Opinion
J-S33045-16 No. 2 WDA 2016
05-17-2016
W. AND J.M. Appellee v. R.B. Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered December 11, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County
Civil Division at No(s): 10385-2015 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON, J., and FITZGERALD, J. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, R.B. ("Mother"), appeals from the order entered in the Beaver County Court of Common Pleas, which granted Appellees, W. and J.M. ("Paternal Grandparents"), partial physical custody of Child, A.M. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. Mother and Father had Child in 2010; they never married. Following Child's birth, Mother, Father, and Child lived with Paternal Grandparents for several months until Mother and Father ended their relationship. The court subsequently entered a temporary custody order on September 15, 2014, which granted Mother primary physical custody and Father partial physical custody, subject to Paternal Grandmother's supervision due to Father's drug addiction problems. Father unexpectedly died on February 18, 2015, and Mother prevented Paternal Grandparents from seeing Child.
On March 30, 2015, Paternal Grandparents filed a petition for partial physical custody or visitation, and the court conducted a pre-hearing conference on April 21, 2015. The court entered a proposed order on April 29, 2015, which granted Paternal Grandparents partial physical custody and shared legal custody with Mother. Mother filed exceptions on May 19, 2015. The court conducted custody hearings on October 14, 2015, and December 3, 2015. The court entered an order on December 11, 2015, which granted partial physical custody to Paternal Grandparents and sole legal custody to Mother. Specifically, the order permits Paternal Grandparents to have physical custody of Child on the 3rd weekend of every month, one day before or after Thanksgiving, Christmas, and Child's birthday, and seven consecutive days during the summer if Paternal Grandparents have plans for "substantial travel," or two 3-day periods during the summer if there are no plans for travel. On December 31, 2015, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).
Mother raises the following issues for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO ADEQUATELY ADDRESS ALL CUSTODY FACTORS PURSUANT TO 23 PA.C.S. § 5328(A).
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOMINALLY AWARDING [MOTHER] SOLE LEGAL CUSTODY,
BUT EFFECTIVELY AWARDING [PATERNAL] GRANDPARENTS SHARED LEGAL CUSTODY, FOR WHICH THE COURT ITSELF ACKNOWLEDGED [PATERNAL] GRANDPARENTS DID NOT HAVE STANDING.(Mother's Brief at 4).
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO COMPLY WITH PRECEDENT SET BY TROXEL V. GRANVILLE AND HILLER V. FAUSEY.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONSIDERATION OF MOTHER'S ENCOURAGING THE GRANDPARENT-GRANDCHILD RELATIONSHIP.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING MORE EXTENSIVE CUSTODY RIGHTS THAN HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED.
In her issues combined, Mother argues Paternal Grandparents should not have been awarded partial physical custody of Child. Mother states the court's analysis failed to consider all of the custody factors in Section 5328(a), and improperly elevated the factors in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(c). Mother claims the court's order permitting Paternal Grandparents to have custody of Child for seven consecutive days during the summer effectively awards them legal custody of Child. Mother asserts that permitting Paternal Grandparents to take Child somewhere that requires "substantial travel" unduly fringes upon Mother's rights as a fit parent, as it allows Paternal Grandparents to make decisions regarding Child's care and control without Mother's consent. Mother also contends the court's order failed to comply with Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) and Hiller v. Fausey , 588 Pa. 342, 904 A.2d 875 (2006), which held, respectively, that parents have a fundamental right to make decisions for their children, and that grandparents' relationships with grandchildren do not outweigh this fundamental right. Mother alleges the court also improperly used her encouragement of Paternal Grandparents' relationship with Child to sever Mother's right to the care, custody and control of Child. Mother maintains it was in error for the court to grant Paternal Grandparents more extensive custody rights than were previously established. Mother concludes we should vacate the trial court's custody order and remand with instructions to dismiss Paternal Grandparents' complaint. We disagree.
In custody cases, the relevant scope and standard of review are as follows:
[T]he appellate court is not bound by the deductions or inferences made by the trial court from its findings of fact, nor must the reviewing court accept a finding that has no competent evidence to support it.... However, this broad scope of review does not vest in the reviewing court the duty or the privilege of making its own independent determination.... Thus, an appellate court is empowered to determine whether the trial court's incontrovertible factual findings support its factual conclusions, but it may not interfere with those conclusions unless they are unreasonable in view of the trial court's factual findings; and thus, represent a gross abuse of discretion.R.M.G., Jr. v. F.M.G., 986 A.2d 1234, 1237 (Pa.Super. 2009) (quoting Bovard v. Baker , 775 A.2d 835, 838 (Pa.Super. 2001)). "On issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we defer to the findings of the trial judge who has had the opportunity to observe the proceedings and demeanor of the witnesses." R.M.G., Jr., supra.
The parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial court places on the evidence. Rather, the paramount concern of the trial court is the best interest of the child. Appellate interference is unwarranted if the trial court's consideration of the best interest of the child was careful and thorough, and we are unable to find any abuse of discretion.Id. (quoting S.M. v. J.M., 811 A.2d 621, 623 (Pa.Super. 2002)). "Indeed, our admittedly circumscribed standard of review does not preclude this Court from finding that a trial court abused its discretion in fashioning a custody order. While prudence dictates that we exercise our authority sparingly, we are not powerless to rectify a manifestly unreasonable custody order." V.B. v. J.E.B., 55 A.3d 1193, 1200 (Pa.Super. 2012). "Ultimately, the test is 'whether the trial court's conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record.'" Ketterer v. Seifert , 902 A.2d 533, 539 (Pa.Super. 2006) (quoting Dranko v. Dranko , 824 A.2d 1215, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2003)).
The statutory presumption favoring an award of custody to parents over third-parties is not applicable to the current case because Paternal Grandparents seek only partial physical custody of Child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5327(b) (setting forth presumption in cases concerning primary physical custody). The Child Custody Act ("Act") provides:
§ 5325. Standing for partial physical custody and supervised physical custody
In addition to situations set forth in section 5324 (relating to standing for any form of physical custody or legal custody), grandparents and great-grandparents may file
an action under this chapter for partial physical custody or supervised physical custody in the following situations:
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(1). The Act further provides:(1) where the parent of the child is deceased, a parent or grandparent of the deceased parent may file an action under this section[.]
§ 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody
(a) Factors.—In ordering any form of custody, the court shall determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which affect the safety of the child, including the following:
(1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact between the child and another party.
(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or member of the party's household, whether there is a continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and which party can better provide adequate physical safeguards and supervision of the child.
(2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a) (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement with protective services).
(3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf of the child.
(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child's education, family life and community life.
(5) The availability of extended family.
(6) The child's sibling relationships.
(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the child's maturity and judgment.
(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the child from harm.
(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable, consistent and nurturing relationship with the child adequate for the child's emotional needs.
(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special needs of the child.
(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.
(12) Each party's availability to care for the child or ability to make appropriate child-care arrangements.
(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one another. A party's effort to protect a child from abuse by another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to cooperate with that party.
(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or member of a party's household.
(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or member of a party's household.
(16) Any other relevant factor.
* * *
(c) Grandparents and great-grandparents.—
(1) In ordering partial physical custody or supervised physical custody to a party who has standing under section 5325(1) or (2) (relating to standing for partial physical custody and supervised physical custody), the court shall consider the following:
(i) the amount of personal contact between the child and the party prior to the filing of the action;
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a), (c)(1). Thus, when deciding an award of custody, the court must conduct a thorough analysis of the best interests of the child based on the factors set forth in the Act. E.D. v. M.P., 33 A.3d 73 (Pa.Super. 2011). "All of the factors listed in [S]ection 5328(a) are required to be considered by the trial court when entering a custody order." J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 652 (Pa.Super. 2011) (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, "there is no required amount of detail for the trial court's explanation; all that is required is that the enumerated factors are considered and that the custody decision is based on those considerations." M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 336 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 620 Pa. 710, 68 A.3d 909 (2013).(ii) whether the award interferes with any parent-child relationship; and
(iii) whether the award is in the best interest of the child.
* * *
Further, "in the recent past, grandparents have assumed increased roles in their grandchildren's lives and our cumulative experience demonstrates the many potential benefits of strong inter-generational ties." Hiller , supra at 360, 902 A.2d at 886. Thus:
While acknowledging the general benefits of these relationships, we cannot conclude that such a benefit always accrues in cases where grandparents force their way into grandchildren's lives through the courts, contrary to the decision of a fit parent. In contrast, however, we
refuse to close our minds to the possibility that in some instances a court may overturn even the decision of a fit parent to exclude a grandparent from a grandchild's life, especially where the grandparent's child is deceased and the grandparent relationship is longstanding and significant to the grandchild.Id. at 360, 904 A.2d at 886-87 (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis added). See also Commonwealth ex. rel. Goodman v. Dratch , 159 A.2d 70, 71 (Pa.Super. 1960) (stating: "Unless there [is] some compelling reason, we do not believe that a grandchild should be denied visitation to his grandparents"). Moreover, permitting partial physical custody of a child to grandparents upon the death of the child's parent does not violate the surviving parent's fundamental right to direct the care, custody, and control of the child. See Hiller , supra (affirming custody order that gave grandparents partial physical custody, including one week during summer vacation).
