Opinion
753 C.D. 2018
01-06-2025
Vamsidhar R. Vurimindi, Appellant v. Prothonotary of Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Diana Anhalt, City of Philadelphia, Clerk of Court of Philadelphia County, Joseph Evers, Martha Neifield, Office of District Attorney, Paula Patrick, Wendy Pew, Philadelphia Municipal Court, Karen Simmons and Sheila A. Woods-Skipper
OPINION NOT REPORTED
Submitted: August 9, 2024
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM
Vamsidhar R. Vurimindi (Appellant) appeals from the May 15, 2018, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court). The trial court dismissed with prejudice Appellant's complaint filing suit against multiple defendants. Upon review, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In February 2014, after a bench trial, the Honorable Diana Anhalt found Appellant guilty of stalking and disorderly conduct regarding his condominium neighbors in Philadelphia; Appellant served a five-year prison sentence for those offenses. Original Record (O.R.) at 3244. Also in February 2014, a default judgment was entered against Appellant for failure to pay his condominium association fees since January 2012. Id. In March 2015, the trial court awarded damages to the condominium association and allowed it to sell the unit in order to satisfy the judgment. Id. at 3244-45. Appellant's condominium was ultimately sold at a sheriff's sale. Id. at 3245. His unsuccessful appeals of the trial court's disposition ended in July 2018 when our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal. Id.
Original Record (O.R.) references are to electronic pagination.
On January 13, 2016, Appellant filed an original complaint naming as defendants the trial court prothonotary, the trial court administrator, the trial court itself, the criminal division of Philadelphia's municipal court, an unnamed municipal court criminal arbitrator, the municipal court criminal trial commissioners, seven individual trial court judges, the Philadelphia District Attorney's office, former District Attorney Seth Williams, the assistant district attorney who prosecuted Appellant's criminal case, the City of Philadelphia (City), the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Office of Attorney General for Pennsylvania, former Attorney General of Pennsylvania Kathleen Kane (AG Kane), the court reporter who transcribed Appellant's criminal trial in February 2014, and other "unknown persons." O.R. at 3245-47.
Appellant originally filed his suit in this Court, docketed with the number 16 M.D. 2016. We transferred the case to the trial court on February 24, 2016.
Appellant asserted multiple claims concerning his criminal prosecution, incarceration in a Philadelphia corrections facility, and various civil judgments against him, including those related to the sheriff's sale of his condominium. O.R. at 737-808. His claims sounded in federal civil rights and state law torts and asserted that various defendants failed to properly investigate the accusations that led to his criminal prosecution and convictions, selectively prosecuted him, fabricated accusations and evidence against him, subjected him to illegal surveillance, deprived him of his rights to a speedy jury trial, retaliated against him, perjured themselves, failed to "docket" evidence he provided for in camera review, failed to provide adequate conditions and medical care while he was incarcerated, and tampered with the transcripts from his criminal trial. Id.
During a case management telephone call on August 9, 2016, Appellant requested that the matter be placed in deferred status due to his incarceration. O.R. at 3246. That was done administratively, but on August 12, 2016, the matter was removed from deferred status with instructions that a motion to defer would be required for future deferrals. Id. On August 15, 2016, the trial court denied Appellant's motion requesting that the trial court serve his complaint on the named defendants. Id.
Also on August 15, 2016, the trial court granted preliminary objections and dismissed Appellant's initial complaint, with prejudice, against the trial court and municipal criminal court, trial court prothonotary and administrator, and seven individual judges (judicial defendants). O.R. at 376. The trial court concluded, inter alia, that Appellant's claims against these defendants were barred by sovereign immunity, judicial immunity, and quasi-judicial immunity. Id.
On February 2, 2017, Appellant filed an amended complaint largely reiterating his original allegations. O.R. at 697-808. On June 1, 2017, the trial court granted preliminary objections and dismissed, with prejudice, Appellant's amended complaint against the Philadelphia district attorney's office, the district attorney, and the assistant district attorney; the order did not specify a reason. Id. at 1782. On June 20, 2017, the trial court granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; the order did not specify a reason. Id. at 1939. On June 22, 2017, the trial court granted in part a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the City and the court reporter. Id. at 1940. The order explained that Appellant's state law-based claims against the City were dismissed on the basis of governmental immunity and his federal civil rights claim against the City pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983) were temporally limited to alleged violations that occurred prior to January 13, 2014, two years before he filed his original complaint. Id. Appellant's claims against the court reporter were permitted to proceed at that time. Id.
"Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for deprivations of federally protected rights caused by persons acting under color of State law." Robbins v. Cumberland Cnty. Child. & Youth Servs., 802 A.2d 1239, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Section 1983 causes of action have been described as "constitutional torts"; they are distinct from torts arising from state-based or common law. Davis v. City of Phila., 650 A.2d 1127, 1130 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).
On August 3, 2017, Appellant filed a motion to compel discovery from the prosecutorial defendants, the City, the court reporter, the Commonwealth, and the municipal criminal court trial commissioners and arbitrator. O.R. at 1954. The motion stated, inter alia, that Appellant had sought the names of 11 individuals from the City's correctional facility that he asserted were relevant to his claims: the warden, three security captains, three nurses, and four doctors, including the facility's medical director. Id. at 1956, 1962, 1981-84. On August 9, 2017, Judge Cohen of the trial court granted Appellant's motion to compel and set a September 4, 2017, discovery deadline. Id. at 2046-47.
On September 8, 2017, Appellant filed another motion to compel discovery from the City and the court reporter. O.R. at 2088. He asserted that he had received discovery responses from the City on August 12, 2017, but the responses were unsatisfactory to him. The City and court reporter had produced some discovery, but Appellant asserted that without all of the information he sought, he could not support his claims. Id. at 2099-2104. The City's and court reporter's discovery responses, attached to Appellant's motion, asserted that beyond what they had provided, Appellant's requests were overbroad and vague; were unreasonably oppressive, burdensome, and costly; were unlikely to lead to admissible evidence; or sought information regarding events prior to January 13, 2014, which was the timeframe set in the trial court's previous order. Id. at 2143-50. On September 29, 2017,Appellant filed another motion to compel discovery from the City and the court reporter, stating that he still had not received all of the information he sought. Id. at 2189-96.
