It would serve no useful purpose to recite the factual details, as they are unlikely to arise again. While there are certain factual differences between this case and W. M. Hobbs, Ltd. v. Accusystems of Ga., 177 Ga. App. 432 ( 339 S.E.2d 646) (1986), our holding in that case is controlling here. Under the evidence, appellant reaccepted the copier after she had allegedly rejected it. Accordingly, appellant has no right to secure the return of the purchase price. Appellant had use of the copier for a significant trial approval period.

Jenkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 240 Ga. App. 636, 637-638 (4) ( 524 SE2d 324) (1999) (continued use of vehicle constituted reacceptance). See also W.M. Hobbs, Ltd. v. Accusystems of Ga., 177 Ga. App. 432, 433 (1) ( 339 SE2d 646) (1986) (same regarding equipment). Although post-revocation acts inconsistent with the seller's ownership are fatal to a buyer's attempt to revoke acceptance under the Uniform Commercial Code, such acts are not necessarily fatal to a claim under Georgia's common law right of rescission, a right codified as OCGA § 13-4-60.

A buyer's use of defective goods after rejection constitutes reacceptance. W. H. Hobbs, Ltd. v. Accusystems of Ga., Inc., 177 Ga. App. 432, 432-433(1) ( 339 S.E.2d 646) (1986). If the machine failed to conform to its contract description, giving Imex the right to reject, then the continued use for a month and the delay in notice of rejection constituted a reacceptance of the machine, because such use was inconsistent with rejection and was inconsistent with the seller's ownership of the goods.

" Prudential Metal Supply Corp. v. Atlantic Freight Sales Co., 204 Ga. App. 439, 440 ( 419 S.E.2d 520) (1992). In this case, the undisputed evidence shows that Contract Sales accepted the shipments of jackets delivered to the company on behalf of American Express, and subsequently sold the jackets to other companies. Contract Sales' sale of the jackets received is an act inconsistent with American Express' ownership. Cf. W. M. Hobbs, Ltd. v. Accusystems of Ga., 177 Ga. App. 432 (1) ( 339 S.E.2d 646) (1986). Bert Gurwitch, President and CEO of Contract Sales, deposed that Contract Sales does not owe American Express any of the money for the jackets because American Express allegedly breached an agreement with Contract Sales to liquidate $12,000,000 in inventory in the future, and breached the present agreement by competing with Contract Sales in selling items to other companies.

We first consider the cross-appeal, in which the Bank asserts that as a matter of law Stratton accepted the equipment because Stratton's actions in modifying the equipment, dismantling it improperly, and using parts of it constituted acts inconsistent with Printaire's ownership, and thus the trial court erred by denying its motion for a directed verdict on that issue. Noting that OCGA § 11-2-606 (1) (c) provides that despite an attempt at rejection "[a]cceptance of goods occurs when the buyer . . . [d]oes any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership," the Bank argues that retention and use or modification of goods have been held to be such acts as are inconsistent with the seller's ownership, citing W. M. Hobbs, Ltd. v. Accusystems of Ga., 177 Ga. App. 432 ( 339 S.E.2d 646) (1986), and Fiat Auto U.S. A. v. Hollums, 185 Ga. App. 113 ( 363 S.E.2d 312) (1987). These abstract principles of law, although otherwise correct, are inapplicable here.

[Cit.]" W. M. Hobbs, Ltd. v. Accusystems of Ga., 177 Ga. App. 432 (1) ( 339 S.E.2d 646) (1986). Subsequent to his letter of January 29, 1982, appellee removed the car from the dealer's lot (where he had left it in an attempt to sell it, and had rejected one offer of sale); took it to various auto shops for repairs; had the car painted another color; paid taxes on the vehicle; insured it; attempted to sell it on his own; and drove it over 6,000 miles.

Such use and knowledge precludes any implied warranties as to the performance of that machine or machines of identical design.See W.M. Hobbs, Ltd. v. Accusystems of Ga., Inc., 177 Ga. App. 432, 339 S.E.2d 646, 647 (1986) (purchaser's operation of machine on trial basis for one week precludes implied warranties in favor of purchaser); Howard v. American Bus. Equipment of Columbus, Inc., 184 Ga. App. 550, 362 S.E.2d 127 (1987) (following W.M. Hobbs); Henry Helde, Inc. v. WRH Prods. Co., 766 F.2d 105, 110-11 (3d Cir. 1985) (under U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b), purchaser's testing of performance of sample for certain defects precludes breach of warranty claim for those defects); see also J. White R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 12-6, at 450-51 (2d ed. 1980). Finding no New York precedent on point, we adopt interpretations of the U.C.C. in similar cases from other jurisdictions, as we believe a New York court would.

Like Pennsylvania, Georgia's implied warranty law requires a showing of causation that can be overcome by proof that the consumer had actual knowledge of the defect at the time of purchase. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. §§ 11-2-314 Cmt. 13, 11-2-316(3)(b) & Cmt. 8; W.M. Hobbs, Ltd. v. Accusystems of Ga., Inc., 339 S.E.2d 646, 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (rejecting implied warranty claim where consumer had the opportunity to use the copier machine on a trial basis prior to purchase). Accordingly, the Court's causation analysis of the New York and Pennsylvania implied warranty classes applies equally here.