The defendants argue that, under Illinois law, where an allegedly defamatory statement does not mention the plaintiff by name, the plaintiff must plead extrinsic facts to demonstrate that third persons believed that the libelous statement referred to the plaintiff. Barry Harlem Corp. v. Kraff, 273 Ill. App.3d 388 (1995) ; Homerin v. Mid-Illinois Newspapers, 245 Ill. App.3d 402 (1993) ; Moore v. Streit, 181 Ill. App.3d 587, 597-98 (1989); Voris v. Street Smith Publications, 330 Ill. App. 409 (1947). We agree with the general proposition that, where a libelous article does not name the plaintiff, it should appear on the face of the complaint that persons other than the plaintiff and the defendant must have reasonably understood that the article was about the plaintiff and that the allegedly libelous expression related to her.

In Kulesza v. Chicago Daily News, Inc., 311 Ill. App. 117, 35 N.E.2d 517, it is said: (p 125) that the law is well settled that a motion to dismiss will be sustained if the words claimed to be libelous are not reasonably or fairly capable of the construction placed upon them by plaintiffs, and that it is for the court to decide whether the publication was reasonably capable of the meaning ascribed to it in the innuendo. The office of an innuendo is to deduce inferences from premises already stated, not to state the premises themselves. (Voris v. Street Smith Publications, 330 Ill. App. 409, 413, 71 N.E.2d 338.) What this alleged libelous letter says is that, a few nights previous, a girl, about 14 years of age, was riding in the back of a convertible, and was at that time half naked and twirling a hula hoop.

Error assigned, inter alia, was order, quoting record. Michael E. Stroup, for appellant. — A judgment entered jointly on a single bill to the same number and term against the maker and payee and assignor of a note, is merely voidable: Miller v. Glass Works, 172 Pa. 70; Hauer's App., 5 W. S. 473; Roemer v. Denig, 18 Pa. 482; Cyphert v. McClune, 22 Pa. 195; Littster v. Littster, 151 Pa. 474; Voris v. Smith, 13 S. R. 334; Lowber Williams App., 8 W. S. 387; Drexel's App., 6 Pa. 272; Breading v. Boggs, 20 Pa. 33; Miners Trust Co. v. Roseberry, 81 Pa. 309; Osterhout v. Briggs, 37 Pa. Super. 169. John McI. Smith, with him W. S. T. Hurlock, Jr., for appellee. — Where a note contains two separate confessions of judgment, one on the face, and one on the back thereof, and an attempt is made to enter a joint judgment against the maker and the payee-assignor (two separate individuals) to the same number and term, as on single bill filed, the judgment so entered is void: Oberlin v. Parry, 287 Pa. 224; Blatt Hardware Co. v. McCarthy, 54 Pa. Super. 463; Agricultural Trust Co. v. Brubaker Shaub, 73 Pa. Super. 468; Pasco Rural L. Co. v. Roland, 88 Pa. Super. 245.

"does not identify the plaintiff by name. Even if his likeness could be reasonably interpreted as being depicted in the cartoon, his complaint is fatally flawed for failing to allege that the readers of the publication reasonably understood the cartoon to refer to him."); Schaffer, 196 Ill.App.3d at 732 (rejecting a defamation per se claim where the allegedly defamatory statement "does not mention [the plaintiff] by name, cannot be injurious to him on its face [citation], and is not defamatory per se as to him [citation]. Extrinsic facts and circumstances must be pleaded to establish that the publication was defamatory to him (colloquium), and special damages must be alleged with particularity."); Moore v. Streit, 181 Ill.App.3d 587, 597-98 (1989) ("One of the requirements for matter to be considered defamatory per se is that it must be injurious on its face. [Citation.] A statement that does not name an individual is not injurious to that person on its face."); Voris v. Street & Smith Publications, 330 Ill.App. 409, 413 (1947) ("It is not enough to constitute libel that plaintiff knew that he was the subject of the article, or that defendants knew of whom they were writing. It should appear upon the face of the complaint that persons other than these must have reasonably understood that the article was written of and concerning the plaintiff, and that the so-called libelous expression related to him.").