On December 20, 2017, Judge Cohen of the trial court issued orders stating that the City and court reporter were to file discovery responses or an opposition to the order within 20 days. O.R. at 3019-20 & 3023. On January 8, 2018, the City and court reporter filed a motion for an extension to respond to Appellant's motions to compel. Id. at 3086. While that motion was pending, on January 26, 2018, Judge Kennedy of the trial court granted the City's and court reporter's motions for summary judgment and dismissed all of Appellant's remaining Section 1983 claims against the City and all claims against the court reporter, with prejudice. Id. at 3153. The order explained that Appellant failed to establish that the City's policies were unconstitutional or that a policymaker had been responsible for Appellant's alleged injuries and constitutional violations. Id. The order stated further that all claims against the court reporter were barred by the statute of limitations. Id.
Although the City and court reporter had been dismissed on summary judgment by Judge Kennedy's January 26, 2018, order, Judge Cohen, who had been addressing discovery matters in this litigation, issued a February 1, 2018, order granting the City's and court reporter's January 8, 2018, motion for an extension to respond to Appellant's motions to compel and setting a deadline for 21 days from the order's date. O.R. at 3162. Then, on March 26, 2018, Judge Cohen issued orders denying Appellant's motions to compel discovery from the City and court reporter as they were no longer parties to the litigation. Id. at 3226 & 3228-29.
On January 24, 2018, the trial court denied Appellant's November 2017 motion to join two additional defendants to his action, specifically Corizon, Inc., and MHM Correctional Services (MHM), which were prison healthcare providers under contract with the City. Id. at 3120. On March 26, 2018, the trial court denied Appellant's motion to compel discovery from Corizon and MHM on the basis that they were not parties to the litigation. Id. at 3227.
At that point, the trial had been scheduled for late April 2018. O.R. at 3249. However, on April 12, 2018, the trial court issued an order canceling the trial. Id. at 3233. The order stated that the only remaining defendants in the case were AG Kane, sued individually, and the municipal criminal court arbitrator and trial commissioners. Id. at 3233 & 3249. The order stated that those defendants had never been served with Appellant's original or amended complaints, gave him an additional 30 days to perfect service, and notified him that failure to do so would result in dismissal of the case with prejudice. Id. at 3233. The docket does not reflect that Appellant timely served the remaining defendants within 30 days; accordingly, on May 15, 2018, the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice. Id. at 3234.
Appellant timely appealed that order to this Court later in May 2018 and filed a statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b), Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). O.R. at 3235 & 3240. The trial court issued its corresponding opinion on August 20, 2018. Id. at 3244-70. In this Court, numerous stays and delays ensued for various reasons, including Appellant's detention for several years by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency. See Cmwlth. Ct. Docket. In early 2023, Appellant informed this Court that he had been released from federal custody. See Status Report, Jan. 21, 2023. In March 2023, this Court issued a briefing schedule. See Order, March 10, 2023. Briefing concluded in October 2023 and this matter is now ripe for disposition.
II. Discussion
Appellant raises 12 issues, which we have consolidated and reordered based on the following categories of defendants: the three individual unserved defendants who were dismissed when the entire case was dismissed by the trial court's May 15, 2018, order; the prosecutorial and judicial defendants and the court reporter; the Commonwealth and Office of Attorney General; the City; and Corizon and MHM, the City's contractors for medical care in its corrections facilities. These will be addressed in turn.
This Court's review of an order of the trial court sustaining a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Musewicz v. Cordaro, 925 A.2d 172, 174 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). In ruling on preliminary objections, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of material fact. Id. Our review of an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law or whether questions of material fact remain outstanding, such that the case should have gone to the jury. Tobias v. Halifax Twp., 28 A.3d 223, 226 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). The review of an order of the trial court granting summary judgment is limited to deciding whether the court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. Manley v. Fitzgerald, 997 A.2d 1235, 1238 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Summary judgment may be granted only when the record clearly shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
A. AG Kane, the Municipal Court Arbitrator, and the Municipal Court Trial Commissioners
Appellant asserted in his amended complaint that AG Kane failed to respond to his private criminal complaints against his neighbors and that the municipal court criminal division arbitrator and trial commissioners mishandled his criminal proceedings. See O.R. at 737-808.
In Fraisar v. Gillis, 892 A.2d 74 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), an inmate filed suit against Pennsylvania Department of Corrections personnel, prison personnel, and employees of the prison's contracted health care provider. Id. at 75. The plaintiff stated in the proof of service attached to his complaint that due to his incarceration, he was entrusting service of the complaint to the Northumberland County court clerk. Id. The trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction when the plaintiff was transferred to prison in another county, adding that it was not responsible for serving the plaintiff's complaint on the named defendants. Id. at 76. This Court affirmed, stating:
A court must remain neutral and cannot act as the attorney for pro se litigants or be responsible for bringing a litigant's suit into compliance with the rules of civil procedure. As the trial court in this matter aptly noted, the burden to comply with all procedural rules lies with the plaintiff who chose to initiate the suit, pro se. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court had no duty to effect service for Fraisar or to otherwise notify Fraisar that it would not effect service on his behalf.Id. at 76-77 (footnote omitted).
Here, the trial court docket shows that Appellant filed his initial complaint on March 29, 2016, and his amended complaint on February 2, 2017. O.R. at 43-119 & 697-808. Regarding AG Kane and the municipal criminal court arbitrator and trial commissioners, the docket reflects that on April 12, 2018, the trial court entered an order stating that they were the only remaining defendants after all other parties had been dismissed on pretrial motions, but they had never been served with either of Appellant's complaints. Id. at 27 & 3233. The order gave Appellant 30 additional days to serve them, or the case would be dismissed with prejudice. Id. The docket includes no indication that they were served either before or after that order, and as all defendants had been excused, the court dismissed the case with prejudice in a May 15, 2018, order, which led to this appeal. Id. at 28.
