Opinion
6 Div. 685.
May 16, 1935.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Lamar County; R. L. Blanton, Judge.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Walter Crossley against W. P. Brown Sons Lumber Company to recover compensation on account of injuries arising out of employment. Judgment awarding compensation, and the employer brings certiorari.
Affirmed.
O. E. Young, of Vernon, and S. T. Wright, of Fayette, for appellant.
Appellee was not an employee of the appellant, but was an employee of an independent contractor. The Workmen's Compensation Act does not, therefore, apply. Code 1923, §§ 7543, 7596 (g); Birmingham Post Co. v. Sturgeon, 227 Ala. 162, 149 So. 74; Freiden v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 190 Cal. 48, 210 P. 420; Pryor v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 186 Cal. 169, 198 P. 1045; Fidelity Dep. Co. v. Brush, 176 Cal. 448, 168 P. 890; Donlon Bros. v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 173 Cal. 250, 159 P. 715; Zainey v. Rieman, 81 Ind. App. 74, 142 N.E. 397; Arterburn v. Redwood County, 154 Minn. 338, 191 N.W. 924; Wagoner v. A. A. Davis Const. Co., 112 Okl. 231, 240 P. 618; Anderson v. State Ind. Acc. Comm., 107 Or. 304, 215 P. 582; Johnson v. Vincennes Bridge Co., 9 La. App. 173, 119 So. 539. The burden of proof rests on the compensation claimant to show that the relation of master and servant existed between him and the alleged employer. Birmingham Post Co. v. Sturgeon, supra; Ex parte Coleman, 211 Ala. 248, 100 So. 114; Sloss-Sheffield S. I. Co. v. Jones, 220 Ala. 10, 123 So. 201; Ex parte Big Four C. M. Co., 213 Ala. 305, 104 So. 764. The existence of such relationship is jurisdictional under the Compensation Law. Donlon Bros. v. Ind. Acc. Comm., supra. The same rules of evidence apply in compensation cases as in other cases. Ex parte Coleman, supra; Republic I. S. Co. v. Reed, 223 Ala. 617, 137 So. 673, 674.
Pennington Tweedy, of Jasper, and Wilson Kelley, of Vernon, for appellee.
If there is any legal evidence on any reasonable view, or reasonable inference therefrom, that supports the facts found and conclusions announced by the court, it is sufficient under the statute, and the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. The Supreme Court is not concerned with the weight of the evidence. Woodward Iron Co. v. Jones, 217 Ala. 361, 116 So. 425. No technical questions as to the admissibility of evidence will be considered in cases tried under the Compensation Law. Sloss-Sheffield S. I. Co. v. House, 217 Ala. 422, 116 So. 167; Ex parte Jagger Coal Co., 211 Ala. 11, 99 So. 99. Under the Compensation Law the relation of employer and employee is not confined within the narrow limits of the rule theretofore existing. Ex parte W. T. Smith Lbr. Co., 206 Ala. 485, 90 So. 807; Code 1923, § 7585. The appellant having exercised supervision of the cutting, both it and Newman having the right to terminate their relationship at any time, Newman having no capital and not being financially responsible, the trial court properly found that the relation of employer and employee existed between appellant and appellee. Dobson's Case (Dobson v. Portland Ice Co.), 124 Me. 305, 128 A. 401, 42 A.L.R. 603; Martin v. Republic Steel Co., 226 Ala. 209, 146 So. 276; J. E. Ross Co. v. Collins, 224 Ala. 453, 140 So. 764; State ex rel. v. Dist. Court, 128 Minn. 43, 150 N.W. 211; Lehigh Valley C. Co. v. Yensavage (C.C.A.) 218 F. 547; Sloss-Sheffield S. I. Co. v. Crim, 219 Ala. 148, 121 So. 408; Amerson v. Coronoa Coal Iron Co., 194 Ala. 175, 69 So. 601; America Min. Co. v. Taylor, 211 Ala. 513, 100 So. 761; Industrial Comm. v. Hammond, 77 Colo. 414, 236 P. 1006; Aisenberg v. C. F. Adams Co., 95 Conn. 419, 111 A. 591.
