The trial court found a violation of the uniformity clause because N.J.S.A. 18A:54-37 granted a tax exemption to Bayonne based on the mere incidence of location, rather than on the use of its property. Applying the three-step special-legislation analysis of Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 300-01, 370 A.2d 825 (1977), the trial court also found the statute to be special legislation. On August 31, 1990, this Court Ordered HCBT to comply with the trial court judgment requiring a single 1990 tax rate among all Hudson County municipalities, but stayed that part of the judgment requiring HCBT to credit and debit the Hudson County municipalities for prior years' payments under the two-tier tax system.

Township of Mahwah v. Bergen County Bd. of Taxation, 98 N.J. 268, 285, 486 A.2d 818 (1985) (quoting Robson v. Rodriguez, 26 N.J. 517, 528, 141 A.2d 1 (1958)). In Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 370 A.2d 825 (1977), we used a three-part test for determining whether a statute is unconstitutional as special legislation. First, we considered the purpose of the enactment and subject matter with which the legislation is concerned.

The purpose behind the prohibition on special legislation rests on the notion that "'[o]ver the course of time, . . . the propensities of legislatures to indulge in favoritism through special legislation developed into a major abuse of governmental power. . . . [C]onstitutional prohibitions were enacted to limit the practice of enacting special legislation and to achieve greater universality and uniformity in the operation of statute law in respect to all persons.'" Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 298, 370 A.2d 825 (1977) (quoting 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1973) § 40.01). "From a constitutional standpoint, a law is regarded as special legislation 'when by force of an inherent limitation, it arbitrarily separates some persons, places or things from others upon which, but for such limitation, it would operate.

Certain clauses of the Constitution, such as the “ ‘great ordinances' are flexible pronouncements constantly evolving responsively to the felt needs of the times.” Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 304, 370 A. 2d 825 (1977). Fitting into that category are the “due process clause, the equal protection clause, [and] the free speech clause.”

The language speaks for itself, and where found in our State Constitution the language is the voice of the people. [ Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 302 (1977).] On the other hand, if the language of the constitutional provision is unclear or is susceptible to more than one interpretation, courts may consider sources beyond the instrument itself to ascertain its intent and purpose.

Where that reading reveals language that has a plain meaning, one derived from ordinary usage and understanding based on common experience, courts need not resort to extrinsic aids or look at outside sources. See Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 302, 370 A.2d 825 (1977). In such a case, "we inquire as to the meaning [that] the symbols of expression would most naturally and plainly convey the sense most obvious to the common understanding."

[ Vreelandv. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 302, 370 A.2d 825 (1977) (citations omitted).]

As made clear by both the plurality opinion of Justice Mountain and the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in Vreelandv. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292 (1977), the ineligibility clause in our State Constitution derives directly from a similar provision in the United States Constitution, namely, Article 1, section 6, clause 2, which was the result of a compromise. 72 N.J. at 306; id. at 315 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).

See Robson v. Rodriguez, 26 N.J. 517, 526 (1958) ("The test of whether a law constitutes special legislation is essentially the same as that which determines whether it affords equal protection of the laws."). As we stated more recently in Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 299 (1977): "The test, of course, is whether the classification is reasonable, not arbitrary, and can be said to rest upon some rational basis justifying the distinction." The propriety of exclusions must be examined utilizing the principles generally applicable to equal protection.

" Chevron, 9 N.J.Tax at 226. To determine whether a statute constitutes special legislation, the Supreme Court established a three part test in Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 370 A.2d 825 (1977). Brown v. Twp. of Old Bridge, 319 N.J.Super. 476, 725 A.2d 1154 (App.Div. 1999).