Appellant does not assert that he served his complaint on AG Kane and the municipal criminal court arbitrator and trial commissioners; rather, he argues that the trial court wrongfully refused to serve them on his behalf, which unfairly prejudiced him. Appellant's Amended Br. at 27-28. The trial court's opinion explained that it had no duty to effect service on Appellant's behalf. O.R. at 3266. It noted that it gave Appellant another 30 days to serve AG Kane and the municipal criminal court arbitrator and trial commissioners in April 2018 prior to dismissing the litigation and that he failed to do so. Id. at 3268-70. The trial court stated that Appellant's failure to properly serve these defendants precluded its jurisdiction over them and they were never parties to the case when it was dismissed in May 2018. Id.
The trial court is correct that it had no duty to serve Appellant's complaint on his behalf. As this Court explained in Fraisar, to do so would impact the court's neutrality and negate the tenet that pro se litigants are bound to comply with procedural rules on the same basis as counseled litigants. See 892 A.2d at 76-77. Regarding AG Kane and the municipal criminal court arbitrator and trial commissioners, the trial court's docket confirms that they were never served, even after Appellant was given an additional 30 days to do so in April 2018. Therefore, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over them prior to the case's May 2018 dismissal. The trial court did not err, and Appellant's claims in this regard are meritless.
B. Prosecutorial Defendants, Judicial Defendants, and Court Reporter
Appellant asserted in his amended complaint that the prosecutorial defendants and judicial defendants mishandled his criminal investigation, prosecution, pre-trial, and trial proceedings. See O.R. at 737-808. He also asserted that the court reporter tampered with the transcript of his February 2014 criminal trial. See id.
In Weaver v. Franklin County, 918 A.2d 194 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), an inmate sued for monetary damages, alleging that the county's prosecuting attorneys, trial court, and judicial personnel "committed acts of conspiracy, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and libel" in trying, convicting, and imprisoning him for sexual assault. Id. at 196. The trial court dismissed the case on the county's preliminary objections asserting immunity. Id. at 198-99. This Court affirmed on that basis, but also addressed the collateral nature of Weaver's claims:
Second, as a state tort claim, [Weaver's] conspiracy allegations attack the legality of his criminal conviction. However, a criminal conviction cannot be collaterally attacked in subsequent civil proceedings. Perez v. Bureau of Comm'ns, 854 A.2d 998 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004); Francis v. Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 746 A.2d 1193 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000).
Third, as [to] a federal civil rights claim, the Supreme Court rejected a similar claim in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 . . . (1994). In Heck, the defendant brought a Section 1983 action against state officials alleging they improperly investigated his crime and destroyed evidence. The [United States] Supreme Court rejected the defendant's constitutional claims, holding "civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments." Id. at 486 . . . . The Court further explained that where the basis for the constitutional claims would require proof of the invalidity of the underlying conviction, a civil rights action cannot be maintained unless the conviction or sentence was invalidated. Id. at 487 . . . .
Here, evidence on the present claims would require proof of a wrongful conviction. [Weaver's] criminal conviction, however, remains valid. Thus, [Weaver] cannot attempt to challenge his conviction through this action. Heck.Id. at 202 (emphasis added); see also Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (stating that courts must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would "necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated").
Relatedly, the appropriate mechanism for such claims is the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46, which is not within this Court's jurisdiction pursuant to Section 761(a)(1)(i) of the Judicial Code. Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 499 (Pa. 2016) (stating that "the PCRA is intended to be the exclusive means for individuals to collaterally attack their convictions"); 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i) (stating that the Commonwealth Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over post-conviction matters). In a recent decision concerning another appeal by Appellant, this Court adopted the trial court's opinion, which stated:
Claims that could be brought under the PCRA must be brought under the PCRA as no other statutory or common law remedy for the same purpose is intended to be available. See Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581, 586 (Pa. 1999). "Where, as here, a defendant's post-conviction claims are cognizable under the PCRA, the common law and statutory remedies now subsumed by the PCRA are not separately available to the defendant." Id. "A plaintiff may not use a civil action for declaratory judgment . . . to collaterally attack the legality of his criminal proceedings[.]" Keller v. Kinsley, 609 A.2d 567, 568 (Pa. Super. [] 1992.)
Here, the trial court properly dismissed Vurimindi's action as frivolous because this civil action is a collateral attack on the legality of his conviction and may only be raised by a PCRA petition. Vurimindi's civil complaint asserts that he was unjustly convicted. He asserts violations of his constitutional rights and common law claims, namely, seeking relief based upon after discovered video evidence, judicial misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct, and immigration issues that directly attack the legality of his conviction. Vurimindi's complaint fails to state a cognizable claim as he filed a civil action seeking to overturn his criminal conviction in the form of a declaratory judgment, an injunction, and a writ against the judges, prosecutors, and attorneys general from several states, of which claims that may only be raised in a PCRA petition. See Guarrasi v. Scott, 25 A.3d 394 (Pa. [Cmwlth.] 2011) (plaintiff's civil action failed to state a cognizable claim against past and present county judges and officials designated as open records officers as it was a collateral attack of the legality of his criminal proceedings); see also Keller . . . (a prisoner's civil action and in forma pauperis petition which contested his conviction upon false allegations and sought money damages was properly denied as the claims raised were a direct attack on his criminal conviction).
Accordingly, Vurimindi's civil complaint fails to state a valid cause of action as his claims must be asserted under the PCRA.Vurimindi v. Borowski (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 668 C.D. 2023, filed Sept. 10, 2024), slip op. at 3, 2024 WL 4132326, at **3-4 (unreported).
Pursuant to Commonwealth Court Internal Operating Procedure 414(a), 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a), unreported panel decisions of this Court, issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited for their persuasive value.