Appellant owned and operated a sawmill at Fayette, Ala., where it had its main office. It owned much timber land situated in Lamar county. Appellee was engaged by Lee Newman to help him cut and skid timber from defendant's timber land to a point of concentration and load it on trucks. It was hauled to defendant's mill independent of contract with Newman. If Newman was an independent contractor, appellee was not an employee of appellant. We will refer to them as plaintiff and defendant. On the other hand, if Newman was one who did what "is commonly known as 'piece work,' or in any [some] way where the system of employment used merely provides a method of fixing the workman's wages," or if he performed "his work upon the employer's premises, and with the employer's tools or appliances and under the employer's directions," he is an employee as defined by section 7585, Code.
If he was such an employee, he was not an independent contractor. If it was such as that his employer contemplated the necessity of his having helpers in his work, the employment of those helpers did not make them the servants solely of the main employee, as contemplated by the Workmen's Compensation Law. It is not necessary that they shall have a claim against defendant for wages to enable them to come within the Workmen's Compensation Law. Their relation to it depends upon the relation of Newman. If Newman was an employee, and his employment with defendant contemplated the use of others, such as plaintiff, plaintiff was also an employee within that law.
Newman had been employed by one Cobb who had a similar contract. He had no funds nor equipment, and had been working as a laborer. The services required the use of a skidder which we understand to be a kind of tractor by which the timber was skidded to location. Cobb had purchased two skidders which were paid for by defendant and charged to him. Newman had no funds nor equipment, but agreed to purchase Cobb's outfit, by which defendant credited Cobb and charged Newman. Newman had no contract for any definite amount of timber to be handled. There was no time limit. The contract could be terminated by either at pleasure.
Defendant's foremen were frequently in the woods directing the lengths to be cut, criticizing the work, seeing that no waste or injury to other timber was done; that timber cut was of the right size; and that the land was cut clean.
When plaintiff was hurt, defendant wrote to the hospital referring to him as its employee, assumed and paid the hospital bill of $160, and charged it to Newman, though plaintiff had only earned and been paid $10.50, by check given by Newman, and defendant then knew that plaintiff was one of Newman's helpers.
This court has in more than one opinion referred to the case of State v. District Court of St. Louis Co., 128 Minn. 43, 150 N.W. 211. It was shown to be authoritative, since it was prior to our adoption of the Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Law. Ex parte W. T. Smith Lumber Co., 206 Ala. 485, 90 So. 807; Martin v. Republic Steel Co., 226 Ala. 209, 146 So. 276. The facts of that case are in all material respects similar to those we are considering. It was there shown that the fundamental test of whether the laborer was an employee or an independent contractor related to the right of control, and it was there stated, as it had been in many other Minnesota cases, that if there was no evidence that defendant reserved no control except an inference from the circumstances, the question was one for the jury.
In the instant case, that question is controlled by the circumstances without an expression in the contract. But all the circumstances should be considered, even when the contract makes clear provision for an absence of such control, to ascertain if its stipulations are merely colorable to enable the master to evade liability to a servant under this law. Schneider on Workmen's Compensation, p. 286.
The facts of this case are not distinguishable in principle from those in Sloss-Sheffield Steel Iron Co. v. Crim, 219 Ala. 148, 121 So. 408; Stith Coal Co. v. Alvis, 224 Ala. 603, 141 So. 663; Martin v. Republic Steel Co., 226 Ala. 209, 146 So. 276.
They have no similarity to those in the case of Birmingham Post Co. v. Sturgeon, 227 Ala. 162, 149 So. 74.
As observed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, supra, the court would not set aside the verdict of a jury so finding on such evidence, and will not set aside the facts thus found by the court without a jury. Sloss-Sheffield Steel Iron Co. v. House, 217 Ala. 422, 116 So. 167; Woodward Iron Co. v. Bradford, 206 Ala. 447, 90 So. 803; Ex parte W. T. Smith Lumber Co., supra.
The inference must be reasonable and based upon legal evidence. When there is such sufficient evidence, the fact that there may also be illegal evidence admitted is not a necessary cause for reversal. Sloss-Sheffield Steel Iron Co. v. House, supra; Greek v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel Iron Co., 207 Ala. 219, 92 So. 458; Woodward Iron Co. v. Bradford, supra; Republic Iron Steel Co. v. Reed, 223 Ala. 617, 137 So. 673.
We think the finding of the court is amply supported by the legal evidence.
Affirmed.
ANDERSON, C. J., and GARDNER and BOULDIN, JJ., concur.