Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-2285 Section: I/1.
December 22, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
On September 21, 2004, the Court granted summary judgment for defendant, United States Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and entered a judgment in favor of NOAA and against plaintiff, dismissing plaintiff's claims with prejudice. This matter is now before the Court pursuant to a motion filed on behalf of plaintiff, WT Offshore, Inc., for reconsideration of the Court's denial of WT Offshore's request for attorney fees and costs.
Rec. Doc. Nos. 35 and 36.
Rec. Doc. No. 37.
BACKGROUND
On June 23, 2003, WT Offshore sent NOAA a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552. The request asked for copies of any documents or information generated by and provided to NOAA. On August 13, 2003, after NOAA failed to respond within the twenty day time period provided by statute, WT Offshore filed a complaint challenging the failure of NOAA to provide a timely response to its FOIA request. Subsequently, NOAA provided an interim response to WT Offshore's request by letter dated August 25, 2003, providing redacted portions of the documents requested.On September 11, 2003, after providing its response, NOAA then filed a motion to dismiss WT Offshore's complaint as moot. WT Offshore continued to pursue its administrative remedies, which led NOAA to supplement its responses on September 12, 2003, and October 3, 2003. WT Offshore then filed an opposition to NOAA's motion to dismiss and an amended complaint, which challenged the sufficiency of NOAA's response. After the Department of Commerce denied WT Offshore's administrative appeal in part and granted it in part, WT Offshore filed a second supplemental and amended complaint, challenging the validity of defendant's claimed FOIA exemptions. NOAA withheld portions of eighteen documents, and after examining the documents in camera, the Court granted NOAA's motion for summary judgment. The Court also denied WT Offshore's request for attorney fees because it had not "substantially prevailed."
Rec. Doc. No. 18.
Rec. Doc. No. 18. According to NOAA, the document released on October 3, 2003, was "inadvertently omitted from the final letter dated September 12, 2003." Id., exhibit 1.
Rec. Doc. No. 18.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly recognize motions for reconsideration. See Bass v. United States Dep't of Agric., 211 F.3d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 2000). When a party moves a court to reconsider its grant of summary judgment, the motion will be recharacterized as a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and analyzed accordingly. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Fair Grounds Corp., 123 F. 3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 1997); Lavespere v. Niagra Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 175 (5th Cir. 1990).
The governing principles pursuant to which a Rule 59(e) motion is determined were succinctly set forth by the Fifth Circuit in Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2004):
A Rule 59(e) motion "calls into question the correctness of a judgment." In re Transtexas Gas Corp., 303 F.3d 571, 581 (5th Cir. 2002). [The Fifth Circuit] has held that such a motion is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment. Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990). Rather, Rule 59(e) "serve[s] the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1989) (internal quotations omitted). Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly. Clancy v. Employers Health Ins. Co., 101 F. Supp. 2d 463, 465 (E.D. La. 2000) (citing 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE PROCEDURE § 2810.1, at 124 (2d ed. 1995)). In Lavespere [ v. Niagara Machine Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1990), the Fifth Circuit] recognized that while a district court has considerable discretion in deciding whether to reopen a case in response to a motion for reconsideration, such discretion is not limitless. Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 174. [The Fifth Circuit] has identified two important judicial imperatives relating to such a motion: 1) the need to bring litigation to an end; and 2) the need to render just decisions on the basis of all the facts. Id. (citations omitted). The task for the district court is to strike the proper balance between these competing interests. Id.Templet, 367 F.3d at 478-79 (alteration supplied).
WT Offshore's motion for reconsideration does not demonstrate any manifest error of law or fact in the Court's judgment. Instead, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is simply an argument for attorneys fees based on legal authority not briefed for this Court in WT Offshore's cross motion for summary judgment. Additionally, WT Offshore has not provided any justification for its failure to present such law in connection with its summary judgment motion. Notwithstanding its initial failure to provide the Court with authorities now cited in its request for reconsideration, the Court makes the following additional findings.
WT Offshore contends that it is "entitled to attorneys' fees and costs for having to initiate and prosecute the instant litigation in order to obtain the FOIA response from NOAA that was ultimately reviewed by this Court." Essentially, WT Offshore claims that it "substantially prevailed" because NOAA responded to WT Offshore's FOIA request only after WT Offshore filed a lawsuit. WT Offshore contends that "it is unequivocal that WT [Offshore]'s Complaint against NOAA had a direct impact on the information that was eventually divulged by NOAA." WT Offshore argues that only after the statutory deadline for responding had passed and WT Offshore had filed its lawsuit, did NOAA provide the information sought.
Rec. Doc. No. 37.
In its cross motion for summary judgment and identical opposition to NOAA's motion for summary judgment, WT Offshore cited Dixie Fuel Co. v. Callahan, 136 F. Supp. 2d 659 (E.D. Ky. 2001), presumably for a definition of "substantially prevailed." Id. at 661-62. See Rec. Doc. Nos. 19 and 20. In Callahan, the court stated "a plaintiff `will have substantially prevailed if it demonstrates that the prosecution of the lawsuit was reasonably necessary to obtain requested information, and that the existence of the lawsuit had a causative effect upon the release of that information.'" Callahan, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 662 (quoting GMRI, Inc. v. EEOC, 149 F.3d 449, 451-52 (6th Cir. 1998). Callahan was decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon Board Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 121 S. Ct. 1840, 149 L. Ed.2d 855 (2001).