Here, as in that recent case, Appellant's amended complaint stated facts and alleged claims against the prosecutorial and judicial defendants and the court reporter concerning the investigation of his dispute with his neighbors and his subsequent arrest, trial, and convictions on charges of stalking and disorderly conduct. O.R. at 704-807. For example, Appellant's first count asserted that prosecutors failed to properly investigate the complaints filed by his neighbors against him, conspired with his neighbors to fabricate the charges against him, and selectively charged him because of his immigration status and past "legal activism" against Philadelphia's high public officials. O.R. at 739-40 & 758-59. His seventh count alleged that the judicial defendants deprived him of his right to a trial by jury by transferring his case to the Philadelphia municipal court's mediation/arbitration unit. Id. at 746-47. His 21st count asserted that he was asserting his rights and defending himself and that the judicial defendants retaliated by compelling him to undergo a psychological evaluation, which deprived him of his liberty interests. Id. at 768-69. His 26th count averred that the prosecutorial and judicial defendants violated multiple constitutional protections by trying him on the stalking and disorderly conduct charges when he was incompetent and unfit to stand trial. Id. at 776-77.
Appellant's claims sounded variously in federal civil rights violations and state law torts: due process, equal protection, criminal rights to a speedy trial, counsel, and a jury, governmental retaliation, selective prosecution, prosecutorial misconduct, evidence tampering, perjury, fraud, abuse of process, tampering with trial transcripts, civil conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, all of which Appellant combined to assert that the criminal prosecution against him was a "sham" and his convictions and sentence were unconstitutional. Id. at 737-807. Appellant's prayer for relief sought a declaratory judgment that his rights were violated and permanent injunctions barring the named defendants from further violations. Id. at 807-08. Although the amended complaint did not expressly seek money damages, each count included a request for judgment against the defendants "in an amount to be determined by the jury." Id. at 737-807.
The judicial defendants were dismissed with prejudice in August 2016 on preliminary objections on the basis of sovereign immunity, judicial immunity, and quasi-judicial immunity. O.R. at 376. The prosecutorial defendants were dismissed on preliminary objections with prejudice in June 2017 on an unspecified basis, but the trial court explained in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) opinion that these defendants were dismissed on the bases of prosecutorial and high public official immunity. Id. at 1782 & 3258-59. The court reporter was dismissed with prejudice on summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations because her actions in preparing the transcript of Appellant's criminal trial occurred in and around February 2014, more than two years before she was named in Appellant's amended complaint in January 2017. Id. at 3153 & 3263-65.
Although the trial court did not raise the jurisdictional propriety of Appellant's claims challenging his criminal conviction in the orders dismissing the prosecutorial and judicial defendants and the court reporter, it raised the issue as an alternative basis in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) opinion. It explained that Appellant improperly sought to use civil proceedings to relitigate nearly every aspect of the proceedings that led to his criminal convictions. O.R. at 3253. The trial court concluded that Appellant's "sought after relief would quite obviously implicate the constitutionality" of his underlying criminal convictions because Appellant's preferred outcome would require the trial court to state that in the course of Appellant's prosecution, convictions, and incarceration, his rights were violated. Id. at 3253-54. Because Appellant's criminal convictions had never been found wrongful or otherwise invalidated, the trial court opined that to the extent that Appellant's civil complaint attempted to relitigate those convictions, it had properly been dismissed. Id. at 3254.
Regarding Appellant's criminal convictions, the Superior Court dismissed his direct appeal from the judgment of sentence after his appeal rights were restored through the post-conviction process; our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal, thereby finalizing his convictions. See Commonwealth v. Vurimindi, 200 A.3d 1031 (Pa. Super. 2018), appeal denied, 217 A.3d 793 (Pa. 2019).
The trial court is correct, and to the extent this matter implicates the trial court's lack of jurisdiction to address PCRA claims in a civil proceeding, the trial court could raise that issue and apply it to this case sua sponte. Bisher v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, Inc., 265 A.3d 383, 400 (Pa. 2021) (stating that "[a] court's sua sponte ability to raise subject-matter defects on its own ensures that a court, at any time, can make certain that the courts are adjudicating only those classes of cases which the law allows us to hear"). Such claims fall within a "class of cases" outside of a civil trial court's adjudicative authority. See Vurimindi v. Borowski, slip op. at 3, 2024 WL 4132326, at **3-4.
Like the plaintiff in Weaver, Appellant seeks to use civil proceedings to attack the legality of his prior criminal convictions, which have not been overturned or otherwise invalidated. See 918 A.2d at 202. Whether his claims sound in federal constitutional rights or state tort law, the same principle applies: "civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments." Id. (quoting Heck) (additional quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in stating that Appellant's claims against the prosecutorial and judicial defendants were improperly before it. Those claims on appeal likewise are improperly before this Court. See Descardes, 136 A.3d at 499. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed the prosecutorial and judicial defendants, albeit on other grounds, and Appellant's claims regarding those defendants on appeal are meritless.
Appellant also claims that the trial court erred in converting his case from deferred to expedited status on August 12, 2016, shortly before it dismissed the judicial defendants on preliminary objections on August 15, 2016. Appellant's Amended Br. at 27-28 & 59. He asserts that this did not give him enough time to serve his complaint on the judicial defendants, who asserted lack of service in their preliminary objections as one basis for dismissal. Id. However, as this discussion concludes, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over Appellant's PCRA-oriented claims and lack of service was not the basis for the trial court's dismissal of the judicial defendants, who participated in the litigation until their dismissal. Moreover, the trial court's conversion of the case to expedited status did not prejudice Appellant as to any other defendants because the August 12, 2016, order advised litigants that any party could seek to return the matter to deferred status by filing a motion. O.R. at 5. The docket shows that Appellant never filed such a motion, and the trial court ultimately granted Appellant multiple extensions as the litigation progressed. Id. at 10, 14 & 17. Therefore, Appellant's claims in this regard are meritless.
C. The Commonwealth and Office of Attorney General
"[T]he Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign immunity and official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity." 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310. Section 8522 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522, sets forth ten exceptions to sovereign immunity where the Commonwealth or its officers and agencies may be sued; for example, these include alleged harm occurs due to dangerous conditions on Commonwealth-controlled premises or roadways, vehicles or animals within Commonwealth control, or actions of the Pennsylvania National Guard. See id.
