Summary
affirming the appellant's murder conviction but reversing and remanding for the state court to vacate the appellant's conviction for accessory after the fact to the murder “because a person convicted as a principal to a crime cannot also be convicted as an accessory after the fact to the same crime”
Summary of this case from Arrington v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.Opinion
No. 1D18-2018
11-08-2019
Paige VOWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Valarie Linnen, Jacksonville, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Benjamin L. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Valarie Linnen, Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Benjamin L. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Ray, C.J.
Paige Vowell appeals her judgments and sentences for first degree felony murder, two counts of kidnapping, and accessory after the fact to first degree murder. We affirm her judgments and sentences for murder and kidnapping without further discussion. But as properly conceded by the State, Vowell's conviction and sentence for accessory after the fact to murder must be vacated because a person convicted as a principal to a crime cannot also be convicted as an accessory after the fact to the same crime. See Donaldson v. State , 722 So. 2d 177, 184 (Fla. 1998) ("We have explicitly held that by legal definition, a person convicted as a principal to a crime cannot also be convicted as an accessory after the fact to the same crime, since these two offenses are mutually exclusive.") (citing Staten v. State , 519 So. 2d 622, 625 (Fla. 1988) ).
We therefore affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part with directions to vacate Vowell's judgment and sentence for accessory after the fact.
Bilbrey and Jay, JJ., concur.