"Provocation instigates or initiates the acts resulting in harm." VonBehren v. Bradley, 266 Ill. App. 3d 446, 450, 640 N.E.2d 664, 667 (1994). "Provocation is defined as an act or process of provoking, stimulation or incitement."

Plaintiff alleged that she grabbed the dog's collar to prevent further attacks or attempted attacks on the children when she was injured. We find that this allegation is akin to self-defense and, specifically, akin to the self-defense that was found in Steichman v. Hurst, 2 Ill. App. 3d 415, 418-19 (1971), and later recognized in VonBehren v. Bradley, 266 Ill. App. 3d 446, 450-51 (1994). In Steichman, the victim was delivering mail to the defendant's home when the defendant's dog came after her. Steichman, 2 Ill. App. 3d at 418.

We find defendants' attempt to equate provocation with negligence unavailing. Indeed, in VonBehren v. Bradley, 266 Ill. App. 3d 446, 449 (1994), the Fourth District rejected the claim that "provocation [under the Animal Control Act] is the equivalent of contributory negligence," explaining: "Each presents a separate origin of causation and is denned differently.

But this analysis overlooks the fact that contributory negligence and provocation are distinct defenses. VonBehren v. Bradley, 266 Ill. App.3d 446, 449-450; 640 N.E.2d 664 (1994). While contributory negligence eliminates a plaintiff's claim because public policy demands that a plaintiff reasonably act to protect his own safety, provocation eliminates a dog owner's duty to prevent the dog from doing damage.

See Wade, 249 Ill. App.3d at 589, 618 N.E.2d at 1320. In VonBehren v. Bradley, 266 Ill. App.3d 446, 640 N.E.2d 664 (1994), the two-year-old plaintiff pulled the dog's tail and ears and hit the dog several times in order to get a bird out of its mouth. The dog bit the plaintiff in the face.

Defendant also argued that parent-child immunity does not apply to preclude its third-party contribution claim against Justin's mother, Candy. During a jury instruction conference held in this case during trial, this court stated that the law is clear that any contributory negligence based on the acts or omissions of Justin's mother would relate only to the parents' claim and cannot be imputed to the child, citing VonBehren v. Bradley, 640 N.E.2d 664, 667 (Ill.App.Ct. 1994), and Rahn v. Beurskens, 213 N.E.2d 301, 305 (Ill.App.Ct. 1966). This court's proposed instructions, therefore, did not include an instruction that the damages awarded to Justin could be reduced based upon the percentage of fault attributed to his mother, Candy. It is this court's recollection that Defendant did not make a specific objection regarding the lack of such an instruction.

In Siewerth v. Charleston, 89 Ill.App.2d 64, 68 (1967), the court found sufficient provocation under the Act where two young boys pushed and kicked a dog that was recovering from an injury. See also VonBehren v. Bradley, 266 Ill.App.3d 446, 450 (1994) (holding that child's action in striking the dog and attempting to remove a bird from the dog's mouth was provocation as a matter of law).

See Severson v. Ring, 244 Ill.App.3d 453, 457-58 (1993) ("[W]e note that greeting or petting a dog does not generally constitute provocation."). In Siewerth v. Charleston, the court found sufficient provocation under the Act where two young boys pushed and kicked a dog that was recovering from an injury. Siewerth v. Charleston, 89 Ill.App.2d 64, 68 (1967); see also VonBehren v. Bradley, 266 Ill.App.3d 446, 450 (1994) (holding that child's action in striking the dog and attempting to remove a bird from the dog's mouth was provocation as a matter of law).