Additionally, in the context of custody proceedings, "[h]ostilities between the [parties] are relevant only insofar as they constitute a threat to the child or affect the child's welfare." Nancy E.M. v. Kenneth D.M., 462 A.2d 1386, 1388 (Pa.Super. 1983). Importantly:
A custodial parent's suspicion of or animosity towards another parent or third party seeking visitation should not alone warrant denial of visitation; otherwise the custodial parent could always effectively deny visitation simply by testifying to suspicion or animosity. Instead of deferring to suspicion or animosity, the hearing judge must try to determine whether there is any basis for these feelings. Stated more broadly, the judge must appraise whether
the relationship between the disputing parties has an adverse effect on the child.Commonwealth ex. rel. Williams v. Miller , 385 A.2d 992, 995 (Pa.Super. 1978) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added) (reversing trial court order denying maternal grandmother visitation with grandchild following mother's death; maternal grandmother offered sufficient reasons why visitation with child for one weekend each month would serve child's best interests; record did not support trial court's finding that maternal grandmother abandoned mother; father's "mistrust" of maternal grandmother was not valid reason for denying her visitation; trial court failed to provide sufficient consideration to unusual facts of case; and if enforcing visitation away from child's home presents harmful effects on child, then trial court may specify place and conditions of visitation).
* * *
Except under unusual circumstances, no child should be cut off entirely from one side of [her] family. [V]isits with a grandparent are often a precious part of a child's experience and there are benefits which devolve upon the grandchild from the relationship with [her] grandparents which [she] cannot derive from any other relationship. If animosities continue between the parties, and result in adverse [e]ffects on [the child]..., a visitation order may be revised, even to the extent of retracting visitation.
Instantly, the trial court concluded:
[Mother] first argues that the [c]ourt abused its discretion in failing to adequately address all custody factors. [Mother] states that the [c]ourt must address each of the listed sixteen (16) factors in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a) in awarding any form of physical custody. While the [c]ourt
agrees that the court must consider all of the factors listed in § 5328(a) that are relevant, this [c]ourt does not agree that it must specifically address all sixteen factors in the [December 11, 2015] Opinion. The statute provides: "In ordering any form of custody, the court shall determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which affect the safety of the child...[.]" 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a) (emphasis added). The statute and judicial precedent require the court to consider the factors, but not to discuss each factor in detail in the [December 11, 2015] Opinion. [ See J.R.M., supra at 653] (stating "all of the factors listed in section 5328(a) are required to be considered by the trial court"). This [c]ourt...briefly addressed the relevant factors in the [December 11, 2015] Opinion, in addition to discussing the factors listed in section 5328(c) in detail, with respect to grandparents seeking custody. By way of example, the hearing revealed no evidence by either party that [Child] has ever been abused. The [c]ourt did not consider that factor but, since it was not relevant to the [c]ourt's determination, it was not necessary to address it in the [December 11, 2015] Opinion. Likewise, the [c]ourt did not hear evidence as to sibling relationships, preference of the five year old [Child], attempts by any party to turn [Child] against another party, nor any history of drug and alcohol abuse by either of the parties.
[Mother] next argues that the [c]ourt abused its discretion by nominally awarding [Mother] sole legal custody, but effectively awarding [Paternal Grandparents] shared legal custody in the Order. This [c]ourt cannot agree with this accusation. The [December 11, 2015] Opinion and Order made clear that [Mother] is to have sole legal custody and shall have the exclusive right to make all major decisions affecting [Child]. However, [Mother] argues that by granting [Paternal Grandparents] the ability to travel with [Child], the court has effectively nullified [Mother's] sole legal custody. To support this contention, [Mother] relies
on a Superior Court case which discussed how legal custody affects travel decisions. See M.P. v. M.P., 54 A.3d 950 (Pa.Super. 2012). This case is distinguishable from the facts at bar, though. In M.P. v. M.P., a mother had sole legal custody of her child, and the father had visitation rights; the problem arose when the mother sought to take the child to Ecuador for a vacation and the father disagreed. Id. at 954. The court found that it was improper for the lower court to prohibit the mother from traveling to Ecuador with her child because she had sole legal custody, meaning she had the "final authority to make decisions regardless of whether the other parent agrees or disagrees." Id. [Mother] argues that, as discussed in M.P. v. M.P., the current Order interferes with [Mother's] grant of sole legal custody. This reasoning stretches the holding of M.P. v. M.P. further than this [c]ourt is inclined to follow.