Sovereign immunity extends to state agencies to the extent that they are "arms of the state." Flagg v. Int'l Union, Sec., Police, Fire Pros. of Am., Local 506, 146 A.3d 300, 306-07 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (stating that the Eleventh Amendmentto the United States Constitution "bars federal lawsuits against states and their agencies unless sovereign immunity has been expressly waived"); see also Goldman v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 57 A.3d 1154, 1173-79 (Pa. 2012) (stating that sovereign immunity "does not extend to suits prosecuted against a municipal corporation or other governmental entity which is not an arm of the state"). The Office of Attorney General is an agency of the Commonwealth and clearly an arm of the state. Synthes USA HQ, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 289 A.3d 846, 859 (Pa. 2023) (stating that "the Pennsylvania Constitution designates the Attorney General as the 'chief law officer' for the Commonwealth as a whole, accountable directly to the Pennsylvania voters, and independent of the Governor and the Commonwealth agencies. Pa. Const. art. IV, § 4.1.").
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
State sovereign immunity defenses are not applicable to Section 1983 claims, which are based on federal constitutional protections. Watkins v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 196 A.3d 272, 274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). However, as a matter of statutory law, "neither a [s]tate nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under [Section] 1983." Flagg, 146 A.3d at 305; see also Watkins, 196 A.3d at 275 (collecting cases and stating that "[a] state or state agency . . . is not a 'person' under Section 1983 and cannot be sued under Section 1983 for violation of federal constitutional rights").
Claims for declaratory judgment (as opposed to damages) are not per se barred by sovereign immunity, as long as the relief sought would prohibit some state action. See Swift v. Dep't of Transp., 937 A.2d 1162, 1169 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). However, a claim for declaratory relief must relate to and arise from the case being litigated and may not serve only as a "legal predicate for a damages or other immunity-barred claim in [the] same action." Id. If the substantive claim is barred by sovereign immunity, then the derivative claim for declaratory relief is also invalid. Id. (holding that the plaintiff's "demand for declaratory relief must fall along with the claim it serves to support . . ." because the defendant agency was immune from the related claim); Stackhouse v. Pa. State Police, 892 A.2d 54, 63 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (holding that claim for declaratory relief is unavailable when related claim against state entity is barred by immunity).
Appellant's amended complaint named as defendants the Commonwealth and the Office of Attorney General (Commonwealth defendants).O.R. at 699. Appellant alleged that the Commonwealth defendants violated his federal civil rights and committed torts against him by "neglecting to respond to [his] private criminal complaints" against his condominium neighbors and the prosecutorial defendants for perjury, conspiracy, harassment, stalking, ethnic intimidation, and illegal eavesdropping. Id. at 803-04. He also asserted that these defendants were part of an overarching civil conspiracy against him. Id. at 806.He sought a declaration that these defendants violated his federal civil rights and committed state law-based civil conspiracy against him, and injunctive relief directing these defendants to cease depriving him of his federal civil rights and conspiring against him. Id. at 808.
AG Kane was also named in this part of Appellant's amended complaint. Individual "state officers may be subject to Section 1983 liability for damages in their personal capacities even when the conduct in question relates to their official duties." Flagg, 146 A.3d at 305. However, as discussed above, AG Kane was never served with Appellant's amended complaint and, as such, was never made a party to this litigation. This discussion addresses only the Commonwealth and the Office of Attorney General.
Appellant also alleged that the Commonwealth defendants failed to establish policies and procedures to ensure that his rights would not be violated during the course of his prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment. O.R. at 804. As discussed above, these claims implicated Appellant's underlying criminal convictions and were not properly before the trial court. See Guarrasi, 25 A.3d at 402; Weaver, 918 A.2d at 202.
The Commonwealth defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting sovereign immunity and averring that they were not "persons" for purposes of Appellant's Section 1983 claims. O.R. at 1429-45. The motion stated that it was brought on behalf of the Commonwealth itself, including the Office of Attorney General as a state agency and arm of the Commonwealth. Id. at 1431. On June 20, 2017, the trial court issued an order granting the Commonwealth defendants' motion in its entirety and without limitation and dismissing Appellant's claims against both defendants with prejudice. Id. at 1939.
Appellant argues on appeal that the Commonwealth defendants should not have been dismissed from the case on the basis of sovereign immunity because that defense was not intended to shield Commonwealth officials against declaratory judgment actions for constitutional and statutory rights violations or for failure to perform ministerial duties. Appellant's Amended Br. at 28-29 & 45.
The trial court concluded that the Commonwealth defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity from all of Appellant's state law-based claims. O.R. at 3259-60. The trial court added that the Commonwealth defendants were also not subject to Appellant's Section 1983 claims, as they are not "persons" amenable to suit under that statute. Id. at 3260. We agree.
First, to the extent that Appellant seeks a declaration from this Court that the Commonwealth violated Appellant's rights and a directive from this Court that the Commonwealth defendants refrain from conspiring against him and depriving him of his civil rights, his request for relief is not per se improper because it would not compel these defendants to perform an affirmative action. Id. However, a declaratory action must stand on its own and cannot serve only as a "legal predicate for a damages or other immunity-barred claim" in the same action. Swift, 937 A.2d at 1169.
Although Appellant now relies upon his demands for declaratory and injunctive relief in order to sidestep the Commonwealth defendants' assertions of sovereign immunity with regard to his state law-based claims, he asserted in the amended complaint that he "suffered damages" and demanded judgment "in an amount to be determined by the jury[.]" O.R. at 804-07. Thus, the declaratory judgment action was merely a predicate for an immunity-barred damages claim. See Swift, 937 A.2d at 1169. Also, none of the actions alleged against the
Commonwealth defendants, such as the Office of Attorney General's alleged refusal to pursue Appellant's private criminal complaints against his former neighbors, fall within the exceptions to sovereign immunity enumerated in Section 8522 of the Judicial Code, so sovereign immunity was never waived here. See Flagg, 146 A.3d at 306-07.
Moreover, Appellant's federal Section 1983 claims against the Commonwealth and the Office of Attorney General also fail because neither is a "person" subject to prosecution under that statute. Flagg, 146 A.3d at 305; see also Watkins, 196 A.3d at 275. Accordingly, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in granting the Commonwealth defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing them from this matter with prejudice, and Appellant's claims in this regard are meritless.
