Opinion
Case No. 4:22-cv-04032-SLD-JEH
2022-11-03
James VRANA, Plaintiff, v. FEDEX FREIGHT, INC., Defendant.
Stephen T. Fieweger, Stephen T. Fieweger, P.C., Davenport, IA, for Plaintiff. Robert Ratton, III, Bridgett Lynn Stigger, Fedex Freight, Inc., Memphis, TN, Martin K. LaPointe, LaPointe Law PC, Northbrook, IL, for Defendant.
Stephen T. Fieweger, Stephen T. Fieweger, P.C., Davenport, IA, for Plaintiff. Robert Ratton, III, Bridgett Lynn Stigger, Fedex Freight, Inc., Memphis, TN, Martin K. LaPointe, LaPointe Law PC, Northbrook, IL, for Defendant.
ORDER
SARA DARROW, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendant FedEx Freight, Inc.'s motion for judgment on the pleadings, ECF No. 11. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff James Vrana alleges that he is a resident of Sherrard, Illinois; that he worked for Defendant from May 10, 2010 until July 30, 2019; and that Defendant discharged him on July 29, 2019 following a verbal altercation with another employee. Compl. 1, ECF No. 1. Meanwhile, "a similarly situated female employee" received a three-day suspension for misconduct following a "similar[ ]" verbal altercation in June 2019. Id. at 1-2.
Plaintiff filed a reverse sex discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Id. at 2. The EEOC subsequently issued a right to sue notice. Id. Plaintiff then filed this action on February 22, 2022. See id. at 1.
Although Plaintiff identifies no specific cause of action, the Court presumes that this is a Title VII reverse sex discrimination suit. See Compl. 2 (alleging that Plaintiff filed a reverse sex discrimination charge with the EEOC, sustained damages due to "acts of discrimination," and was "treat[ed] . . . differently" than a female employee). Plaintiff asserts that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction "pursuant 42 USC § 20009(e-1) [sic]," id., which does not seem to exist; presumably, he means to reference Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
Defendant filed its answer on March 23, 2022. See Answer 1, ECF No. 4. It admitted some allegations, denied others, and raised various affirmative defenses. See id. at 1-4. Defendant contemporaneously filed Plaintiff's March 25, 2010 application for employment with Defendant as an exhibit to its answer. See generally Answer Ex. A, ECF No. 5 ("Employment Application").
"[T]he Seventh Circuit has recognized that a defendant can attach exhibits to its answer as part of the pleadings." Pierson v. Blagojevich, No. 04 C 939, 2005 WL 1162964, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2005) (citing N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998)); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) ("A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.").
On October 5, 2022, Defendant filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Mot. J. Plead. 1. Plaintiff neither responded nor requested additional time to do so.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
A party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when there are no disputed issues of material fact and it is clear that the moving party . . . is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Unite Here Loc. 1 v. Hyatt Corp., 862 F.3d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 2017). For instance, "[a] district court may enter judgment on the pleadings if the pleadings show that the statute of limitations blocks the plaintiff's claims." Mohamed v. WestCare Ill., Inc., 786 F. App'x 60, 61 (7th Cir. 2019).
"Pleadings include the complaint, the answer, and any written instruments attached as exhibits," Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coyle Mech. Supply Inc., 983 F.3d 307, 312 (7th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted), though courts may also properly consider "documents incorporated by reference to the pleadings and . . . take judicial notice of matters of public record," Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. Flynn, 863 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted). "As with a motion to dismiss, the court views all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 983 F.3d at 313.
