In order to construe the in personam jurisdictional framework prescribed in Maine's long-arm statute in a way that fulfills the Legislature's express intention that jurisdiction over nonresident defendants should be as extensive as the United States Constitution allows, 14 M.R.S. § 704–A(1) (2016), we have held that the statute creates a three-part test. Cavers v. Houston McLane Co., 2008 ME 164, ¶¶ 18–19, 958 A.2d 905 ; Von Schack v. Von Schack, 2006 ME 30, ¶ 9, 893 A.2d 1004. The plaintiff—i.e., the party asserting that the court has in personam jurisdiction—must demonstrate that (1) Maine has a legitimate interest in the subject matter of the litigation, and (2) the defendant, as a result of his conduct, reasonably could have anticipated litigation in Maine. Cavers, 2008 ME 164, ¶¶ 18–19, 958 A.2d 905. If the plaintiff establishes these elements, the defendant must then demonstrate that (3) the exercise of jurisdiction by Maine's courts does not comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
In Maine, we have applied similar principles to establish that a trial court having personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff spouse but not over the defendant may enter a judgment dissolving the marriage but leaving "all property, spousal support, and parental issues to be litigated in a jurisdiction that might have personal jurisdiction over both the parties." Von Schack v. Von Schack , 2006 ME 30, ¶¶ 4, 25, 893 A.2d 1004 (quotation marks omitted). [¶15] Because the discrete portions of a divorce action are divisible and therefore the jurisdictional foundation of each claim may vary, to determine whether the court erred in extending comity to the Swedish judgment in its entirety, we would have to determine—for each element of its judgment—whether the Swedish court was of competent jurisdiction to act.
. . ." Von Schack v. Von Schack, 893 A.2d 1004, 1011 (Me. 2006). The court did so notwithstanding a Maine statute, similar to D.C. Code § 16-910, that provides that "[i]n a proceeding for a divorce, . . . the court shall . . . divide the marital property in proportions the court considers just after considering all relevant factors."
Surely that language encompasses a family whose well-being is best served by severing its legal relationship. See Von Schack v. Von Schack, 893 A.2d 1004, 1011 (Me. 2006) ("Maine has a unique interest in assuring that its citizens are not compelled to remain in such personal relationships against their wills * * *."). Void or Voidable Marriages
And given this conclusion, the Court declines to address the arguments and counterarguments made by the parties regarding whether Section 903-E is unconstitutional. See, McGee 2006 ME 30, ¶ 42 (Clifford, J. concurring). 2. Adequacy of the Secretary's Investigation on Remand