D. City of Philadelphia
Unlike the Commonwealth and its agencies, local governments may be subject to Section 1983 claims. Greenwich Twp. v. Murtagh, 659 A.2d 1083, 1086 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). This section will first address Appellant's Section 1983 claims against the City with regard to the statute of limitations and then will address the interplay of the trial court's summary judgment and discovery orders concerning those claims.
In his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and brief to this Court, Appellant did not challenge the trial court's dismissal of his state law-based tort and negligence claims against the City, which concerned his care and treatment while in City custody. See O.R. at 3240-43. Accordingly, any such claims were waived. See Fouse v. Saratoga Partners, L.P., 204 A.3d 1028, 1034 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (reaffirming the "well-settled, bright-line rule" that "issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived"); Ward v. Potteiger, 142 A.3d 139, 143 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (restating tenet that "where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority, or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived"). Even if Appellant had preserved these state law-based claims for appeal, the trial court's June 22, 2017, order granting the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings correctly dismissed them. O.R. at 1940. It is clear on the face of Appellant's complaint that his state law-based claims regarding the care and treatment he received while in City custody did not fit within any of the enumerated exceptions to local governmental immunity, which the City claimed as a defense in its motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1641-42; see Gore v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 537 A.2d 913, 914-16 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (granting summary judgment because facts did not support application of real property exception to governmental immunity).
1. Section 1983 Claims Against the City: Statute of Limitations
For Section 1983 claims, the statute of limitations is the same as for personal injury tort claims, which, in Pennsylvania, is two years from the date the cause of action arose. Burger v. Borough of Ingram, 697 A.2d 1037, 1041 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). When a continuing or ongoing tort is alleged, the plaintiff must show that the alleged tortious behavior constituted a genuinely cumulative pattern of conduct rather than one or more discrete acts. See Barra v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 858 A.2d 206, 213 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).
Appellant's primary allegations against the City appeared in his amended complaint at Counts 31-34. O.R. at 784-89. He asserted that the City and its corrections personnel knowingly or with deliberate indifference allowed him to be assaulted and then failed to give him adequate medical care related to several incidents during the time he was in City custody from October 2013 through May 2014. Id.
In May 2017, the City filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings asserting that Appellant's claims against it were barred by the statute of limitations because they pertained to events that occurred more than two years before Appellant filed his original complaint. O.R. at 1638-43. On June 22, 2017, the trial court granted the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings in part, specifically excluding any Section 1983 claims by Appellant based on facts prior to January 13, 2014, or two years before Appellant filed his original complaint naming the City as a defendant. O.R. at 1940.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in limiting his Section 1983 claims against the City to facts occurring after January 13, 2014. Appellant's Amended Br. at 48-49. He avers that he alleged a continuing conspiracy by the City's jail personnel to fail to protect him from assault while he was in jail and then to fail to provide him adequate medical care for his injuries and that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until after the commission of the last act of the conspiracy. Id. He maintains that the most serious assault occurred in October 2013 and that the trial court's ruling allows the City to evade liability for its wrongdoing in that regard. Id.
The trial court stated in its opinion that Appellant's Section 1983 claims were subject to a two-year limitations period. O.R. at 3260-61. We agree. For purposes of the statute of limitations, Appellant's allegations against the City did not state facts supporting either an ongoing conspiracy or continuing violations. Instead, he asserted various discrete and individual actions, most of which occurred more than two years before he filed his complaint. In the statute of limitations context, allegations of "discrete" actions that do not amount to a consistent continuing pattern of conduct are not sufficient to preserve otherwise time-barred claims. See Barra, 858 A.2d at 213.
Accordingly, the trial court was within its discretion to conclude that Appellant's Section 1983 claims were subject to the two-year limitations period for allegations sounding in torts. Accordingly, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in limiting Appellant's claims to facts asserted as of January 2014, two years prior to when Appellant filed his complaint, and Appellant's claim is meritless.
2. Section 1983 Claims Against the City: Summary Judgment and Discovery Orders
Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court has described the requirements for Section 1983 municipal liability as follows:
Under section 1983, local governments are considered "persons" who may be directly liable when a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by a local government or municipality causes an employee, acting under the color of law, to violate another's constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep[']t of Soc[.] Serv[s.] of City of N[.]Y[.], 436 U.S. 658 . . . (1978). A local government may also be held liable when a "custom" of the governing body causes a constitutional deprivation even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decision making channels. Id.
A local government cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Id. Instead, it is when the execution of a local government's policy, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the local government as an entity is responsible under section 1983. Id.
Since Monell was decided, the United States Supreme Court has developed further the contours of municipal liability under section 1983. In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 . . . (1986), the Supreme Court in
addressing when a municipality is responsible for its actions, opined that not every decision by an officer of a local government automatically subjects the municipality to section 1983 liability. The Pembaur court stated that:
Municipal liability attaches only where the decision-maker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered. The fact that a particular official-even a policymaking official-has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion[.] The official must also be responsible for establishing final government policy respecting such activity before the municipality can be held liable. Authority to make municipal policy may be granted directly by a legislative enactment or may be delegated by an official who possesses such authority, and of course, whether an official had final policymaking authority is a question of state law[.] We hold that municipal liability under [Section] 1983 attaches where-and only where-a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.Id. at 481-83 . . . (citations and footnotes omitted). Greenwich Twp., 659 A.2d at 1086-87.
Section 1983 claims may be addressed within the context of a motion for summary judgment. Schnupp v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty., 710 A.2d 1235, 1237 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). The procedural rules apply as in any other summary judgment matter:
[A]ny party may move for summary judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law (1) whenever there is no genuine issue of material fact that could be established by additional discovery or expert report, or, (2) whenever there is insufficient evidence to permit a jury to find a fact essential to the cause of action or defense.Id. at 1237 (citing Rule 1025.2 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1025.2). A plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment solely on the basis of conclusory allegations made in the complaint but must present some factual basis to support his position. Delate v. Kolle, 667 A.2d 1218, 1221 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). To that end, the trial court must give the parties a "reasonable time to complete discovery" before ruling on a motion for summary judgment, but the parties must also show that "the information sought was material to their case and that they proceeded with due diligence" in seeking it. Reeves v. Middletown Athletic Ass'n, 866 A.2d 1115, 1124 (Pa. Super. 2004).
