Summary
In West Coast Air Conditioning Company, Inc. v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Jan. 9, 2017, D069033 [nonpub. opn.]), CDCR both appealed the trial court order granting West Coast's request for a temporary injunction preventing HP from performing any additional work on the misawarded contract and sought a writ of supersedeas to avoid enforcement of the injunction.
Summary of this case from W. Coast Air Conditioning Co. v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab.Opinion
D069033
01-09-2017
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Douglas J. Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Stepan A. Haytayan and Jeffrey A. Rich, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Appellant. Finch, Thornton & Baird, P. Randolph Finch, Jr. and M. Katy Ross for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2015-00017334-CU-WM-CTL) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Joan M. Lewis, Judge. Appeal dismissed. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Douglas J. Woods, Assistant Attorney General, Stepan A. Haytayan and Jeffrey A. Rich, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Appellant. Finch, Thornton & Baird, P. Randolph Finch, Jr. and M. Katy Ross for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) appeals from an order of the trial court granting an application by plaintiff West Coast Air Conditioning Company, Inc. (West Coast) for a temporary restraining order to prohibit CDCR from permitting another company to continue to work on a construction project pursuant to a contract the court had already determined was void. As we explain below, subsequent events in the trial court have rendered this appeal moot. We therefore dismiss the appeal.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2015, CDCR awarded a contract for a heating, ventilation and air conditioning project to Hensel Phelps Construction Co. (Hensel Phelps). Later that month, West Coast filed a petition/complaint in which it sought a writ of mandate requiring CDCR to set aside the contract awarded to Hensel Phelps, a permanent injunction prohibiting Hensel Phelps from performing any further work on the project, and damages under a promissory estoppel theory of recovery. West Coast argued that Hensel Phelps's bid for the project was nonresponsive because it failed to list license numbers for a number of identified subcontractors and because it contained numerous mathematical/typographical errors that were not waivable because the errors gave Hensel Phelps a competitive advantage over other bidders.
In July 2015, West Coast made a motion requesting that the court grant its petition for a writ of mandate. In September 2015, the trial court granted West Coast's petition and issued a writ mandating that CDCR set aside the contract awarded to Hensel Phelps.
In the meantime, CDCR had permitted Hensel Phelps to begin construction on the project. After the trial court issued a writ of mandate commanding CDCR to set aside its contract with Hensel Phelps, West Coast requested that CDCR stop work on the project under the contract with Hensel Phelps. Apparently unhappy with CDCR's response, West Coast filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order to prevent CDCR from permitting Hensel Phelps to continue to work on the project.
The trial court held a hearing on West Coast's ex parte application for a temporary restraining order on October 6, 2015. The trial court granted West Coast's request for a temporary restraining order and set a hearing on December 11, 2015 with respect to West Coast's request for a permanent injunction.
On October 8, 2015, CDCR filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's order granting West Coast's application for a temporary restraining order.
On December 11, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on West Coast's request for a permanent injunction prohibiting Hensel Phelps from continuing to work on the project. Upon the conclusion of the December 11, 2015 hearing, the court granted West Coast's request for a permanent injunction.
The trial court also held a trial on West Coast's cause of action for promissory estoppel. The court concluded that West Coast was entitled to $250,000 on its promissory estoppel claim.
Thereafter, the trial court entered judgment in the matter, which includes the terms of the permanent injunction issued by the trial court upon the conclusion of the December 11, 2015 hearing.
A copy of the trial court's judgment, which includes the terms of the permanent injunction issued by the court on December 11, 2015, is included in the Respondent's Appendix on appeal. CDCR did not object to the inclusion of this document in the record.
III.
DISCUSSION
CDCR seeks review of the trial court's order granting West Coast a temporary restraining order to prevent CDCR from continuing to allow Hensel Phelps to work on the project, pursuant to a contract that the trial court had determined was void. A temporary restraining order, as an interim provisional order granting injunctive relief, is immediately appealable under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6). (See In re Marriage of Nicholas (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1576.)
However, subsequent events in the trial court have rendered CDCR's current appeal moot. Specifically, after CDCR filed its notice of appeal with respect to this matter, the trial court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the CDCR from permitting Hensel Phelps to continue work pursuant to the voided contract. It is well understood that a "TRO . . . terminates automatically when a permanent injunction is issued or denied." (Landmark Holding Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 525, 529.) Thus, the granting of a permanent injunction in this case terminated the temporary restraining order, thereby mooting any appeal from the order granting the temporary restraining order. (See, e.g., O'Kane v. Irvine (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 207, 210, fn. 4 ["[A]ppeal from the TRO, following the trial court's grant of the three-year restraining order, is moot"]; See also People v. Gordon (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 711, 725.) We therefore dismiss CDCR's appeal from the court's temporary restraining order.
CDCR will have an opportunity to challenge the propriety of the permanent injunction pursuant to an appeal from the judgment in this action. --------
IV.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
AARON, J. WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, Acting P. J. NARES, J.