II. Analysis
Defendant argues that judgment on the pleadings is appropriate because this action is time-barred. Mot. J. Plead. 1, 2-4. Ordinarily, an Illinois Title VII plaintiff has 300 days to file his charge with the EEOC. See Speer v. Rand McNally & Co., 123 F.3d 658, 662 n.1 (7th Cir. 1997). However, Defendant points to Plaintiff's Employment Application, which contains a provision stating that
[t]o the extent the law allows an employee to bring legal action against [Defendant], [the applicant] agree[s] to bring any such complaint within the time prescribed by law or within six (6) months after the date of the event forming the basis of [his] claim or lawsuit, whichever expires first. [The applicant] waive[s] any statute of limitations to the contrary.Employment Application 7. Because Plaintiff filed his charge with the EEOC roughly eight months after his termination, see Charge of Discrimination, Mot. J. Plead. Ex. A, ECF No. 11-1 at 2 (indicating that the charge was filed on March 14, 2020), Defendant contends that this action is barred as the six-month limitations period is enforceable, see Mot. J. Plead. 2-4.
The Court may properly consider Plaintiff's EEOC charge on Defendant's motion. See United States v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1582 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he district court may take into consideration documents incorporated by reference to the pleadings."); Compl. 2 ("[P]laintiff has timely filed his charge of reverse sex discrimination with the EEOC . . . ."). Moreover, the Court need not accept Plaintiff's assertion that his EEOC charge was "timely filed," Compl. 2. See, e.g., Culp v. Flores, 454 F. Supp. 3d 764, 767 (N.D. Ill. 2020) ("As on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court on a Rule 12(c) motion assumes the truth of the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations, though not its legal conclusions.").
Plaintiff has filed no response, so the Court presumes that Defendant's motion is unopposed. See Civil LR 7.1(B)(2) ("If no response is timely filed, the presiding judge will presume there is no opposition to the motion and may rule without further notice to the parties."). Nevertheless, the Court will consider Defendant's arguments independently to satisfy itself that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Having done so, the Court concludes that judgment as a matter of law is appropriate. In Illinois, parties may contract to limit a limitations period so long as "such limitations clauses . . . [are] (1) knowingly and voluntarily accepted, (2) reasonable, and (3) not inconsistent with public policy." See Taylor v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188, 1203-04 (7th Cir. 1992) (footnotes omitted). Here, the Employment Application constitutes a valid contract to shorten the limitations period. See Ravenscraft v. BNP Media, Inc., No. 09 C 6617, 2010 WL 1541455, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2010) (finding a valid contract to restrict the limitations period existed where "[the] defendant agreed to consider [the] plaintiff for employment if [the] plaintiff, upon employment, agreed to abide by the company rules—including the agreement to shorten the limitations period"); cf. Chatman v. Pizza Hut, Inc., No. 12 C 10209, 2013 WL 2285804, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2013) ("[W]here an employer promises to consider an applicant for employment in exchange for the applicant's return promise to abide by company rules upon employment[,] . . . there is sufficient consideration to establish a valid, enforceable contract."). And Plaintiff does not dispute that he knowingly and voluntarily accepted it. Cf. Employment Application 7 (containing this provision and Plaintiff's name signed thereunder). A six-month limitations period is reasonable. See Lugihibl v. Fifth Third Bank, Case No. 13 C 7193, 2015 WL 1235221, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2015) (reaching this conclusion because "the default period to file an EEOC charge is exactly that-180 days"). And it is not contrary to public policy. See Taylor, 966 F.2d at 1206 ("Title VII provides no public policy contrary to the six-month limitation of actions clause.").
Thus, the Court agrees with Defendant that the six-month limitations clause is enforceable, and because Plaintiff filed his charge with the EEOC more than six months after his termination, his claim is untimely. See Lugihibl, 2015 WL 1235221, at *2; Ravenscraft, 2010 WL 1541455, at *5. The Court is unaware of any reason that judgment as a matter of law would be unwarranted, and Plaintiff, having not responded, has advanced no argument to that effect. See Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999) ("If [courts] are given plausible reasons for dismissing a complaint, they are not going to do the plaintiff's research and try to discover whether there might be something to say against the defendants' reasoning."). Seeing no reason that Plaintiff's action should survive this motion, the Court concludes that judgment on the pleadings in Defendant's favor is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendant FedEx Freight, Inc.'s motion for judgment on the pleadings, ECF No. 11, is GRANTED.