In Anthony Biddle Contractors, Inc. v. Preet Allied American Street, LP, 28 A.3d 916 (Pa. Super. 2011), the plaintiff filed a motion to extend the discovery deadline because it had not received discovery from two newly joined defendants. Id. at 920. The trial court denied the motion and subsequently granted summary judgment for the defendants on the basis that the plaintiff had not factually supported its claims. Id. at 921. On appeal, the Superior Court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion because its denial of the plaintiff's motion "stripped [the plaintiff] of the means to acquire such evidence" as necessary to defend against the motion for summary judgment and led directly to the demise of the plaintiff's case. Id. at 926. The Superior Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court for proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. at 929.
Here, Appellant's Section 1983 allegations against the City are at Counts 31-34 of his January 2017 amended complaint. O.R. at 784-89. Omitting from this analysis Appellant's time-barred allegations based on events that occurred prior to January 13, 2014, he asserted that while in City custody on February 10, 2014, he was assaulted by another inmate and sustained multiple injuries. O.R. at 730. He alleged that at least one guard witnessed the incident but did not intervene and that the City correctional authorities took no action against the inmate who assaulted him. Id. at 730-31. He alleged that he was refused timely and suitable medical and dental care by the facility's staff during his time in City custody. Id. at 730. He also alleged that in another instance, he was knowingly subjected to medication that rendered him unfit for trial, which violated his constitutional rights. Id. at 731. In addition to suing the City, Appellant also named as defendants multiple "unknown persons" who were responsible for the injuries and harms he alleged. Id. at 784-89.
On August 3, 2017, Appellant filed a motion to compel discovery from the City and other defendants. O.R. at 1954. He asserted that he sent the City discovery requests in February 2017. Id. at 1956. These included a request for the names of 11 individuals from the City's correctional facility that he asserted were relevant to his claims against the City asserting inadequate confinement conditions: the warden, three security captains, three nurses, and four doctors, including the facility's medical director. Id. at 1956, 1962, 1981-84. He asserted that he did not receive adequate discovery responses from the City and was forced to file the motion to compel. Id. at 1957. On August 9, 2017, Judge Cohen of the trial court granted Appellant's motion to compel and set a September 4, 2017, discovery deadline. Id. at 2046-47.
On September 8, 2017, Appellant filed another motion to compel discovery from the City and court reporter. O.R. at 2088. He asserted that he had received discovery responses from the City on August 12, 2017, but that the responses were incomplete and that without the information he sought, he could not support his claims. Id. at 2099-2104. The City's discovery responses, attached to Appellant's motion, asserted that beyond what they had provided, Appellant's requests were overbroad and vague; unreasonably oppressive, burdensome, and costly; unlikely to lead to admissible evidence; or sought information regarding events prior to January 13, 2014, which was the timeframe set in the trial court's previous order. Id. at 2143-50. On September 29, 2017, Appellant filed another motion to compel discovery from the City and the court reporter, stating that he still had not received all of the information he sought. Id. at 2189-96.
Meanwhile, the City filed a motion for summary judgment in November 2017, asserting that Appellant failed to meet his Section 1983 burden because he failed to assert or provide evidence of a specific policy or practice that led to the harm he asserted or a specific policymaker responsible for the harm he asserted. O.R. at 2557-65.
On December 20, 2017, Judge Cohen of the trial court issued orders stating that the City and court reporter were to file discovery responses or an opposition to the order by January 9, 2018. O.R. at 3019-20 & 3023. On January 8, 2018, the City filed a motion for an extension of time to respond to Appellant's motions to compel. Id. at 3086. While that motion was pending, on January 26, 2018, Judge Kennedy of the trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of Appellant's non-time-barred Section 1983 claims against the City with prejudice. Id. at 3153. The order granting summary judgment explained that Appellant "failed to produce sufficient evidence to maintain his Section 1983 claims against the City and that the record to date "is devoid of evidence of an unconstitutional municipal policy" or that a policymaker had been involved in Appellant's alleged constitutional violations. Id.
Although Judge Kennedy's January 26, 2018, order dismissed the City on summary judgment, Judge Cohen, who had been addressing discovery matters in this litigation, issued a February 1, 2018, order granting the City's January 8, 2018, motion for an extension to respond to Appellant's motions to compel and setting a February 22, 2018, deadline for the City to comply with Appellant's discovery requests or respond to his motions to compel. O.R. at 3162. Then, on March 26, 2018, Judge Cohen issued orders denying Appellant's motions to compel discovery from the City and court reporter as they were no longer parties to the litigation. Id. at 3226 & 3228-29.
On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court wrongly refused to compel discovery from the City and that the trial court rewarded what he deems the City's "abuse" of the discovery process. Appellant's Amended Br. at 24, 54 & 59-60. Specifically, Appellant alleges that the City delayed responding, then subjected him to a "document dump" consisting of "masses of irrelevant documents" but missing "critical documents" that he needed to support his claims and pursue this case. Id.
The trial court explained in its opinion that after Appellant filed his motions to compel discovery, the City requested an extension of time, which the trial court granted because Appellant had already received multiple extensions throughout the litigation. O.R. at 3267. The trial court acknowledged that by the time discovery responses were due from the City in February 2018, it had been dismissed from the case on summary judgment by a different judge the month before. Id. The trial court opined that once the City was no longer a party to the case as of January 26, 2018, it could not be compelled to produce discovery absent subpoenas, which Appellant had not secured by March 26, 2018, when the trial court issued orders denying Appellant's motions to compel discovery from the City and court reporter as they were no longer parties to the litigation. Id. As such, the trial court concluded that Appellant's discovery motions had properly been denied. Id.
