Votrian v. Quick

8 Citing cases

  1. McNealy v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.

    193 N.E.2d 879 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963)   Cited 19 times

    No other instruction, given or refused, is abstracted. Under this condition, a court of review does not consider alleged errors in instructions. People v. Gawlick, 350 Ill. 359, 363, 183 N.E. 217; Votrian v. Quick, 271 Ill. App. 259, 263." In People v. Gawlick, supra, the court stated: "It is also argued that the court erred in instructing the jury.

  2. People v. Harrell

    180 N.E.2d 889 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962)   Cited 2 times

    No other instruction, given or refused, is abstracted. Under this condition, a court of review does not consider alleged errors in instructions. People v. Gawlick, 350 Ill. 359, 363; Votrian v. Quick, 271 Ill. App. 259, 263. [4] The defendants assert they were not properly notified to have their children in school, because the notice required by Sec 26.6 of the School Code was served by the County Superintendent instead of by a truant officer.

  3. Okai v. Roofing

    164 N.E.2d 237 (Ill. App. Ct. 1960)   Cited 5 times

    In that case the Court rightly pointed out that there may have been other instructions given which would have cured the errors assigned. Similar conclusions were set forth in Griggas v. Clauson, 6 Ill. App.2d 412, and in this Court in the case of Votrian v. Quick, 271 Ill. App. 259, 263. [5] From the record it appears that the verdict is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

  4. Chapman v. Baltimore O.R. Co.

    340 Ill. App. 475 (Ill. App. Ct. 1950)   Cited 28 times

    Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Laack, supra; Village of Carterville v. Cook, 129 Ill. 152; City of Joliet v. Shufeldt, 144 Ill. 403; Armour v. Golkowska, 202 Ill. 144; 45 C.J. Negligence, §§ 486 and 499; Restatement of the Law of Torts, § 439. Hence, the wrongful author of any efficient cause "is liable as though it were the sole cause." Votrian v. Quick, 271 Ill. App. 259, 263. The negligence is actionable if it is "a direct contributing cause" ( Storen v. City of Chicago, 373 Ill. 530, 533) or if it "contributes directly to producing" the harm.

  5. Jackson v. Thompson

    32 N.E.2d 997 (Ill. App. Ct. 1941)

    Certainly he was put upon notice that a dangerous situation existed, involving the safety of his passenger, but instead of staying close to the curbing, he attempted to pass around the Henninger parked car, which involved his getting out into what might be termed the danger zone of the street, where the Chevrolet was careening from one side to the other. The proximate cause of the injury was a question of fact for the jury, and they, under the evidence could very well have reached the conclusion that the negligent conduct of the taxi driver was one of the proximate causes of the injury to the plaintiff concurring with the negligence of the driver of the Chevrolet car, which in combination caused the injury complained of. Votrian v. Quick, 271 Ill. App. 259; Thomas v. Chicago Embossing Co., 307 Ill. 134. We do not believe that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

  6. Murphy v. Brichler

    27 N.E.2d 1003 (Ill. App. Ct. 1940)   Cited 7 times

    Objection is likewise taken to another instruction, which advised the jury if it found from the greater weight of the evidence that the defendant had been guilty of negligence charged in the complaint, and had failed to perform a continuous duty in the matter of keeping the cellarway and rear porch in a reasonably safe condition, then, although it might also believe that the negligence of some other person concurred or contributed toward the accident in question, still such negligence of such third persons could be disregarded in arriving at a verdict. While this court feels that such instruction, as well as other instructions which were submitted by the plaintiff below, could be improved as to form and clarity, still, under the law (and in view of the evidence presented herein), there was no reversible error in the giving of such instruction ( Paris v. East St. Louis Ry. Co., 275 Ill. App. 241, 251; Votrian v. Quick, 271 Ill. App. 259, 262, 263). Defendant also objects to the giving of the stock instruction on damages in the form which has been approved many times by courts of this State ( Wolczek v. Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois, 342 Ill. 482, 495, 496; Walsh v. Chicago Rys. Co., 303 Ill. 339). Defendant's contention is that there was no evidence that any "wages" were lost, and that the instruction is erroneous for that reason.

  7. Randall Dairy Co. v. Pevely Dairy Co.

    9 N.E.2d 657 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937)   Cited 3 times

    " In Votrian v. Quick, 271 Ill. App. 259, speaking through Mr. Presiding Justice Barry, we said: "Defendant insists that the court erred in refusing instructions defining proximate cause.

  8. Paris v. East St. Louis Railway Company

    275 Ill. App. 241 (Ill. App. Ct. 1934)   Cited 9 times
    In Paris v. East St. Louis Ry., 275 Ill.App. 241, the plaintiff was a passenger on a motorbus which stopped in the middle of the street for her to alight.

    uld not have happened in the absence of either, the negligence of both is the proximate cause of the accident and both are answerable. 22 R. C. L. 130. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against either or all of the responsible persons; 45 C. J. 924. . . . The mere fact that the injury would not have happened but for the negligence of a third party is not sufficient to exonerate the defendant; Sullivan v. Ohlhaver Co., 291 Ill. 359. Where an injury proceeds from two causes operating together, the party putting in motion one of them is liable as though it were the sole cause; Fisher v. C. R.I. P. Ry. Co., 290 Ill. 49. . . . If the occurrence of an intervening cause might reasonably have been anticipated, such intervening cause will not interrupt the connection between the original cause and the injury." ( Votrian v. Quick, 271 Ill. App. 259, 262.) Upon the evidence presented here, and under this declaration, the jury might conclude, within their province, that the conduct of defendant's bus driver was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, if they believed that it was an element without which plaintiff would not have been struck, even though negligence by another was necessary to be added to the conduct of the defendant, in order that the injury to plaintiff might result.