W. Alameda v. County Comm

5 Citing cases

  1. Western Land Co. v. Truskolaski

    88 Nev. 200 (Nev. 1972)   Cited 10 times

    Although commercialization has increased in the vicinity of the subdivision, such activity has not rendered the restrictive covenants unenforceable because they are still of real and substantial value to those homeowners living within the subdivision. West Alameda Heights H. Ass'n. v. Board of Co. Com'm., 458 P.2d 253 (Colo. 1969); Burden v. Lobdell, supra; Hogue v. Dreeszen, 73 N.W.2d 159 (Neb. 1955). The appellant asks this court to reverse the judgment of the district court and declare as a matter of law that the objects and purposes for which the restrictive covenants were originally imposed have been thwarted, and that it is now inequitable to enforce such restrictions against the entity that originally created them.

  2. Banning Lewis Ranch Co. v. City of Colo. Springs (In re Banning Lewis Ranch Co.)

    532 B.R. 335 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2015)   Cited 8 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Evaluating restraint on alienation under Colorado law

    In the absence of a showing that the Annexation Agreement and other Agreements no longer provide a benefit to the City and the other Annexors, the Agreements cannot be set aside. West Alameda Heights Homeowners Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs of Jefferson County, 169 Colo. 491, 458 P.2d 253, 256 (1969) (“[Changed circumstances] will not warrant the lifting of restrictive covenants affecting property within the subdivision if the covenants are still a benefit to the owners of the property under the restrictions.”). Here, all the evidence before the Court supports a conclusion that the Agreements provide a benefit to the City (particularly the City's existing residents, the stated beneficiaries of the Annexation Agreement's requirement that development costs be borne by the Annexors) and the other Annexors.

  3. C & A Invs. v. Jiangson Duke, LLC

    No. 79881 (Nev. Oct. 11, 2022)

    W. Land Co. v. Truskolaski, 88 Nev. 200, 205, 495 P.2d 624, 627 (1972) (quoting W. Alameda Heights Homeowners Ass'n v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 458 P.2d 253, 256 (Colo. 1969)); see also Gladstone, 95 Nev. at 479, 596 P.2d at 494 (holding that an increased monetary value without the restriction did not justify invalidating the restriction based on changed conditions). C & A alternatively argues that the REOA does not restrict gaming.

  4. Camelback Del Este Home-Owners Ass'n v. Warner

    156 Ariz. 21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 11 times
    Concluding that "unless otherwise provided for in the restrictions themselves, any amendment to restrictive covenants must apply to every lot"

    The other tiers of lots might fall like ten pins, once the encroachment of commerce and business was begun.See also West Alameda Heights Homeowners Association v. Board of County Commission, 169 Colo. 491, 458 P.2d 253 (1969); Finley v. Batsel, 67 N.M. 125, 353 P.2d 350 (1960); Cliberti v. Angilletta, 61 Misc.2d 13, 304 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1969). In the matter before us, it is undisputed that East Camelback Road has undergone tremendous expansion and increased use over the past thirty years.

  5. Exchange National Rank v. City of Des Plaines

    32 Ill. App. 3d 722 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975)   Cited 13 times

    • 8 The single-family use restriction should only be invalidated if it no longer serves the function for which it was intended. As stated in West Almeda Heights Home Owners Association v. Board of County Commissioners (1969), 169 Col. 491, 498, 458 P.2d 253, 256: "Normal growth and change and the possibility of encroachment of commercial uses, we can infer, were contemplated when the covenants and the master plan of development were created by the original owner and platter.