The trial court's treatment of this issue ignores the fact that it had already granted Appellant's motion to compel discovery from the City on August 9, 2017 and subsequently had ordered the City to either provide Appellant the discovery he sought or respond to his motions to compel by February 22, 2018. The trial court's disposition on the summary judgment should have been held in abeyance until the discovery matters were concluded. If the resolution of those matters meant that the City established that its initial responses were sufficient and that Appellant's requests for more information were unreasonable or would not produce evidence that was admissible or relevant to Appellant's claims, then summary judgment would have been appropriate. If, however, the trial court concluded that Appellant's motions to compel were warranted, then the discovery process should have proceeded to a resolution, after which consideration of summary judgment would have been appropriate.
The trial court's actions regarding discovery precluded Appellant from obtaining the discovery he sought from the City in his first motion to compel, which had been granted and which he alleged was necessary to defend against summary judgment. He was then deprived of a ruling on his subsequent motions to compel that would have stated definitively whether he was entitled to have the additional discovery he sought from the City. The trial court here granted summary judgment on the basis that Appellant failed to produce evidence in support of his claims, but that disposition ignored the parallel process where Appellant had already succeeded on his initial motion to compel and the City had yet to comply or respond before it was dismissed by a summary judgment that terminated Appellant's cause of action against the City in its entirety. Moreover, the unresolved discovery matters here precluded Appellant from supporting the personal-capacity Section 1983 claims he raised in his (first) amended complaint against the individual "unknown persons" who acted on behalf of the City when he was in its custody.
This case is even more problematic than Anthony Biddle Contractors, where the trial court denied the plaintiff's discovery motions and then ruled against the plaintiff on summary judgment. Here, the trial court granted Appellant's motion to compel discovery from the City but then declined to enforce that holding prior to ruling against Appellant on the City's motion for summary judgment. As in Anthony Biddle Contractors, the trial court's actions here with regard to the discovery process constituted an abuse of discretion that tainted the subsequent grant of summary judgment to the City. As in that case, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment here and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We note, however, that this reversal is without prejudice, and this holding will not bar the City from refiling its motion for summary judgment once the trial court has ensured that the discovery process is complete.
E. Joinder of Corizon & MHM
Rule 2232(c) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure states:
At any stage of an action, the court may order the joinder of any additional person who could have joined or who
could have been joined in the action and may stay all proceedings until such person has been joined. The court in its discretion may proceed in the action although such person has not been made a party if jurisdiction over the person cannot be obtained and the person is not an indispensable party to the action.Pa.R.Civ.P. 2232(c).
Here, the record includes Appellant's November 6, 2017, motion to join Corizon and MHM, which were providers of physical and mental healthcare at the Philadelphia correctional facility where Appellant was in custody from October 2013 through May 2014. O.R. at 2524-28. He alleged that he did not learn of the existence and nature of the City's contractual relationship with Corizon and MHM until he received discovery responses from the City in August 2017, at which point he learned that Corizon and MHM were potential defendants with regard to his claims against the City because the actions and inactions of their personnel, acting on the City's behalf, led to his injuries. Id. at 2524 & 2527. The trial court's docket does not indicate that the City, Corizon, or MHM ever responded to Appellant's motion. Id. at 19-24. Then, on January 24, 2018, the trial court issued an order denying, without explanation, Appellant's motion to join Corizon and MHM. O.R. at 3120.
Appellant argues that his otherwise untimely motion to join Corizon and MHM was valid because he did not learn of the identity of Corizon and MHM until their names were disclosed in the City's August 2017 discovery responses. Appellant's Amended Br. at 46. He states that he could not have known this before learning it through discovery since the City's inmate handbook does not reveal that healthcare services are provided by outside for-profit entities and actively misleads inmates to believe that those services are provided solely by the City. Id. at 47.
The trial court did not directly address Appellant's assertion that the discovery rule excused his failure to name Corizon and MHM earlier. The trial court simply stated in its opinion that Appellant's November 2017 motion to join Corizon and MHM as defendants was based on alleged events that occurred in 2013 and 2014, more than two years before he filed his joinder motion, and accordingly, his motion was barred by the statute of limitations. O.R. at 3268.
As discussed above, the trial court properly limited Appellant's claims against the City to events occurring after January 13, 2014, two years before he filed his original complaint. As also discussed above, Appellant's claims seeking to collaterally relitigate his criminal conviction are also barred here. However, Appellant's motion to join Corizon and MHM includes allegations against those entities based on facts that occurred within the statute of limitations and that do not implicate his criminal conviction. Specifically, he asserted in his joinder motion that Corizon and MHM personnel provided him inadequate care after he was assaulted by another inmate while in City custody on February 10, 2014. Id. at 2526-27.
If deemed valid, Appellant's explanation that he could not reasonably have learned of the existence and involvement of Corizon and MHM until receiving the City's discovery responses in August 2017 would excuse Appellant's failure to previously name them in his amended complaint and rebut the trial court's conclusion that Appellant's claims against these entities were barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court's failure to address Appellant's discovery rule argument leaves this Court unable to conduct meaningful appellate review on this issue. Accordingly, the trial court's January 24, 2018, order denying Appellant's motion to join Corizon and MHM will be vacated. In association with the remand to address Appellant's discovery motions, as addressed above, the trial court is also directed to address the validity of Appellant's explanation for his otherwise untimely motion to join these two additional defendants.
III. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the trial court's May 15, 2018, order dismissing Appellant's amended complaint with prejudice is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part; this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Specifically, the trial court's May 15, 2018, order is reversed as to the trial court's January 26, 2018, order granting summary judgment in favor of the City. The trial court's May 15, 2018, order is vacated as to the trial court's January 24, 2018, order denying Appellant's motion to join Corizon and MHM. This case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion regarding those two issues. In all other respects, the trial court's May 15, 2018, order is affirmed.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 6th day of January, 2025, the May 15, 2018, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court), which dismissed with prejudice the amended complaint filed by Vamsidhar R. Vurimindi is REVERSED in part and VACATED in part. Specifically, the trial court's May 15, 2018, order is reversed as to the trial court's January 26, 2018, order granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Philadelphia. The trial court's May 15, 2018, order is vacated as to the trial court's January 24, 2018, order denying Appellant's motion to join Corizon, Inc. and MHM Correctional Services. This case is REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion regarding those two issues. In all other respects, the trial court's May 15, 2018, order is AFFIRMED.
Jurisdiction relinquished.