.D.2d 422; Eretz Funding v. Shalosh Assocs., 266 A.D.2d 184; Spatz v. Bajramoski, 214 A.D.2d 436; Blackman v. Blackman, 131 A.D.2d 801, 805). Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to submit any evidence sufficient to satisfy the serious injury threshold set forth in Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Sarot v. Yusufov, 301 A.D.2d 512; Waaland v. Weiss, 228 A.D.2d 435). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the motion to vacate.

ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondents. The defendants Rodney LaPidus and Paul LaForgia established their prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by submitting, among other things, affirmations by their examining physician which indicated that neither the plaintiff Julia Hernandez, nor the plaintiff Noemi Funes, sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) ( see Kallicharan v. Sooknanan, 282 A.D.2d 573; Santoro v. Daniel, 276 A.D.2d 478) . Thus, it was incumbent upon the appellants to come forward with admissible evidence sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an issue of fact ( see Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955). The appellants failed to meet this burden ( see Monaco v. Davenport, 277 A.D.2d 209; Graves v. Liu, 273 A.D.2d 440; Young v. Ryan, 265 A.D.2d 547; Waaland v. Weiss, 228 A.D.2d 435). SANTUCCI, J.P., SMITH, LUCIANO, SCHMIDT and MASTRO, JJ., concur.