NOAA released documents throughout the course of litigation which coincided with WT Offshore pursuing the administrative appeals process.
Rec. Doc. No. 37, p. 3.
The FOIA allows for an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs to a prevailing party. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (E) (stating, "[t]he court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed"). Section 552(a)(4)(E) grants a trial court discretion when deciding whether to award attorney fees.
When determining whether to award attorney fees, Fifth Circuit law requires a two step analysis: first, the court determines whether the party seeking attorney fees substantially prevailed; second, the court considers four factors in deciding whether to award attorney fees. See Texas v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 935 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1991). Previously, this Court found that WT Offshore failed the first step because it had not "substantially prevailed," and, therefore, the Court did not engage in the second step and weigh the discretionary factors to be considered when determining whether to award attorney fees.
The four factors are: (1) the benefit to the public deriving from the case; (2) the commercial benefit to the complainant; (3) the nature of the complainant's interest in the records sought; and (4) whether the government's withholding of the records had a reasonable basis in law. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 935 F.2d at 729.
WT Offshore alleges that this Court failed to apply the proper test to determine whether it "substantially prevailed," i.e., the catalyst theory test. See Cazales v. United States Department of Justice, 660 F.2d 612, 619 (5th Cir. 1981). Rather than apply the catalyst theory, this Court relied on Buckhannon Board Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 604, 121 S. Ct. 1835, 1838, 149 L. Ed.2d 855 (2001), for the proposition that when a requested attorney fee award is premised on a fee-shifting statute like the FOIA, either a judgment on the merits or a settlement enforced through a consent decree is required. WT Offshore asserts that Buckhannon does not apply because the Fifth Circuit has not applied the Supreme Court's holding in Buckhannon to the FOIA.
In Cazales, the Fifth Circuit set forth the catalyst theory for determining whether a plaintiff has substantially prevailed in a FOIA case:
The proper test to be applied to determine whether [plaintiff] substantially prevailed involves a showing that prosecution of the action could reasonably be regarded as necessary to obtain the information and that the action had a substantial causative effect on the delivery of the information.Cazalas, 660 F.2d at 619 (citations and quotations omitted).
Buckhannon addressed an award of attorney fees pursuant to the fee-shifting provisions of the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, which permit a court to award reasonable attorney fees to a "prevailing party." The Buckhannon Court explicitly rejected the catalyst theory and required that there be a "material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties" to permit an award of attorney fees. 532 U.S. at 604, 121 S. Ct. at 1840. Furthermore, the Court recognized that fee-shifting provisions in other statutes have been interpreted consistently. 532 U.S. at 603 n. 4, 121 S. Ct. 1839 n. 4 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n. 7, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983)).
As an initial matter, the Court reiterates that an award of attorney fees pursuant to the FOIA is discretionary. See § 552(a)(4)(E). Second, while the Fifth Circuit has yet to apply Buckhannon to a case brought pursuant to the FOIA, other circuit courts have found that the Supreme Court's rejection of the catalyst theory precludes an award of attorney fees to FOIA plaintiffs when there is neither a judgment on the merits nor a settlement enforced through a consent decree. See Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees v. INS, 336 F.3d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating, "while [a FOIA plaintiff] may have accomplished the objective it sought to achieve by initiating this FOIA action, its failure to secure either a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree renders it ineligible for an award of attorney's fees under Buckhannon"); Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Dep't of Energy, 288 F.3d 452, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that "in order for plaintiffs in FOIA actions to become eligible for an award of attorney's fees, they must have `been awarded some relief by [a] court,' either in a judgment on the merits or in a court-ordered consent decree"). Specifically, the District of Columbia Circuit found that the Supreme Court's rejection of the catalyst theory and the consistent practice of treating various fee-shifting statutes as interchangeable countenanced treating the FOIA's "substantially prevail" language as the functional equivalent of the "prevailing party" language found in the other statutes addressed in Buckhannon. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 288 F.3d at 455-56.
The catalyst theory urged by WT Offshore as the appropriate test was articulated by the Fifth Circuit more than twenty years ago and well before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Buckhannon which explicitly rejected the catalyst theory as a basis for recovering attorney fees pursuant to fee-shifting statutes such as the FOIA. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604-05, 121 S. Ct. at 1838. The Court finds Buckhannon and the decisions of other courts which have interpreted it to be exceptionally persuasive authority for the proposition that WT Offshore has not "substantially prevailed" in this case. While Buckhannon did not hold that a FOIA plaintiff must obtain judicially sanctioned relief before fees are awarded, this Court's denial of WT Offshore's request for attorney fees was guided by the Supreme Court's decision in that case. See Hopwood v. State of Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 274 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating "[l]ower courts are bound only by Supreme Court holdings"). As courts in other circuits have applied the Supreme Court's holding in Buckhannon to FOIA plaintiffs, the Court finds that WT Offshore has not demonstrated any manifest error of law.
Because the motion for reconsideration is supported by legal theories and arguments that have been considered by this Court, the Court concludes that the "judicial imperative" of finality outweighs the need for this Court to exercise its discretion and reopen this case in response to plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion. Accordingly, for the above and foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the motion of plaintiff, WT Offshore, Inc., for reconsideration be and hereby is DENIED.