The gist or sting of the article is that plaintiff was involved in a serious crime involving armed violence, which resulted in minor injuries to two store employees: "`The gravamen of an action for defamation is not the injury to plaintiff's feelings, but damage to his reputation in the eyes of other persons.' (33A Ill. L. Prac. Slander Libel ch. 2, sec. 11, at 23 (1970), citing Cowper v. Vannier (1959), 20 Ill. App.2d 499, 156 N.E.2d 761; Voris v. Street Smith Publications (1947), 330 Ill. App. 409, 71 N.E.2d 338.) `A statement is defamatory if it impeaches a person's integrity, virtue, human decency, respect for others, or reputation and thereby lowers that person in the estimation of the community or deters third parties from dealing with that person.' ( Newell v. Field Enterprises, Inc. (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 735, 741, 415 N.E.2d 434, 440.)" ( Berkos v. National Broadcasting Co. (1987), 161 Ill. App.3d 476, 485, 515 N.E.2d 668, 672-73.) We find The Pantagraph articles were substantially true.

• 2, 3 "The gravamen of an action for defamation is not the injury to plaintiff's feelings, but damage to his reputation in the eyes of other persons." (33A Ill. L. Prac. Slander Libel ch. 2, sec. 11, at 23 (1970), citing Cowper v. Vannier (1959), 20 Ill. App.2d 499, 156 N.E.2d 761; Voris v. Street Smith Publications (1947), 330 Ill. App. 409, 71 N.E.2d 338.) "A statement is defamatory if it impeaches a person's integrity, virtue, human decency, respect for others, or reputation and thereby lowers that person in the estimation of the community or deters third parties from dealing with that person." ( Newell v. Field Enterprises, Inc. (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 735, 741, 415 N.E.2d 434, 440.)

The law does not recognize a cause of action for defamation by resorting to innuendo alone. ( Voris v. Street and Smith Publications (1947), 330 Ill. App. 409, 413, 71 N.E.2d 338.) Rather, the function of innuendo is to explain a matter already expressed, but not to change the sense of the words used. Life Printing Publishing Co. v. Field (1944), 324 Ill. App. 254, 262, 58 N.E.2d 307, appeal denied (1945), 388 Ill. 613; W. Prosser and W. Keeton, Torts sec. 111, at 782 (5th ed. 1984). • 9 In place of well-pleaded "extrinsic facts," the second amended complaint is a litany of self-serving characterizations and constructions of the words spoken of and concerning the bank.

• 5 For a complaint to be sufficient to allege publication of a libelous article when it does not name the plaintiff, it must appear on the face of the complaint that a third person reading the article must have reasonably understood that the article was written of and concerning the plaintiff and that it referred to him. ( Algozino v. Welch Fruit Products Co. (1951), 345 Ill. App. 135, 143; Voris v. Street Smith Pub. (1947), 330 Ill. App. 409, 413; Duvivier v. French, 104 F. 278, 281 (CCA7-1900).) Here plaintiff has failed to allege those facts by which a reasonable man might infer that a third party reading the news items might understand it to refer to the plaintiff.

Lundstrom v. Winnebago Newspapers, Inc., 27 Ill. App.2d 128, 169 N.E.2d 369; LaGrange Press v. Citizen Pub. Co., 252 Ill. App. 482. It also has been held that an averment of fact extrinsic to the words used in an article, and essential to an identification of the article with the person complaining, cannot be embodied in an innuendo. Voris v. Street Smith Publications, 330 Ill. App. 409, 71 N.E.2d 338. No matter by which of these standards the article in question is judged, it is not prima facie libelous. It merely states that on this one occasion, in a saloon at 458 E. 61st Street, a woman performed what is commonly known as a strip-tease act. At the worst there is an implication (because of the price charged for beer) that such acts may have been presented with some regularity.

In the instant case it is possible that the party to whom the letter was addressed might have understood it to refer to James, but there is no substantial evidence in the record to this effect. In the case of Voris v. Street and Smith Publications, 330 Ill. App. 409, this court held that where an alleged libelous publication does not name the plaintiff it must be alleged and proved that persons other than the plaintiff and defendant reasonably understood that the libel related to plaintiff before he can recover. In the absence of this proof the verdict should have been directed for the defendants on this charge.