In the current Order, [Paternal Grandparents] are granted either seven consecutive days, or two sets of three consecutive days in the summer time, depending on the amount of travel required. In order to receive this time, [Paternal Grandparents] must notify [Mother] by March 15, of the days they desire to exercise custody and where they plan to travel to. [Paternal Grandparents] must also provide a means of communication between [Mother] and [Child] at all times when they are exercising custody of [Child]. Unlike the Order in M.P. v. M.P., the Order here does not restrict [Mother's] ability to make travel plans with [Child]. Like all other major decisions that will affect [Child], [Mother] is permitted to take [Child] to any location that [Mother] pleases, and does not have to answer to [Paternal Grandparents] when doing so. The only restrictions placed on [Mother] are to comply with the Order. Furthermore, the present Order provides that [Mother] will have advanced notice of the dates and locations where [Paternal Grandparents] plan to travel to, if anywhere. And, [Mother] will always be provided with a means of contact with [Child]. This [c]ourt does not believe that this nullifies [Mother's] sole legal custody. [Mother] still has the right to make all major decisions affecting [Child] without taking into consideration [Paternal Grandparents'] opinions. Finally, by requiring [Paternal Grandparents] to reveal their travel plans no later than
March 15 of each year, [M]other has more than enough time to request relief from the [c]ourt if the parties cannot reach agreement on [Paternal Grandparents'] vacation plans.
[Mother] further argues that the [c]ourt erred in failing to comply with judicial precedent, namely [ Troxel , supra ] and [ Hiller , supra ]. [Mother] argues that the [c]ourt failed to give proper weight to the presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of...her child. [ See Troxel , supra at 69, 120 S.Ct. at 2062, 147 L.Ed.2d at ___]. The [c]ourt specifically found that [Mother] is a fit-parent and that the [c]ourt believes she will act in [Child's] best interest. However, as discussed at length in the [December 11, 2015] Opinion, [Mother] has allowed the bond with [Paternal Grandparents] to grow over the course of [Child's] life, and [Child] deserves to maintain that bond now that her father has passed. Because [Mother] is a fit-parent, this [c]ourt granted her sole legal custody and awarded [Paternal Grandparents] a maximum of thirty-one (31) overnight visits out of every three hundred and sixty-five (365) days. This [c]ourt specifically found that [Child] has had similar contact with [Paternal Grandparents] since her birth. This [c]ourt also found that pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(c)(2), this award does not interfere with the parent-child relationship, as [Mother] still maintains sole legal custody and will maintain primary physical custody of [Child] over ninety (90) percent of the time. The [c]ourt does not believe this counters the precedent established in Troxel or Hiller , but rather permits [Paternal Grandparents] to spend a limited amount of time with their grandchild, as they have done throughout [Child's] life.
[Mother] next argues that the [c]ourt erred in its consideration of [Mother's] encouragement of the grandparent-grandchild relationship. [Mother] alleges that choosing [Paternal Grandparents] as supervisors for Father's partial custody rights should not be a factor for the court to rely on in granting [Paternal Grandparents] custody. This [c]ourt disagrees. [Paternal Grandparents] have been trusted with the safe-keeping of [Child] for visitation throughout her life. As indicated in the [December 11, 2015] Opinion, there is no evidence to
suggest that either party poses a risk of harm to [Child's] well-being. Furthermore, [Paternal Grandparents] supervising the Father's custody is not the only reason this [c]ourt granted [Paternal Grandparents] custody rights. In fact, the [c]ourt noted that [Child's] relationship with [Paternal Grandparents] extended beyond a mere supervisory role between the Father and [Child]. [Child] has maintained a close relationship with [Paternal Grandparents] throughout her life, with and without the presence of her Father in [Paternal Grandparents'] home. [Child] continued visitation to [Paternal Grandparents'] home, with [M]other's consent, for periods when Father was incarcerated. The [c]ourt finds this to be an adequate reason to grant [Paternal Grandparents] partial custody rights pursuant to § 5328(c)(1), requiring the court to consider "the amount of personal contact between the child and the party prior to the filing of the action." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(c)[(1)(i)].(Trial Court Rule 1925 Opinion, filed January 19, 2016, at 3-8) (emphasis in original). The record supports the court's conclusions. Therefore, we affirm the court's order granting Paternal Grandparents partial physical custody of Child.
Finally, [Mother] argues that the [c]ourt erred in granting more extensive custody rights than had been established previously. Specifically, [Mother] argues that she has never consented to [Paternal Grandparents] taking extensive travel periods with [Child]. This [c]ourt knows of no authority, and [Mother] cites to no authority that requires a court deciding custody to grant only identical time to that which has been historically granted by [M]other. Rather...the "paramount concern [in child custody cases] is the best interest of the child." McMillen v. McMillen , 602 A.2d 845, [846] (Pa. 1992). After considering all of the testimony, this [c]ourt finds that the Order is in the best interests of [Child], which includes the grant of one seven-day, or two three-day vacations with [Paternal Grandparents] in the summer. Testimony at trial established that [Child] and [Mother] have vacationed with [Paternal Grandparents] in the past. Thus, because [Child] has enjoyed extensive time with [Paternal Grandparents] throughout her life, the [c]ourt finds the grant of vacation time will merely be a continuation of the already established relationship, and is not an abuse of the [c]ourt's discretion.
A copy of the court's December 11, 2015 custody order and opinion is attached for reference.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 5/17/2016
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